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ABSTRACT
The problem investigated in this thesis concerns the part 
played by systems of economic, status and political stratification in 
processes of political change. It is demonstrated that two major 
variables required in explanation are (l) the nature of actors1 
perceptions of power structures in the society; (2 ) the differential 
capacities for political organization in different strata. The 
cases for study are the East African kingdoms of Buganda and Rwanda 
during the period, ending in 1962, when they were subject to colonial 
overrule.
In parts I and II, I analyze the processes of change in structures of 
power in the two kingdoms along the three dimensions indicated. These 
processes were themselves the product of interplay between those 
taking place in the precolonial kingdoms and those introduced by the 
colonial powers. The kingdom governments retained some ’traditional* 
forms, with changed functions. Their offices were virtually monopolized 
by the most powerful economic classes and elite status groups - *elite 
classes* - in each case. In the later colonial period, the legitimacy 
of the existing political systems was threatened as the colonial powers 
allowed parties to be formed which exploited structural conflicts of 
interest;
In part III, I examine how the ’elite classes* attempted to deal 
with the potential challenge to their political domination. In each 
case they tried to mobilize the whole kingdom in structural opposition 
to outsiders, and to articulate unity through intensified use of disting­
uishing cultural forms, in a ’neotraditional* cultural strategy. I 
examine the internal structural context of success in organizing the 
Baganda as a political group,and contrast it with the context of failure 
in Rwanda. Explanation takes the form of examining whether pre­
requisites of political group organization could be fulfilled by 
neotraditional forms in the context of processes of structural change 
analyzed in parts I and II.
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A fundamental prcTblem in sociology, defined by the 'classical' soc­
iologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is the explanation 
of the inter-relations of systems of stratification in a society, as a means 
to provide models of institutional change (Davies, 1970, chapter l). Weber 
provided the most satisfactory basic classification of systems of stratifi­
cation (cf .Runciman, 1968), by analyzing the processes in which distinct 
types of strata arose as persons sharing a common 'situation' in relation 
to persons in other 'situations' in the same institutional order* (l) The 
economic processes of production and exchange distribute unequally among roles 
"the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods and skills 
for the sake of income in a given economic order" ("Weber, 1970,p. 18l), thus 
creating 'class situations'* The term 'class' refers only to an economic 
category of roles or persons, although it might provide a basis for group 
organization. (2) The cultural processes of differential evaluation of roles 
create 'status situations', occupied by what Weber called 'status groups' 
although he pointed out that sometimes these are more like 'categories' than 
'groups' (ibid,p.186; cf. Frahkenberg, 1965,p. 18). (3) Both economic and 
cultural processes give rise to types of power, but power itself is formally 
regulated by a distinct order of institutions in the "house of power" (Weber 
1970,p.194), or politics. Each political institution, including the forms 
which preceded the state,
"is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported 
by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) 
violence..It is understood that, in reality, obedience is 
determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope- fear 
of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power - holder*; 
hope for reward in this world or in the beyond - and besides 
all this, by interests of the most varied sort" (ibid, pp.78-79)
However, we should note that it is not only the institutions which are form­
ally political in a particular society that are involved in political pro­
cesses (Cohen, 1969a). Institutions ostensibly concerned with other matters 
notably kinship and religion, have often been intimately involved in politi­
cal processes, in an 'informal'way. Informal as well as formal means will 
affect the "structure of domination". Political stratification arises from 
the power, or lack of it, to dispose of the means of administration in a 
society for the purpose of carrying out policy; this is what parties compete 
for (ibid,p. 195) Often there is a dominant stratum monopolizing the means 
of administration and maintaining itself in power "chiefly by virtue of being an 
organized minority confronting the unorganized majority"(Bottomore, 1964, 
p.42). As with status strata, a minimum degree of corporateness is inplied 
among the members of a dominant political stratum but its solidarity as against 
the sectional interests of its members can only be deteimined empirically.
The validity of Weber's three dimensions - of class, status and power - lias
recently been "conceptually and empirically" reaffirmed by Runciman (1968),
and Davies points out that while
"it should be noted that many sociologists have gone some 
way beyond Weber..and have classified ranks by education, 
religion, race, income, occupation, political affiliation, 
sex, age, and other characteristics..all of these can be 
shown to be in some measure indicators of status "(ibid, p. 47)
within a particular community. Stratification will be analysed within
these three dimensions here.
The term 'political change1, which has no clearly defined and accepted 
definition (Gould, 1970,p.42l), will refer here to change in the forms and 
functions of the means of administration in a society, for maintenance and 
change of such forms and functions is the object of political competition 
and conflict.
At the most abstract level, then, the problem for study in this thesis 
is how such forms and functions of the means of administration are related 
to the systems of stratification in a society; and, more particularly, how 
do changes in either of these variables affect the other? Weber himself 
investigated two major processes in this field, at a high level of abstraction, 
- the formation of parties 011 the basis of economic and status strata, and 
the effect on stratification systems of the administrative staff pursuing 
their sectoral 'rationalizing' interests. At a more empirical level, a 
major focus of study in recent British social anthropology is relevant.
Particularly under the influence of Professor Gluckman and his associates 
this focus has been on the use of traditional cultural or 'symbolic' forms 
(see below)in processes of political and economic change, and the effect 
of the latter processes on traditional forms. The classic statement of 
this interest is in Gluckman (1948), and a recent systematic presentation is 
found in Gohen (1969b). In the main, such studies have concentrated on show­
ing how, in the process of differentiation out from precommercial 'tribal' 
society of an economic institutional order (cf. Gluckman, 1965,p*68. Fallers, 
1967) ~ notably in the urban situation (cf. Gluckman, I960; Mitchell, 1966; 
Epstein, 1958) -, and in the process of radical change in the legal-political 
order - notably in the encapsulation of tribal and other traditional com­
munities within modem state organizations (cf.Gohen, 1969a; Bailey, 1960,1963) 
-, there occur changes in the kind of status groups od? categories to which 
persons belong and on the basis of which political groups are foimed. The 
argument is that a new political or economic category of persons and groups 
of various kinds which shares a common situation in structurally-generated 
conflicts ( I use Lloyd's definition (l968,p.30) rather than Gluckman's (l965 
p.xxii)) will tend to develop common cultural f 01ms which symbolize its solid­
9arity and help it to organize as a political group. This involves cultural 
processes of the development of new symbolic forms and a change of function 
for old forms which are retained. Two polar processes have been particularly 
studied in Africa: ' d et r ibalizat ion * and 'retribalization' (Mercier, 1965; 
Cohen, 1969a) The former refers to the 'emergence of economic classes and 
occupational status groups as the hasis for political groups. This has been 
qualified hy studies of 'retribalization', which point out that where the 
'tribal' status group also constitutes an economic organization (cf.Cohen, 
1969a) and where it is competing for "particularistic" advantages in the new 
state (cf. Gulliver, 1970), there may be a new emphasis on the traditional 
symbolic forms.
Studies of 'retribalization' have shown how the process arises out of
new and more intensive contact and interaction between ethnic status groups
and categories, but they have given relatively little attention totfeRsfcfun-
ctions in regard to the internal power structures of such groups, beyond
showing that certain prerequisites of political group organization can be
fulfilled in this way (see chapter ?)• I suggest that this aspect is equally
important in 'retribalization': as Gulliver points out:
"Symbols of whatever kind though 'merely representational' 
of more concrete interests, have an autonomy and a force 
of their own. People can become so affected by them that 
they will even act against their own interests in further­
ance of the symbols. Leaders, who may have a more or less 
conscious perception of the economic and political interests 
involved, use these symbols not only in an expressive, 
emotive manner, but to gain the support of followers who 
may not at all see clearly what the interests are* Leaders' 
interests may in any case differ from those of followers.."
(ibid,pp.33-34)
It is on this neglected aspect of 'retribalization' that I intend to concen­
trate. The most satisfactory material for its study is provided where the 
'traditional' group displays a relatively high degree of role different­
iation and stratification beyond the 'universals' of age, sex and personal 
characteristics (cf. Sahlins 1958,p*l*) In East Africa these conditions are 
best fulfilled by the larger kingdom organizations.
'Retribalization' has been seen as a cultural strategy in the organizat­
ion of political groups in particular structural circumstances. Besides 
examining more closely the internal power structures of the 'retribalizing' 
group, I wish to test this hypothesis by demonstrating its explanatory value 
in a case where 'retribalization' was not successful as well as in a case 
where it was. Moreover, it will be shown that the reasons for failure lay 
with the internal rather than the exrtemal structural context. Finally, I
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intend to isolate the crucial variables which account for the differences 
between the two cases*
In order to avoid the implication that I am referring only to those 
structural situations already examined in studies of 'retribalization', and 
to focus attention on the claim to 'traditional* authority ( I am writing here 
of a claim, and not referring to Weber's typolgy of authority), I refer to 
this type of cultural strategy as 'neotraditionalism1. By this I mean the 
tise of old symbols for new functions. I include, as an aspect of this 
definition, their use In a new structural context. I specifically do not 
mean the use of new symbols for what are held to be traditional functions - 
as, for example, where writers attempt to explain sociocultural change as the 
expression in 'modem' terms of structures morphologically analogous to 
'traditional' structures (e.g. Lloyd, 1965,p.108). While my usage is in 
some respects similar to Apter's (l961,pp,27»195)» it differs (l) in recog­
nising that neotraditionalism might take more than one form in any particular 
case, and be used by both sides in a conflict; and (2) in referring only to a 
cultural process, i.e. not to structural characteristics. In the case of 
Buganda, for example, writers have often used the term 'neotraditionalist' 
only for the most uncompromising opponents of British overrule through the 
Baganda chiefs (Apter, 1961; Low, 1962) - and this tends to discount the sig­
nificant uses made of traditional symbols of authority by the chiefs and the 
British.
By a 'symbol* I mean any element of 'culture', or 'ritual' in Leach's 
definition (l964»p*10ff), which can be isolated analytically or empirically.
The sociological significance of symbolism and ritual is fundamental; Turner's 
comment, that it "actually creates, or re-creates, the categories through 
which men perceive reality - the axioms underlying the structure of society 
and the laws of the natural and moral orders"(l968), need not be restricted 
to the particularly systematic and highly charged form of which he was waiting. 
Ritual in "everyday reality" legitimates particular forms of social order by 
linking them with cosmic order (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). These statements, 
however, while useful as definitions are only a starting point for the analy­
sis of empirical social processes. Statements about the place of cultural 
factors in determining political and economic structures can only be gener­
alized and speculative unless we can also demonstrate the place of structural 
factors in determining cultural form. For some social anthropologists this 
involves reduction to the'natural' structures investigated by ecology, biology 
and psychology; but I refer to structures of institutionalized social regions,
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while avoiding reduct ionism by examining such structures historically as 
dialectical and diachronic processes.
This thesis, then, investigates the symbolic organization of political 
p-nri economic inequality in the two East African kingdoms of Rwanda and Buganda 
during a period of rapid social change. A brief introductory description of 
the two kingdoms will be appropriate here. It is not intended to be more 
than a location of the two kingdoms in broad geographical and historical terms.
The country of Rwanda, independent since 1962, is located in eastern 
central Africa and has an area of about 10,000 sq. miles. It borders on 
the Gongo-Kinshasa, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi. With the latter it formed 
the colony of Ruanda-Urundi under German (1900-1916) and Belgian (1916-1962) 
overrule. The Belgians held Ruanda-Urnndi in mandate from the League of 
Rations and the United Nations* Topographically, Ruanda is distinguished 
as a highland country which is broken up by deep river valleys into its 
characteristic hill-features. The population totalled 2,452,757 in 1957, 
and was divided into three caste-like groups! Tutsi (l6.6$)i Hutu (82.7$)i 
Twa (0 .7$) The latter did not play any significant role in the stratification 
systems or in political change in our period, living as isolated hunters and 
gatherers in the northern forests or being employed as jesters and police 
agents by political officials. They are largely excluded from the analysis 
in this thesis. Until the revolution of 1959-61, Tutsi had been politically 
and militarily the dominant caste. Ideologically, and to a considerable 
extent in practice, they possessed a distinct life-style characterised by a 
monopoly of political administration and cattle past oral ism. Crop culti­
vation and the rearing of other animals was carried out by Hutu, Except for 
the production, from the 1930s, of a small amount of coffee under Belgian 
compulsion, and the growth of a tiny sector of commercial cattle goods, pro­
duction was devoted almost wholly to subsistence. Cash incomes were sporad­
ically acquired by labour migration. There was virtuahlly no industrial sector/' 
and very few European commercial enterprises. The largest town, Kigali, had 
a population of only 4,000 in 1957, when Kampala in Buganda had a population 
of approximately 60,000, Hutu paid tribute in labour and goods directly and 
indirectly to the Tutsi during the precolonial period, and to a variable extent 
during the colonial period. All political officials were Tutsi until the 
1950s, and in 1959 only 2$ of chiefs were Hutu. Clientship was a pervasive 
informal political institution, in which Tutsi sought advancement and the 
Hutu sought security of their lives and property usufruct. The monarchy of 
the mwami was of the patrimonial type described by Weber. It was abolished 
by a referendum of 1961 under U.N. supervision.
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The kingdom of Buganda made up the Buganda province of the Protectorate 
of Uganda, in eastern Africa, which was formed in 1894 and became an inde­
pendent state in 1962. In the process of the British establishing over­
rule in the 1890s, Buganda acquired an enlarged area mainly at the expense 
of its northern neighbour, the kingdom of Bunyoro, In 1962, the area of 
Buganda was 17,295 sq. miles. It occupied the northwestern shore of Lake 
Victoria from the River Nile, its eastern boundary, to the Tanzanian border, 
and extended inland to the southern tip of Lake Albert and the western shore 
of Lake ICyoga. It was bounded by the Ugandan kingdoms of Ankole and Toro 
in the west, Bunyoro in the north and/vBusoga in the east. In 1959, the 
African population of Buganda was 1,834,128, of whom 1,006,101 were members 
of the Baganda tribe as established by membership of one of the approximately 
fifty recognised clans. Norms of political and status stratification were 
not closed, as in Rwanda, by descent and endogamy. Private property in land,
under the "mailo" system, was introduced in 1900, Commercialization of
crop production (mainly cotton and, later, coffee) and development of urban 
industry and commerce took place early, rapidly and on a large scale by com­
parison with Rwanda. The precolonial monarchy of the kabaka was of the 
patrimonial type, Like that in Rwanda it was used by the colonial power, 
after some 'rationalization', in a form of indirect rule. Definition of its 
position in the Protectorate and in any future independent Ugandan government 
were major issues in the politics of Uganda in the decade before Independence.
The monarchy retained much of its power and authority into the period of
Independence.
I reinterpret much of the available evidence on the kinds of structural 
change which took place during the period in which both were subject to colonial 
rule. Study of the processes of structural change shows that ritual behaviour 
is not simply the expression of political and economic structures, but plays 
an active part in determining the form they take. Particular symbolic systems 
legitimate particular power structures and may be superceded as the latter ~ ■- - 
change, and they may hold up change. On the other hand, the existing symbolic 
forms may acquire new functions in terms of the power structures which they 
legitimate. But while the particular forms of symbolism which have potency 
in a society are not simply determined by its power structures, neither is 
their use arbitrary.
The symbolism used in the organization of social order must provide a 
'blueprint* (cf.Gohen, 1969a) through whidipotentially conflicting groups and 
categories of persons can articulate and justify their cooperation (Bvans- 
Pritchard & Nortes, 1940). In particular, it must justify inequality of power,
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ensuring the authority of the super ordinate. The dominant group or groups 
in a society constantly seek: legitimation of their power by symbolic means 
in oider to organize their own members, minimize the need to use military 
violence, and to maintain continuity of social order. This is a continuous 
process as internal and external conditions change; but in periods of rapid 
change such as occurred in East Africa under colonial rule, in the first half 
of the twentieth century, it can be seen most clearly*- Buganda and Rwanda 
provide particularly good cases for the study of ths process, and comparison 
of the effectiveness of a neotraditional cultural strategy under different 
conditions, (l) Both kingdoms were formally subjected to colonial rule in the 
same period, from about 1900 to 1962. (2) Both were in the immediate pre­
colonial period expanding state organizations of approximately.the same scale 
and complexity. (3) Tu both cases there were, at the end of the colonial 
period, dominant but informally-organized political groups which attempted to 
prevent the economic, status and political mobility of other groups and 
categories, which appeared imminent, bs?- appeal to neotraditional symbols which 
upheld- both their dominance and the solidarity of the widest group. (4) While 
the dominant group in Buganda retained its position into the first years of 
Independence, that in Rwanda was overthrown in a social revolution of the last 
years of colonial rule. It is possible, then, to examine in cases of both 
success and failure the cultural strategy of neotraditionalism adopted by the 
dominant political groups in the two kingdoms as a means of dealing with prob­
lems of political organization in their different structural situations. It 
will be shown that the most satisfactory explanation of the forms of political 
change which occurred requires analysis of the 'feedback' between symbolic 
processes and political and economic processes.
Where I can &iicu>that it is appropriate, I refer to the dominant political 
groups in the two kingdoms as 'elite classes'. I have borrowed thfe term 
from Fallers, (see chapter six), but I use it in a different way (see chapter 
6). I find it useful for expressing the idea of an economic class, which is 
an analytical category, whose constituent persons have considerable awareness 
of their mutual, diffuse and often exclusive interest because they also con­
stitute a status group - in this case, the elite status group. Other pos­
sible names and definitions would not only be less precise, but would be con­
fusing because of a failure to distinguish the 'objective* and 'structural' 
aspects of stratification from the 'subjective' and 'cultural* aspects. For 
example, a definition of the ruling class' such as that given by Lloyd (l965.p.78) 
says too much and too little; it refers to
"the whole group from which the political elite..(the actual
officeholders (ibid, p. 64). * are dr awn., members of which do not
carry out political duties".
It is saying too much to assume that the category from which the political
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elite is drawn is a group, defined by mutual recognition of rights and duties, 
and too little to assume that if such a category is not a group then it 
might not in some sense worthy of investigation be a 'ruling class1.. I suggest 
that whether officeholders are recruited from a single economic class, and 
whether they form a group, is a matter for investigation and not definition 
(cf.Southall, 1966,p.347).
Although my main purpose in this thesis is to examine the functions of 
neotraditional cultural strategies in respect of the internal power structures 
of Buganda and Rwanda, analysis of the structural contexts in which the 
strategies were adopted cannot be made simply by drawing up a model of 'the 
social structure' in each kingdom "as if it were in a state of equilibrium" 
(Gluckman, 1965,p.279) for the time at j*.which political parties began to be 
organized to challenge the existing power structures. For such a model by 
definition holds 'in balance' and thereby obscures the internal processes lead­
ing to change (Barth, 1967; Lloyd, 1968p.27), which are precisely those I wish 
to analyse. If structural models may be constructed which show the 
integrative functions of social institutions (including the accomodation of 
variations and exceptions, as in the case study method) it is no less legiti­
mate to construct structural models which show the main processes of change 
taking place within a society, These are necessarily historical models of 
structural processes, which are unlikely empirically to be well-integrated 
since conflict and contradiction are major sources of change, and not synchronic 
models of a structure in which integration must be an assumption (or a 'pluralism' 
of integrated structures). It is in this sense that I agree with Worsley 
when he argues that social anthropology is a "comparative and historical science"
(1957,p.258) • In such models it is possible to fill the requirement recently
insisted on by several social anthropologists that structural analyses be tested 
against historical data (Bvans-Pritchard, 1951; Lewis, 1968,p.xx)
In parts I and II of the thesis I analyze the processes of. change in 
structures of power in the two kingdoms along the three dimensions isolated by 
Weber* These processes themselves were the product of an interplay between 
those already taking place in the precolonial kingdoms and ttose introduced by 
the colonial powers. At the end of the colonial period the legitimacy of the 
existing political systems was placed in doubt as the colonial powers allowed 
parties to be formed winch exploited structural conflicts of interest. In part 
III X examine how dominant groups which had appeared in the colonial period 
attempted to deal with this challenge to the legitimacy of their regulation of 
power in the society. In each case they attempted to mobilize the whole king­
15
dom in structural opposition to outsiders - as in the process of 'retrib- 
alization* - and to articulate this new unity through special emphasis on the 
cultural forms which distinguished them from others. These same cultural forms 
legitimated the power of the dominant groups and enabled them to define as 
sectional and selfish (cf. Evans-Pritchard & Fortes, 19-10) the aims of poli­
tical groups being formed along internal lines of stratification. I examine 
the successful use of symbolism in the organisation of the Baganda as a 
political group, and contrast it with the failure in Rwanda. Explanation 
takes the form of examining' whether the prerequisites of group organization 
could be fulfilled by appeal to neotraditional symbolism in the context of 
processes of structural change which I i have analysed in parts I and II.
PART ONE 1D
CHAPTER OWE
RWANDA: ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND POWER STRUCTURE
The purpose of This chapter is an analysis of the power structure 
discernible in economic relations between persons and groups in Rwanda 
towards the end of the colonial period. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to examine the question of whether the institutional changes 
of the colonial period accentuated or alleviated conflicts of [*objective.* 
interests (cf. NLoyd, 1968,p.3l) between groups and persons in the power 
structure. Eor it has been suggested by many writers (see below & chapter 
3) that there was in the precolonial kingdom 'a traditional balance* of 
interests, from which the colonial period brought inevitable decline.
This has important implications for the study of political change at the 
end of the colonial period, for it suggests that the mere appearance of 
conflicting interest between the ruling Tutsi caste and themselves was 
enough to ensure that the subordinate Hutu caste should rise in revolt, 
as they did in 1959 ? moreover, it suggests that the sources of conflict 
can be found in the way that institutional changes by the colonial admin­
istrations upset the *balance* of the ^traditional * system. In contrast,
I will show that there were at all times friajor conflicts of ^objective;* 
interest between the castes and their members, but that the institutional 
control (cf Davies, 1970,p.11) exercised by the Tutsi was such that Hutu 
could not organize effectively to alter the power structure. Much of the 
data I use is taken from studies of the precolonial kingdom, and so when 
I discuss social relations in the colonial period (for which relevant data 
is scarcer) I explain to what extent and in what ways the nature of those- 
relations changed and remained constant over time. During the colonial 
period the Tutsi largely retained effective institutional control, and in 
some fields increased it, despite changes or abandonment of specific 
customary institutions. Nevertheless, economic processes - and particu­
larly the emergence of a differentiated economic order of institutions, 
participated in by only a tiny proportion of the population but including 
Hutu as well as Tutsi - enabled a small number of Hutu to acquire economic 
power which gave them a certain degree of autonomy from Tutsi control.
It was this new aspect of the power structure which was crucial in political 
change at the end of the colonial period, (as I shall show in chapter 7). 
However,' its'importance cannot be assessed unless economic aspects of the 
total power Structure are examined in the whole period from the years immed­
iately before the establishment of colonial overrule to the 1950s* I 
should stress that I intend here to examine only one particular analytical 
relationship, and not to write a conventional history of the causes of 
institutional change.
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At the "beginning of the colonial period the population of Rwanda was 
probably about l|r million (Czekanowski,* 1906v,IOt^ Is'^  1963 pp 108-9)* ka 
1957 11 was 2,452,737 (Ruanda-Urundi A, 1960,p.40) at an average density of 
227 persons per square mile. The main population increase came after 1949 
for which the Ten-Year Plan recorded 1,808,776 persons; but even before 
this there was land shortage at times in many areas. There were extensive 
famines in the precolonial and early colonial periods; as late as 1916 and 
1943 there were two famines which officially caused 50,000 and 36,000 deaths 
respectively. In heavily populated areas Tutsi control of the access of 
Hutu cultivators to the land was in part responsible for the effect of the 
famines — for example, they refused to allow Hutu to cultivate areas which 
they needed themselves for dry season pastures, notably the fertile marsh- 
bottom land (Rrankenberg,unpubl.) After 1943, the Belgian Administration 
protected marsh—bottom cultivation as a measure against famine.
Lacking mineral resources and with little incentive to develop, Rwanda 
had very largely a subsistence economy at the time of Independence in 1962 
(Gravel, 1968,pp.51—52), and was one of the poorest countries in Africa, 
Coffee was the_ only important cash-crop, introduced compulsorily in 1932 
and attaining a production of under half of the mere 33,629 metric tons 
totalled by Rwanda and Burundi in 1961 (Lemarchand, 1970?P*14)* did
not provide an adequate income to most cultivators to cover cash needs.
Cash needs were generated by (l):
"a relatively large head-tax - 420 Er. p.a. in 1961 — upon every 
adult male1' (Gravel, 1968,p. 107)
which increased by 270 Rr. for a second wife, and by 420 Rr. for a son old
enough to go on labour migration; (2) by the process of labour migration
itself. Need to pay the head—tax accounted for the labour migration of the
majority (ibid,p.112), but some desire for cash goods was probably also
acquired. In the main this refers to \*essential^ items, such as hoes,
machetes, clothing and, to a lesser extent, salt, kerosene, palmoil and
soap. A few migrants acquired enough cash for items like school fees and
bicycles, though these would normally only be available to those with jobs
in the colonial administration. In Remera, the hill community in eastern
Rwanda studied by Gravel, which had a total poplation of 1462 in i960
(353 Tutsi, 1109 Hutu), these occupations were as follows: 1 subchief,
1 policeman and 1 secretary to the subchief, 3 agricultural assistants, 1
judge, 1 medical assistant and 1 road worker (ibid,p.108). These were
the only wage-earners. Elsewhere there might be a few petty traders and
housebuilders, often working in their spare time (Lemarchand, 1970,p.479)
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Thus while labour migration reached huge proportions for short periods by 
i960 - 300,000 Banyarwanda a year went to Uganda for the cotton-picking 
season (ibid, p. 15)-!-it had not encouraged movement away from subsistence 
production to cash-cropping to meet persistent cash demands, as in some 
other parts of Africa, despite land shortage. One reason was that wages 
in Uganda, where all migrants went, were very low (of. Gulliver, i960).
Gravel estimated that a man with one job
"cannot possibly start saving before (his) third month*s work.
Xet some of them do not remain for more than two or three months 
in Uganda" (l968,p.H3)
While Gravel found that 12.7$ of Eemera men were absent at any time, 80.3$
of all migrents went for less than a year. Banyarwanda mostly went on
labour migration to meet immediate cash needs, returning when this was done,
or they moved away permanently into Uganda. The most important effect of
labour migration on economic and political change was in providing the
opportunity for a few Hutu to become petty traders, mechanics, truck drivers,
builders etc. — occupations which permitted them to think of success in
terms other than increased favour from a Tutsi patron (see chapter 7}*
Coffee was only reluctantly adopted in Ewanda, and the Belgian Admin­
istration had to enf@fr©e care of the trees (ibid,p.66). This may have 
been because sale prices were fixed very low by the Administration, and 
incomes were low - an average of about 1000 TV. in i960 in Eemera. (Note: 
Average Baganda incomes were seven times higher from coffee — see chapter 4 ) 
Some 50$ of* Tutsi and 25$ of Hutu at Eemera did not cultivate coffee at all. 
The staple crop was j* year—round* Plantain, supplemented with soya. The 
other main crops were, in order of importance: sweet potato, sorghum, peas
and maize. There was relatively little division of labour between men 
and women, even in agricultural production. Both worked in the fields, with 
division of tasks limited to men doing the seeding. Otherwise, women 
looked after the household and children while men did the heavier tasks, 
raised cattle, sheep and goats, and did some part-time craft work. Until 
the abolition of ubuhake, in 1954* wen had to give a considerable amount 
of time to serving their patrons, in labour and attendance.
There was a significant difference between the parts played by members 
of the Hutu and Tutsi castes in the processes of agricultural production 
which leads Maquet (l964,p.557) to write-of them as "authentiques classes 
sociales". This definition of Hutu and Tutsi as "Social classes" has been 
accepted by other recent writers on Ewanda, Gravel (l968,p.2l) and Lemar— 
chand (l97G,p.6 & p.478)* though both stress that they do not accept that
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these'teocial classes" were "economic classes" in Weberns sense (l970,p.405) 
or "classes" in either of the two senses which Marx uses (1962,p.334)•
But, as I will show, use of the term [*social classj1 "begs some important 
questions — in particular, that of the nature of the relationship between 
economic and status orders here. It is my intention in this chapter to trace 
the analytical relationship between "economic class" and "status group" — the 
two concepts submerged in "social class" - in Rwanda more fully than has 
either of these writers. It will be shown that while economic classes 
which cut across the Hutu/Tutsi status division were emerging in Rwanda, 
they did so too slowly to make this an overt theme of the political changes 
before Independence. Cultural changes occurred still more slowly, and the 
conflict of 1959-62 took place in terms of caste not class. Nevertheless, 
the emergence during the colonial period of an elite class (wholly recruited 
from the Tutsi caste) did affect the nature of political change in the decade 
before Independence, as they attempted to create an organization and the 
ideology and ritual to legitimate their position*^ To begin Hlkfe previous 
writers by defining Hutu and Tutsi as social or economic classes, with a 
note that neither definition adequately fits the facts, would be to miss the 
significance of the interaction of developments in the status and economic 
orders. During the colonial period, important changes occurred in the nature 
of economic stratification within the Tutsi caste, so that it is essential in 
the explanation of political change that specification is made of the changed 
function of the ideological category "Tutsi", and of why it was retained in 
use - particularly as some Tutsi tried to abolish it formally in -1958 (see 
chapter 7)
When I refer to Hutu or Tutsi as a oaste, it is in the specific sense 
used by Weber (l970,p.405)
"a closed status group. Tbr all the obligations and barriers that 
membership in a status group entails also exist in a caste, in which 
they are intensified to the utmost degree",
Maquet argues that all Banyarwanda had access to land for agricultural 
production, but that cattle distribution was controlled by Tutsi. In his 
argument, cattle were a sort of capital, since a herd was both a saving and 
produced interest in the form of its offspring and i*renti* in goods and 
services. Tutsi alone downed* the capital, only landing it out to Hhtu 
In return, Hutu supplied the Tutsi with food crops and labour services which 
freed them for military and governmental activities as a ruling class.
In this model it is the Tutsi control of cattle as the supreme economic good 
through the ubuhake patron-client relationship that gives them power over 
the Hutu. Heusch (l$56) argues the same, in a more historical framework,
i.e. that the Tutsi institutionalized in the ubuhake the supremacy they 
had acquired in the past by military conquest. However, I shall show that:
(1) economic factors were relatively insignificant in cattle transfers;
(2) Tutsi dominance did not derive from a monopoly of cattle ownership)*, i.e 
it was not a primarily economic form of domination; (3) the Tutsi and
Hutu castes were not also economic classes.
Elsewhere in the same article, Maquet indicates the true source of
inequality between the two castes:
"Dans cette societe ou coexistaient deux strates de statut inegal, 
tout membre de la couche superieure avait, independamment de sa 
situation personelle et de ses qualites individuell.es, un pouvoir 
fort etendu d,infliger differents dommages a m timporte quel membre 
du niveau inferieure (p*556).
A member of the lower caste, a Hutu, could only; obtain security through a
patron in- the higher caste, a Tutsi. The patron-client relationship took
several forms in Rwanda, the most prominent of which was ubuhake. In
the sociological literature on Rwanda, including Maquet}*s. ubuhake has
usually been seen as in itself comprising the patron—client relationship,
and as the source of inequality between the castes since Hutu accepted an
inferior position, it is said, in order to obtain cattle. However, Gravel
(1967,passim) has shown conclusively that cattle were not sought as ends in
themselves but merely acted as "tokens" which recorded relationships having
other ends in view.
Cattle had very little economic value in Rwanda, except in the last
decade of colonial rule when they could be owned as private property; even
then they were seen as primarily an economic good only by the few Tutsi who
acquired large, viable herds in the reallocations after 1954* They were
not draft animals, their meat yield was low (Gravel, 1968,pp 90-93) and
according to the Ten-Year Plan (1951*P*417) only one cow in seven yielded
milk at any one time. The economic value of cattle to a Hutu was much
less than the value of the services he had to give in order to obtain them.
I conclude that Gravel is correct in stating that
"the transfer of cows as an institution in Rwanda was a mechanism 
for recording relationships between various corporate groups normally 
represented by individuals" (l967*P*325)
Cattle were used to record relationships such as marriages, but their
predominant use was in recording patron-client relationships.
The ubuhake relationship was initiated by the prospective client
approaching his prospective patron, and serving a trial period for him
(ubuhange) , to prove his loyalty and obedience. Por a Tutsi this might
last one or two months; for a Hutu it was more usually two or three years
(Bourgeo is, 1958*P*5; Gravel, 1968,p.l67). At the end of the trial period 
the new client (umugaraau) received a cow accepting the relationship 
( inka y^nmnnyafu) from his patron ( shebujat;). While a Hutu client served
his patron with labour and agricultural tribute which provided the basis for 
the latterifs subsistence and more leisured life-style, a Tutsi client served 
his patron with political support (see chapter 2), Cattle received by a 
Tutsi client were distinguished from those received by a Hutu (i.e. the 
relationships were distinguished), as ingabane and inkazibiti respectively.
The client had the rights of usufruct over the cow(s) he received.
He could consume as he pleased: (l) milk (2 ) male cattle (3) cattle which
died. He had the usufruct of any female offspring of the original cow(s) 
in milk or further transfers, but they remained at the patron^s disposal.
A client could use the cow or its female offspring for his brid^ewealth. 
Until recent years only Tutsi gave cattle in bridewealth (Gravel, 1968, 
p.134)* When the bridewealth cow was provided by the patron this gave 
him considerable control over his clienttfs marriage alliances (ibid,p.173  ^
see chapter 2). A cow received by a client could be used to record a 
relationship in which he acted as ubuhake patron. This did not affect 
his clientage to the patron from whom he had obtained the cow.
I^ ie ubuhake could in theory 'be terminated by either party, and usually 
the failure of the other to fulfill his obligations was given as the reason. 
The client was, however, subject:: to the same pressures which had made him 
seek patronage in the first place. The patron was not subject to any 
sanctions, and he received back the cows given to record the ubuhake. 
plus any which had been born to them, and often plus all the rest of the 
clienti*s cows (see below). Despite Maqueti’s description (l96l,p.l32) 
of how a client could avoid these problems, there is no direct evidence of 
the effectiveness of recourse to an army chief or other possible protectors. 
According to Maquet, the control of Tutsi patrons over any cattle possessed 
by Hutu increased during the colonial period, though we should note that 
he expresses this argument in speculative form (ibid). He claims that 
until the 1920s a patron who took back his cattle because an ubuhake 
relationship was being broken off had claims only on the original cows 
and their offspring. The client kept his (non-ubuhake) imbata cattle 
whether they were acquired before or after he had entered into the ubuhake 
relationship. However, in the late colonial period patrons were able to 
stake successful claims to all the cattle of a client, including imbata 
acquired before the relationship was entered into. Maquet|*s explanation 
for this apparent change is that the administrative officials, the mwami
and the army chiefs, who had previously "been available for appeals against 
this kind of extortion, had been undermined or abolished by the colonial 
administrations (see chapter 3). So the remaining administrative officials, 
who were the leading patrons, were no longer subject to restraint in their 
exploitation of Hutu and lower status (see chapter 2) Tutsi — the Tutsi bahozi 
or bi*impanffa, whom Lemarchand calls the i*lesser gentryi*(l970,p.130).
That such a change took place in the 1920s is essential to Maquetj*s argument 
about the traditional Ubalancej* of the system (1961 passim), for if Hutu 
could not break off their relations with a patron and change to another with­
out losing all their cattle, then the theoretical freedom of Hutu to man­
ipulate competing individuals in the dominant caste and so prevent "over­
exploitation" is effectively lost. It is more likely that at all times 
when there was a division of cattle at the end of an ubuhake relationship 
each side took as many cattle as possible. This is born out by the case 
reported by Gravel in Remera (see chapter 2) It is also clear in that 
case that, although the argument took place in terms of cattle, what was 
really in dispute was whether the ownership of a particular cow by a Hutu 
meant that he was the client of a Tutsi. furthermore, even if a patron 
could not, normatively, lay claim to his clients^ imbata cattle, he could 
always daim that his client had failed in his obligations and demand 
recompense in the shape of some imbata caiir^ as well as the return of his 
own inkazibiti:. As I will show, only Tutsi effectively had recourse to 
powerful Tutsi patrons who might be willing to support their case ( chapter 3). 
Hutu clientsj* chances were unaffected by the existence or otherwise of the 
traditional powers of the mwami or army chief.
Political protection by a patron centred on support of the client in 
lawsuits (kulengera). for Tutsi who took cases before the mwami it was 
essential to have a very high-ranking patron in accompaniment. Patrons 
of poor Tutsi and Hutu were also involved in paying their fines and compen­
sation, or in gaining revenge for their murder either from the political 
authorities or by their own action (kumuhorera), A patron might give 
some economic assistance; for example, providing meat and milk for ritual 
occasions when the primary lineage was unable to do so, or hoes to a poor 
cultivator^- He might help the surviving dependents of a dead client if 
there was no one else — this was normatively recognised in the concept of 
kumuremera. But none of these services was contractual, and their fulfill­
ment by a patron depended on the political expediency of keeping the 
relationship alive.
Similarly the clienti*s obligations were not absolutely fixed. But
a client had to observe certain expected behaviour, besides less formal 
gifts to ensure the moral obligation of the patron to give continuous 
protection. A client had to give personal service to his patron: giving
his time (gufata igihe) to the patroni*s service, maintaining his household 
(kubaka inkike), and in the precolonial period accompanying him on military 
expeditions (kumutabaraho). Gufata igihe involved, for a Hutu, menial 
tasks requiring about half a day*s labour in the !patronTs s*manori*. For 
a Tutsi it involved supervisory tasks in the administration of the Umanor*
(Gravel, 1968,p.l64; chapter two). Tutsi also spent much time in attendance 
on their patron, amusing and advising him. There was thus a major difference 
between Hutu and Tutsi here, and it can be seen particularly well in the 
important service of kubaka inkike (which means maintaining the fabric of 
the patronj*s house and was thus a physical measure of whether the client 
fulfilled his obligations). Unlike Hutu, Tutsi never did such work them­
selves ( until after 1954)* They sent their Hutu servants to do it (ibid).
Moreover, even after the formal abolition of labour services and dues in 
kind, patrons continued to demand the kubaka inkike because it was the main 
act of recognition by the clients. Gravel reports a court case on this sub­
ject in 1956 (ibid).
Ubuhake relationships were more stable than would appear frcm;: the 
discussions of their manipulation by clients. They often extended over 
more than one generation. A patron*s heir inherited all the dead man;*s 
clients, so long as both sides agreed and the clients retained the cows.
However, when the client died his heir was only recognised by the patron if he was
suitable to him. If he was not, the patron could designate another man of
the same lineage to succeed the dead man — both as his client, and as the 
lineage leader where this was applicable. Thus Tutsi patrons could control 
recruitment to Hutu leadership. It was not possible for a man to be the client
of more than one patron. Gravel (1968) explains that a client might in
theory send out one of his sons to find a different patron, stronger than 
his present one. But this tactic was rare, and open only to Tutsi in 
practise (pp.166-7).
The relationship of the ubuhake institution and the political structure 
of Rwanda must now be considered. Cattle were passed up the latter, 
through the tribute system (see chapter 3), and passed down the former in 
recording patron-client ties. However, van der Meeren(l969?P*213) has 
argued that the role—relationships patron/client and Chief/subject were 
essentially different despite their interconnections. The chief and patron 
were almost invariably the same person because of the access which office 
gave to protective powers and to the cattle with which to signify patronage
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(Gravel 1968,pp.l66—7j Lemarchand, 1970,pp.37—38)• Van der Meeren stales
that the main difference was that the ubuhake relationship could be ended,' 
while the chief/subject tie could not (l969}p.213). But the difficulties 
which faced a client who wished to change his patron (see above) usually 
forced him to take the same action as was available to him if he wanted to 
escape his chief: to move to another area. ibid at the level of abstraction
at which it is said'that a subject must always have a chief (ibid)., it 
was no less true that in Bwanda a man always had to have a patron. The 
practical difficulties, even for a Tutsi, in attempting to change patrons 
is well illustrated by a case reported by Gravel (l968,p.l65) from the 
second half of the colonial period. A ’Biifesi refused allegiance to 
Ewambyogo, the hill chief of Eemera. The latter forced him off the hill 
by "treating me like a Hutu", but he bould not find another patron and 
returned to Eemera. He had to give la cow to Ewambyogo to make peace, 
before becoming his client. It is probable that the ability to j*transfer 
clientages*, which most writers assume guaranteed Hutu a certain freedom 
from exploitation, in fact refers to such situations where they were forced 
to transfer their clientage from an old hill chief who diesd, or was dismissed 
or transferred, to his successor — i.e. transference was an expression of 
exploitation, not a guarantee against it.
Another difference is said to have been that ^shebuja* and i*umugaragnt 
were not mutually exclusive statuses (ibid,p,214j Mair, 1961,pp.322—323) 
and therefore cannot be used as the basis for an analysis of stratification 
in Ewanda society. But there were clear differences in the way in which 
the statuses were distributed and operated in the two Inajor status categories, 
Tutsi clients were distinguished from Hutu clients both conceptually, 
in the different. classifications of their ubuhake cattle, and their rele*-* 
behaviour. And while Tutsi were both patrons and clients, Hutu were never 
patrons to Tutsi. In the north, Hutu abakonde were land patrons to Hutu 
clients (abagererwa) of different lineages. Apart from this,few Hutu were 
patrons even to each other in any sense except to members of own lineage 
(Lemarchand, 1970,p.37)• ‘ So although the terms shebuja and umugaragu did 
not designate distinct strata in the population, the social processes in 
which the empirical meanings of the terms were defined stressed the boundaries 
between the castes and their differential access to political power, which 
was the basis of patronship, Tor Hutu, patron and client were mutually 
exclusive statuses Tike? titodse of chief and subject; for Tutsi, patron/ 
client statuses were not mutually exclusive, and neither were the chief/
subject statuses. Within the Tutsi caste, nobles had a greater statistical 
possibility of becoming chiefs as well as subjects thah the Tutsi b:;timpanga.
But the exclusive difference here is that between §hitsi and Hutu, involving 
a different type of patron-client relationship in eaeh case.
Several writers speak of the i•mutual advantage)* which patron and client 
receive from their relationship, and go on deliberately to analyze this 
without concern for whether the benefits were unequal or not. In faot, 
by definition they must be unequal, and to ignore this is to present an 
inadequate picture of the relationship itself, and its place in processes 
of change. Everything which Maquet or van der Meeren sgys about the 
mutual advantages of patron and client must be set within a context of 
Tutsi military domination in which, as Gfravel)*s definition of the ubuhake 
puts it,
"The patron grants protection (most often from himself as well as 
from other rapacious notables) and the client renders homage, paying 
services and goods according to his own station in life"(l968,p.l62)
The patron-client relationship provided political support in both 
directions, in a particular environment. In the struggle for power among 
noble Tutsi, they could not rely on the lineage alone — although, as we will 
see in chapter 2 they did try to mobilize kinship links informally - 
because the lineage was not localized, there was competition within the 
lineage, and support was required from a wider group if an individual was to 
be successful. In this situation, cattle were used to symbolize linkages 
ramifying through the whole society which may be considered sociologically 
as personal networks with a political exchange content (of, J. Clyde Mitchell, 
ed.,1969,pp.20-22,212) & (Mayer,A.,1966). Unlike Mayer i*s example, in 
which many different kinds of service passed out from the patron and only 
one kind passed in (political support of a very specific and limited kind, 
a vote), the noble Tutsi politician needed more permanent support of a diffuse 
kind. The linkages in his personal network needed to be as ritualised as those 
in a corporate gfeoup so that they were continuously ready to be mobilized 
and were always visible to potential rivals. This was achieved by the use 
of a very specific, institutionalized and symbolic kind of service passing 
outwards, i.e. cattle usufruct. The Bwanda politician who received cattle 
as a direct client of the mwami. was able, by further transfers of those|cattle 
to record an extensive network through three or four links by the most 
efficient distribution of patronage. I suggest that it was the pressure to 
wards the most efficient use which both maintained the Tutsi status category 
as a mobilizable political force, and maintained the stability of the noble 
Tatsi ruling group over a long period despite their very strong competition
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amongst themselves.
By ’most efficient distribution1, I mean that the most Powerful Tutsi 
politicians had in their "primary star" (Barnes, 1968 & 1969) •^^ie mos't 
powerful persons who were prepared to be clients. As I explained above, 
although Tpatron' and Tclient! were relative terms in the Tutsi category 
this did not lead to ’anomalies:* in the power structure such as a man’s 
patron also being the client of one of his own clients, as Jiappened in 
feudal Europe in respect of fief-holding. The process of ’most efficient 
distribution’ was ihus repeated in the secondary and tertiary "zones"(ibid.)
In empirical terms this means that a Tutsi chief would seek out as his 
clients those persons who already had the largest number of clients. The 
network could be very extensive and yet fairly "intense" (Mitchell, 1969) 
because the same symbols established the relationships througk>!ut( i.e. 
cows,) and so directly linked the furthest client in the network to the 
patron in the middle by readily mobilizable ties.
In Rwanda there was also a clearcut-off point between Hutu and Tutsi 
in this political aspect of the total network. This camtwhere a Tutsi 
pastoralist exchanged protection for the clientage services of a Hutu 
cultivator. The latter gave political support at the local-level of the 
hill, but his main services were the provision of consumption goods; and 
he usually retained the ubuhake cow for his own consumption purposes and 
could not use it to record clientage because he could not give protection. 
This clearly supports Gkavel’s argument that the transfer of cattle did 
not create clientage but was a token of the relationship created by power- 
for here the Hutu with a cow could not obtain clients by virtue of that 
fact alone (contrary to Mair, 1961, p.324-), and so normally he had to use the 
cow for economic purposes as he did not have the power to act as a patron.
It has been argued that Tutsi patrons did not demand much from their 
cultivator clients because they had many of them and could not store a 
surplus in produce (van der Meeren, 1969). But this ignores both the 
extensive redistribution made by the great patrons to their many Tutsi 
clients, and the situation of the Tutsi b ’impanga with only one or two 
clients. These ’lesser gentry’ (see above) did not have direct access to 
consumption goods which went with political office, and so relied heavily 
on obtaining as much as possible from their clients, who were all Hutu.
Eor these reasons they were often felt by Hutu to be worse exploiters than 
the great patrons, and Bourgeois (1958,p.39) states that it was this category 
who tried hardest to maintain ubuhake relations after the abolition in 
I954, and from whom Hutu were gladdest to escape. The patron^olient 
relationship was fundamental to kTutsi domination for these reasons, not
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because it was part of a system bf .’balancing structures’ or because of 
abstract or ideological mutual advantages which it brought to the Hutu as 
well?as the Tutsi. Van der Meeren’s remark that: "Because of the ubuhake 
system, the ruled participated in the power structure and this made for 
integration" (l969, p.2l8) begs a question of the nature of that participation 
or else must be taken to apply only to the Tutsi caste. For the ubuhake 
relationship was extremely important in maintaining the cohesion of the 
Tutsi in their position of privilege. It may not be possible to define 
them absolutely by the criterion of patronage but their differences from 
the Hutu in this respect are clear. The institution, and the symbolism of 
the pastoral way of life, enabled noble Tutsi to keep the allegiance of the 
majority of poor Tutsi even at the end of the colonial period. Basically, 
in relationships of patron-client, Hutu gave agricultural and labour tribute. 
Tutsi gave political support in either role.
Under colonial rule the noble Tutsi had less need of this extensive 
network of the army'sssupport since political strategies were more 
oriented to obtaining the Germans’ or Belgian’s favour, and thus office.
They came to want their herds for economic purposes. The lesser Tutsi 
however, still needed to maintain their contacts through ubuhake with 
politically powerful persons. Most Hutu wanted to dispose of their 
obligations, and while they still needed protection the main danger came 
from their own patrons (Gravel, 1968, p.l62). For the colonial administr­
ations reduced the chances of other Tutsi exploiting the Hutu, but 
recognised the right of the patron in ubuhake to demand services (ibid).
As we have seen, the Hutu sought in ubuhake not cattle possession 
but security of their persons and land tenure. In so far as it is poss­
ible to write of an economic aspect of patron-client relations in Rwanda, 
it concerned the usufruct of land rather than cattle. A Hutu sought 
land or, more usually, confirmation of his right to that which he occ­
upied and inherited, from the local hill chief. To detain security he 
had to pay tribute to (l) the mwami (ikoro tribute); (2 ) various cate­
gories of chiefs - see chapter three; (3) the hill chief or one of the 
latter’s clients who had been granted limited political rights (amarembo) 
as a favour (Gravel, 1968, pp.l60-l6l). It should be noted that the 
patron-client relationship here, between a Hutu, and, directly or indir­
ectly, his local political chief does not necessarily involve the 
establishment of ubuhake ties. In other words, ubuhake was only one 
form of the patron-client relationship, which can be seen conclusively 
here to have derived from inequalities of political power. Except in 
some parts of the north and north-west which were still in process of 
being conquered by Tutsi from petty Hutu kings in I9OO (and gradually
in those areas too as the process was completed during colonial over­
rule, see chapter 3), only political chiefs could allocate land. Even 
disputes within a Hutu lineage were formally decided by the Tutsi hill-; 
chief. At a more general level, Tutsi militarily controlled Hutu access 
to land. Vansina (l962,p,57) mentions that the Tutsi conceived the 
whole area under their military control as blocs of potential pasture 
land on which there happened to be some Hutu cultivators, who could 
supply tribute in labour and crops. All Hutu had a Tutsi patron in at 
least this minimal sense. However, for any Hutu who could persuade 
the Tutsi hill chief to take him as a client in return for political 
support in struggles against other Hutu at hill level, there was consider­
able advantage in doing so - and this involved the recording of special 
relationship by ubuhake cattle transfer: In fact, this is a rather
schematic description — direct or indirect ubuhake relations with the 
hill chief were a political necessity if a man and his lineage were not 
to fall behind their competitors. Except when a lineage had incurred 
the hill chiefi*s displeasure, or in a special circumstanc© like those in 
Gfravel^ s case-study (see chapter 2) when a Hutu lineage head tried - 
and failed y to make himself independent under the colonial administrat— 
ioi|fe protection, the head of each Hutu lineage had an ubuhake relation­
ship with the hill chief on behalf of the lineage (Lemarchand, 1970?P*38) 
Finally, it might be argued that land, if not cattle, monopoly made the 
Tutsi an economic class. However, I will show that the right to distribute 
land was an aspect of polftsfcal office, which meant it could not be in­
herited or in any other way built up as an independent souce of power - 
i.e. it was not a (‘capital!.* - and could not therefore give rise to 
economic classes (Vansina, 1963,p.354)» situation changed very
slowly during the second half of the colonial period, as an economic order 
was differentiated out to a limited degree (see below).
Where the Tutsi had institutionalised their military control, there 
were two kinds of land holdings: ibikingi (actual pasture) and amasambu
(agricultural) holdings. Hutu occupied the latter, though some might 
keep cattle on their patronsi* ibikingi. In both cases they had only 
usufructary rights. The differences between the two kinds of holding 
were not so great as appears in a schematic presentation: . much amasambu
was liable to become ibikingi during the dry season as Tutsi often had 
rights to pasture on agricultural land (igisigati rights). But the 
differences became important during the colonial period, when they were 
i*rationalisedi* by the Belgians.
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Land was distributed, like cattle, from the mwami, who in theory 
owned it all (l&hsina, 19^3,p.354) • The whole of central and eastern 
Rwanda was divided among the direct clients of the mwami in ibikingi, 
symbolised by cow transfers* These direct clients received political 
rights (amarembo) in their ibikingi, Amarembo were rights over ob­
jects and labour (Gravel, 1968,pp.l60—l6l). The whole complex,- ',
of these nights was available to the political chief. He could dis­
tribute the usufruct of iihis amarembo to his Tutsi clients. The 
mwami^s direct clients were usually army chiefs, although some were 
hill chiefs or favourites directly chosen by the mwami. The army
chiefs distributed ibikingi to their own direct clients, who were con­
firmed with the amarembo of office by the mwami. These were the ord­
inary hill chiefs, some of whom were also land or cattle chiefs. The
areas ruled by hill chiefs were often called their ibikingi, as an 
alternative to the administrative term i*umusozijT.
The hill chiefs used part of their ibikingi for their own cattle,
They allocated parts of it that they did not use themselves in several 
ways. First, they gave pasture to Tutsi (i.e. ibikingi) who were kin 
or were their ubuhake clients.
Exceptions to this rule were few, and arose from the situation 
created when a hill-chief was transferred, dismissed or died. His 
clients might not wish to transfer clientage to his successor. But as 
the case X quoted above illustrates, the hill chief always had adequate 
force available to make his Tutsi subjects his clients (see also Lemarchand, 
1970,pp.37-38)«hisOft.dnj. thbjhilX chief also transferred to his Tutsi 
client some of his labour and produce rights (i.e. amarembo) over the 
Hutu settled on part of his hill, such as the right to corvee labour 
(ubuletwa) and dues in agricultural goods ( ibihunikwa). He continued 
to collect ikoro from such Hutu* Other poor Tutsi clients received 
only small ibikingi with few or no amarembo, and sometimes combined 
pastoral and agricultural activities. Before 1954? even such very poor 
Tutsi participated in exploitation of the Hutu as a whole, for they rec­
eived privileged redistribution from their patron, who had expropriated 
part of the Hutu production in his capacity as hill chief, (see Academia 
Praha, 1968). Even after 1954? many Tutsi remained clients to powerful 
patrons, either by choice or the economic necessity of obtaining land.
In part this accounts for the solidarity of the Tutsi es a political group 
during the pre—Independence decade, and for the Hutu failure to discriminate
between noble Tutsi and Tutsi b[*impanga - some of whom had no cattle by 
1959? and lived by cultivation (Gravel, 1968,p.74) - in their attack on
the group as a whole from 1957 onwards.
Hutu clients were quite different from the poor Tutsi who supple­
mented their t*pastoralif income with agricultural production, in that they 
never received ibikingi holdings and always had to graze their cattle on 
their patroni*s ibikingi. Even the poorest Tutsi seemed to have security 
on his ibikingi until 1954? provided he fulfilled his ubuhake obligations.
It is probable that the question of which cows a Tutsi patron claimed back 
from Hutu clients can be explained partly by the problematic status of 
a Hutui*s imbata cattle which were grazing with his patron^s herd. In­
ability to obtain ibikingi or amarembo distinguished Hutu absolutely from 
all Tutsi, who had access to such rights.
Secondly, the hill chief would allow Hutu to settle on part of his
umusozi which was designed as agricultural land (amasambu) . He gave 
these Hutu minimal protection unless the relationship was supplemented 
with an ubuhake agreement. He exercised full amarembo rights over them, 
and collected ikoro for the mwami.
The land tenure system in northern Rwanda was somewhat different 
except in so far as the Tutsi chiefs, imposed there in the late precolonial 
or early colonial periods, attem$)jbed to adapt it to the system of central 
Rwanda. They also tried to enforce much heavier obligations, notably 
ubuletwa and ibihumikwa, than had been paid there previously, and which 
included some which were only (•customary* in the eyes of the Belgians. 
(Lemarchand, 1966,p.607). The more traditional ^ubukonde,* or itingobylt 
system was paralleled rather than replaced by the Tutsi clientage system 
(Pauwels, 1967,pp.295-299? Lemarchand, 1970,p.104). Thus a distin­
ction was made between the [Hraditionali* olients( abagererwa ooutumiers) 
of the (•traditional* Hutu rulers (abakonde) and the new clients of the 
Tutsi chief, who were called abagererwa politiques. The abakonde were 
heads of local Hutu ruling clans. They had allowed client clans and lineages 
the usufruct of their estates (ubukonde)t and ideologically they were 
the first settlers of the land. They paid only nominal tribute to the 
mwami until Rwabugiri came on his great campaign in the 1880s (Pages, 
1933,pp.690-69l). They and their clients were expelled from their hold­
ings by the Tutsi political chiefs, who replaced them with abagererwa 
•politiques. The expropriators and expropriated formed competing political 
groups between whom hostility broke out into violence in 1959 as a sig­
nificant element in the northern beginnings to the Hutu revolt (ibid,p.184)*
The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi roles in patron-client rel­
ationships is thus clearer in rights concerning land than cattle, though 
the two are aspects of the same relationships. Like cattle transfers, 
transfers of rights in land symbolized certain power relationships; 
but at the point in the hierarchy of transfers at which a Tutsi patron 
transferred some rights to a Hutu cultivator, the economic element was 
more important than with cattle. As Maquet and Naigiziki state (1957?P*355)
”le groupe Tutsi etait parvenu a controler lf*utilisation de la 
terre arable en sorte que les cultivateurs n^etaient plus que 
les tenaciers precaires de leurs champs”.
This, rather than the ubuhake, was the economic institutionalization 
of Tutsi military power, mentioned by Heusch. Through their depend­
ence on Tutsi for land, Hutu were forced to participate in the power 
structure in a subordinate position, having no autonomous sources of 
power.
The landlord/tenant relationship was essentially the same as those
of chief/subject and cattle patron/client, in that all three represented
different aspects of rule by noble Tutsi, supported by lesser Tutsi,
through a monopoly of state power. A Tutsij*s cattle patron was also
his landlord, for as Gravel shows
”The benefice, land, was the measure of service and the cow re­
corded the grant of benefice” (ibid,p.82)
He was also invariably the chief (see above). The ubuhake secured the
Tutsi client both protection and favours from his patron; and the amarembo
he received over his igfkingi land ensured his supply of c consumption
goods and labour from Hutu cultivators.
The land tenure system was officially reformed between 1930-1950? 
though such of it remained in informal use. Firstly, the Tutsi system 
was extended over the peripheral areas. In 1932 a decree prohibited 
further opening up of ubukonde on uncultivated ground, and so consol­
idated Tutsi control. In the same year, universal adult male taxation 
was introduced for the first time for ubukonde holders. Hutu continued 
to pay dues to amarembo holders as well as the tax.
Secondly, after the Second World War, Hutu were given security of 
tenure on their amasambu holdings. This did not entirely free them 
from obligations to the hillchief, aside from any ubuhake relations 
which were still legally enforcable, but it made it easier for them to 
resist illegal demands. Lemarchand (1970,p.131)considers amasambu 
holders had de facto freehold tenure; but I suggest while this might 
have been a result in theory, in practice hill chiefs were able to continue
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■to demand, services legally and illegally: the ubulatwa for example was
not commuted for a money payment until 1949j a-nd it is unlikely that 
it ceased immediately. The Hutu Manifesto of 1957 claimed it was still 
"being demanded.
Thirdly, the ibikingi tenure system was 'rationalised7. In 1924 
it had been decided to treat ibikingi holders as private landlords but, 
though ibikingi rights were abolished in 1929, nothing was done officially 
to enforce change until the abolition of ubuhake in 1954t and the old 
system continued tor operate. But because of the conflicting claims, 
no such de facto peasant free hold (with qualifications) as had emerged 
on the amasambu land could be applied to ibikingi land. In the period 
between 1929 and 1954» ike noble Tutsi were informally consolidating 
their position as great ibikingi holders through their control of, or 
access to, political office. When the ubuhake was abolished, Hutu and poor 
Tutsi were unable to find pasture for their now privately-owned cattle since 
it was all owned by their former patrons. They rarely had enough agricultural 
land to spare for pasture. They therefore sold their cattle to the landlords 
or, in return for the right to continue grazing their cattle on the ex- 
patron's private land, served him in whatever way he demanded. Lemarchand
refers to this as a process of "reinfeudation" (1970, p,13l). Tutsi
landlords were thus in the late.1950s continuing to- receive services from 
Hutu and poor Tutsi, and were benefiting by buying up cheaply the cattlfe 
which many ex-clients were forced to sell.
The introduction of cash in the colonial period was not extensive 
(see above). But it did alter the nature of the patron-client relation­
ship. A cash value could now be put on the dues paid in labour and 
kind. At the same time, demand for these dues by chiefs increased 
in the peripheral areas which previously had escaped them Increasingly, 
clients everywhere were less ready to pay; in 1941 the great Tutsi 
patrons complained of this to the mwami. Already, from about 1926, 
final divisions of cattle were taking place between patrons and clients, 
with the former often taking everything since he was the sole judge. In 
1938 the Resident expressed the Administration's fear that the political 
order, which seemed to rest on the ubuhake might be undermined. Itom 
1941 divisions were to be by.te.qual shares, and the mwami's court soon 
took over their administration: for example, decreeing that the umurundo
gift of a cow to a new chief should continued to be paid by clients.
This situation clearly favoured the great patrons, and in 1945 they 
supported the mwami in his declaration of the abolition of the ubuhake 
institution for Jan. 1. 1946. The Resident postponed abolition until
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after the Plan Decannal had been drawn up in 1950. When the Plan came, 
its provisions directly harmed the great patronsjJ interests. It aimed 
at de-stocking by about half, introducing price controls on cattle sales, 
and improving quality by enforced sale of unhealthy animals - and patrons 
had to replace any such animals their clients might lose. However, 
these measures were not put into effect: they were rejected by an extra­
ordinary council of the great Tutsi patrons with the mwami. Instead the 
council proposed a free market in cattle and the dissolution of the 
ubuhake. The latter process was to give %■ or|- of the cattle to the 
patron, depending on whether it was he who failed to fulfill his obligat­
ions, or the client. The Belgian Administration accepted these proposals. 
In 1952, the mwami decreed that no new ubuhake could be made, and in 1954 
that the institution should be ended, according to certain conditions.
Articles 2 and 3 of the 1954 decree (see Bourgeois, 1958*pp.12—14) 
established that the division should be made, if possible, by agreement 
between the two parties, but that if it was not then either of them could 
take the matter to court. Article 4 established that the division should 
be as follows: to the patron, -g- if the umurundo had not been paid, if 
it had. ' This division gave a great advantage to the great patrons with 
many clients. They were able to build up viable and profitable herds 
from their shares. But the lesser Tutsi patrons with only a few clients 
with one or two cows stood to lose by the dissolution, as the services 
they received were still worth more than their share of the cattle.
These lesser patrons often tried to avoid the dissolution as long as 
possible. Article 5 established that non-ubuhake cattle were to be ex­
cluded from the dissolution; otherwise the client^s whole herd was to be 
divided. This left much room for dispute, and it seems that patrons 
were often able to have"the excluded categories of cattle included in the 
division (Maquet and di’Hertef elt, 1959?P»29)* excluded categories
were supposed to be registered by special tribunals, though these failed 
to recognize some traditional means of acquiring cattle outside ubuhake - 
such as bridwealth.
By December 31, 1956, there had been 80,000 divisions: 97-4$ by
agreement, 2.6$ in court. Of the former, 40$ were at the client's request, 
and 40.9$ at the patrons’s. But these figures underestimate the degree 
to which it was the clients who wanted the relationship ended, for the 
figures for the patrons includes those who introduced a very great number 
of cases, with each case counted. As I showed above, it was these great 
patrons who wanted ubuhake ended.
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"Hie division took place before a tribunal in each chiefdom. The 
herd was presented, each head of cattle valued, and the total divided by 
three or four (see above, Article 4). The client chose one animal.
Then the patron made his first choice out of those that were left, and 
so on. At the end the discrepancy between the value of the share each 
man was entitled to and the value of the shaie he had taken was adjusted 
by a cash payment. This was immediate, with the cattle being auctioned 
off and the cash divided if the man could not pay.
In the areas longest dominated by Tutsi, 3 2 of cattle had been 
shared out by 1957; in the peripheral areas only 13%-24^. This reflects 
the much greater proportion of imbata cattle in the latter areas, and 
the s.emi-nomadism of many Tutsi there. In so far as in the latter areas, 
ubuhake. involved mainly Tutsi, it also indicates thetdegree to which 
Tutsi organization through patron-client ties were maintained.
For some Hutu the abolition of ubuhake meant the end of a major 
source of oppression. But for others, as we have seen, it was only the 
prelude to 'reinfeudation'. And for still others, who were clients of 
poor Tutsi 'lesser gentry' who profited more from the ubuhake than they 
would from private ownership of the cattle, it was very difficult to 
secure the dissolution, as their patrons employed effective delating 
tactics (Bourgeois, 1958, pp.39“40)* After the initial rush in 1954-55? 
there was a considerable fall—off in the rate of dissolution (ibid.) 
in 1956. Ubuhake clearly did not end immediately on its formal abolition, 
but th^great patrons - who were also the great landowners (see above) - 
were able to 'recover1 their herds of cattle.
The great landowners' desire to end the ubuhake did not presage 
an end to the political domination of the Tutsi as a caste. In the 
period after 1954' some of the great landowners, who were afraid of land 
reform on ibikingi land,as there had been on amasambu (see above), were among 
the least prepared to make political or symbolic concessions to the Hutu 
(see chapter 3). They wanted dissolution because they stood to gain 
the economic value of their land and cattle, which were being lost to the 
persons with usufruct. Subsidiary reasons were: (l) economic wealth 
was an increasingly important component of social status; (2) clients were 
increasingly losing the legal obligation to fulfill services; (3) cattle 
patronage was no longer the major criterion for political office. Kinship 
ties were still important, but were linked with educational achievement.
I began this chapter by criticising Maquet's analysis of the Hutu and
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Tutsi as "authenti-'ques classes sociales” on the grounds that, besides 
its inaccurate basis on Tutsi cattle ownership, this formulation hid the 
changing nature of the relationship between economic and status stratif­
ication, and of economic and status relationships within their analy­
tically separable orders. That is to say that, in Rwanda the concept of 
"social class" begs more questions than it helps answer, for if Tutsi 
and Hutu were "social classes" they were not the same kind in 1959 that they 
were in 19OO. A summary of the changes is now necessary.
Economic classes, in Weberns sense, cannot be isolated in precol— 
onial Rwanda because of the absence of a.market mechanism. Economic 
relations were determined by political rather than economic processes.
The Tutsi constituted a political group or |*estatei* in Weberns terms, i.e. 
a "political association in which the means of administration are auto­
nomously controlled, wholly or partly, by the dependent administrative 
staff", though in Rwanda the "patrimonial" lord, the mwami, had managed 
to keep the"decentralization of authority" to a minimum, and was nearer 
to "pure" than "decentralised" patrimonialism. (Weber,1970,pp.81—82)•
In Rwanda the tension between the two types was represented by the two 
main factions at the mwami!*s court throughout the precolonial period: 
the favourites and the great Tutsi lineages. The economic context for 
such Tutsi rule was a type of basic organization which was, as Eeber 
points out, very frequent in patrimonial systems (1964*P*354)' dhe
"budgetary unit of a lord, an oikos" (ibid,pp.229-231). ."where needs 
are met wholly or primarily in kind in the form of contributions and 
compulsory services" (p.354)*
and where the development of markets is obstructed. It is easy to re­
cognise here the unit which Gravel described, referring to the hill chiefi*s 
umusozi as a "manor":
"The manor in Rwanda was characterised by a quasi total self- 
sufficiency, ,( except that)., in the eyes of the community (the 
hill-chief) was the representative of a centralized administration.. 
Even in i960 the amount of goods produced for market was minimal"
(1965,p.324)
The hill chief was a member of the ruling estate, and Weberns analysis of
the ^financing1 of such a group is relevant here
"The most direct connection between the economic system and primarily 
non—economic corporate groups lies in the way in which they secure the 
means of carrying on their corporate activity as such. .Permanent 
financing may..be based on the. existence of a productive organization 
under the direct control of the corporate group..(such) as an oikos 
or feudal domain (ibid,pp.310-312)
Directly or indirectly, all Tutsi belonged toa.corporate group through the
patron-client system, which was merely symbolized by cattle transfers, and 
the substance of which was political protection. The political dominance 
of the tSfefcsAs^ iQu6O(taSi0iply reflect their economic dominance, as Maquet 
claims, but was a prerequisite of it and itself the result of superior 
Tutsi organization. The Tutsi were a status group, the Hutu a status cat­
egory defined by their masters (cf. Bailey, i960).
During the colonial period, the introduction of private property in 
land altered these power relations. However, the process was de facto and 
unsystematic from its beginning,in about 1924,to its legal recognition in 
1954j and in this period power relations altered little at the local level 
(Gravel, 1965*P*323). The change came dramatically in the period after 
1954 when the consequences of private property in land were realised. The 
corporateness of the Tutsi group was threatened, as only the nobles were 
recognised as Landowners and poor Tutsi faced the loss of their cattle, 
much of their land, and the few Hutu clients they might have by the ubuhake 
or their patronj*s amarembo gift. This would mean their loss of Tutsi 
status and, if the change had been fully realized, would have left only 
an elite class as Tutsi. However, such possible consequences were not 
fully realized by 1959 three main reasons: (l) poor Tutsi continued
to share a corporate interest in Tutsi status; (2) many of them had man­
aged to avoid dissolution of their ubuhake relations by even that late date; 
(3) others were |*reinfeudated* — but we should note that these no longer 
had Hutu clients of their own or, legally, amarambo rights over them; 
they were more dependent than before on privileged treatment by the land­
lord to maintain their status. Often they had very few cattle and 
agriculture became their main occupation. By the end of the colonial 
period, the Tutsi were not a "social class" but a status group whose 
members were of two separate economic classes: landlords and tenants.
The status group of nobles within the Tutsi caste had used its monnpoly 
of political office to constitute itself as an economic class by de facto 
expropriation of other ibikingi claimants, as emerged in 1954* Bud 
expropriated Tutsi retained their ties of clientage to the landlord. For 
example, Chief Kamatari of Ruhengeri territoire still had, in April, 1959 
258 head of cattle which were leased*' to a dozen Tutsi subchiefs who were 
his clients (Lemarchand, 1970*p«130n.)• What Maquet^s formulation hides 
is that most Tutsi were excluded from the politically dominant landlord 
class within that group. However, their misfortunes seemed to have been 
arbitrarily imposed by the Belgian authorities, apparently acting, as their
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patronsif propaganda emphasized, in alliance with Hutu agitators (see chapter
7).
The Tutsi were maintained in their monopoly of office hy the Belgians 
"because they provided the most efficient means to maintain order. As 
administrative skills of a more modern kind came to "be required the Tutsi 
monopoly was retained "by the reservation to them of the necessary ed­
ucational skills. Education was almost exclusively provided "by the missions, 
which were overwhelmingly Catholic: until 1948, only Catholic schools
qualified for government subsidies (ivan der Meeren, 1969,p#259)* ®y 
the end of the first decade of colonial rule, during which it was mainly 
Hutu who joined the missions and took up the new roles as catechists and 
employees of the Europeans, Tutsi realized the advantages of the new 
religion. Erom then on, it was mainly Tutsi who became converted, and 
central Rwanda where Christianity spread, rather than the peripheral areas 
where the first missions were established, but where they had become 
associated with the colonial governments!* suppression of local autonomy.
The number of Hutu converts more than doubled after 1949» when it was 
announced that conversion would entail some exemption from corvee labour 
(ibid.)f but the failure of the missions to attract them is reflected in 
the 1962 religious census: about 45$ of "the population were nominally 
Christian (37*5$ Catholic*, 7*5$ Protestant) (ibid). Most of these were 
only nominally converted in order to obtain the educational facilities 
which were reserved to Christians. In 1958, when there were 160,000 
children at primary school, only one such school was not run by missions 
aries. All three secondary schools were run by Catholics, and at least 
until 1956 academic education was obtainable only by joining the priest­
hood (Lemarchand, 1970,p.l40); many left soon afterwards (Maquet, 1964,p.56o)
Those educated to secondary level entered the colonial administration 
or such European private commercial enterprises as there were in Rwanda.
Maquet considers them as becoming a new class of i*evoluesi* or a ^bourg­
eoisie noirej*, since they were distinguished by their cash incomes and 
their more l*western* life-styles from ordinary Tutsi and Hutu. However, 
they did not develop any class—consciousness, despite the efforts of the 
few Hutu among them to create it, such as the pamphlet by S.Naigiziki in 
1954» justifying marriage between Hutu and Tutsi, which was suppressed by 
the mwami as revolutionary.
Most of the persons in this <afcegory were in fact Tutsi: in 1959
only 12$ of the lower cadres of the colonial administration were Hutu 
(Lemarchand, 1970,p.l25), and until the 1950s government policy virtually
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excluded. Hutu from post—primary education. Even in 1954? there were only 
3 Banyarwanda Hutu at the main school for chiefs (5$), the Groupe Scolaire 
at Astrida (ibid,p.138). Erom the start the missions believed in Tutsi 
superiority possibly even more than the administration i{ibid, p.73). By 
1925 there were four government schools which had formally taken over 
the functions of the chiefs?* courts in educating future chiefs, as at 
the Hyanza Ecole pour 4Eils de Chefs, and only Tutsi were admitted. In 
1929 the Groupe Scolaire school at Astrida was founded, and became the 
main recruitment channel for chiefs as it was specifically designed for 
that purpose. In the immediate pre—Independence period the most con­
servative group of Tutsi chiefs, who would not even make ideological 
concessions to the Hutu or base their ^superiority* anew on possession of 
modern skills, were associated with education at Hyanza and Ruhengeri schools. 
The (*progressivesi* who were prepared for the changes, were often referred 
to as i*les anciens d*Astrida* or ?*les Astridiens.*( ibid, pp.134—135) *
These schools also provided the Tutsi 88$ of the colonial admin­
istrative cadres mentioned above — monopolizing the higher positions 
as ^secretaires indigei-veS'*. The result was that even at the end of 
1959 (Hov.l), the Tutsi occupied 100$ of the chiefships (43^2 vacancies) 
and 549 4he 559 subchiefdoms. These Tutsi, through the mode of 
recruitment and use of their offices, were of the elite class of land­
lords.
In 19591 elite class of Tutsi ruled a Hutu peasant class who 
occupied amasambu land in de facto freehold but still paid informal 
tribute intermittently and acknowledged the general patronage of the 
local subchief (see Gravel, 1965? passim). They also ruled Hutu and Tutsi 
peasants who were more fully and regularly dependent on the landlord- 
ship of the local subchief or chief, and could be loosely said to be 
i*reinfeudated*. Glass divisions in the Tutsi category were overlaid 
by the continuance of patron-client ties,
Eew Hutu were not simply of the peasant class. But the expansion 
of education in the 1950s (note: before 1955? even the facilities I have 
described above hardly existed; between 1950 and 1958 the number of 
teacher—training schools rose from 1 to 10, for example) and the return 
of labour migrants with enough cash to set up as petty traders, or with 
skills that, at least as a sideline, could command cash, did make some 
differentiation of roles possible (see chapter 7)* 14 was only the most
highly educated Hutu who made any impact on the political system before 
parties were formed in 1958, and whom I shall discuss here, I shall call
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this group the Hutu intelligentsia* - not’elite* as others have called, 
them, for it is doubtful whether ordinary Hutu saw them as a reference 
group (of. Southall 1966),and they were educated persons seeking professional 
occupations.
Most of the Hutu intelligentsia were educated at seminaries (see 
above), and the leaders of the Hutu movement were recruited mainly from 
those at Kabgaye and Nyakibanda. Until 1955 very few went on to the 
Groupe Scolaire at Astrida, or to the Centre Universitaire at Kisantu 
in the Congo. The first Hutu graduated from Kisantu in 1955j an(l there 
were only 18 Hutu enrollments at the Groupe Scolaire from 1945 to 1954 
inclusive. However, by 1959 there were 143 Hutu there, and 279 Tutsi.
The Hutu intelligentsia was thus extremely small, but increasingly qualified 
in the 1950*s to compete with the Tutsi for higher administrative posts.
The Tutsi retained their monopoly, and the Hutu could obtain only minor 
clerkships. Even in the Catholic church, which had radically revised its 
policy in the 1950*s, all the higher African posts were occupied by 
Tutsi.
It seems to have been the process of rejection which made the Hutu 
intelligentsia revolutionary. Eor example, the first Hutu graduate 
of Kisantu was A. Makuaa, who later became President of the National 
Assembly in the PARMEHQTQ government of the republic. When he returned 
to Rwanda in 1955t with a degree in political and administrative sciences, 
he was prepared to fit the pattern of the rare Hutu who joined the Tutsi 
(see chapter 3). He went first to pay
"a visit to Mwami Mutara to explorswith him the
possibility' of employment in the administration.
As was to be expected, his request was turned down"
( Lemar chand, 19 70, p. 139 ) •
He eventually became a typist at 750 Er. per month (about £6). As
Belgian policy changed rapidly, in 1957 he became an administrative
assistant but still could not compete with less qualified Tutsi. Other
Hutu intelligentsia members achieved positions from which they
had more freedom of political action, as assistants to European Catholic
leaders at a time when Catholic policy was changing rapidly to a pro-
Hutu position, notably under the Apostolic Vicar from 1955» Mgr.
Perraudin. Iko of the seven signatories of the Hutu Manifesto
were at some time his personal secretaries: G. Kayibanda, the future
President of the Republic, and C. Mulindhabi, the future secretary-
general of PARMEHQTU and Minister of Armed Forces. It was this category
of Hutu intelligentsia who came together as the first self-conscious
Hutu political group, to agitate against their exclusion from the Tutsi 
elite class.
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CHAPTER WO
THE SIMBOLISM OF INEQUALITY IN RWANDA 
1. KINSHIP AMD MARRIAGE
The institutions of kinship and marriage play an important part both 
in the maintenance of status group boundaries, by focusing moral relation­
ships within particular categories of persons, and in breaking down those 
boundaries by providing ties which cross them. Such institutions provide 
the means by which political and ecomomic groups can maintain their corporate 
activities against tendencies for individuals to lose sight of the common 
long term interests of the group in the hope of immediate and sectional 
gains (cf. Evans-Pritchard & Eortes, pp. 16-22). In highly stratified 
political systems, the organization of political and economic groups within 
the different strata will be formally different in certain ways - suited to 
the pursuit of power at the available level. In this chapter I shall 
relate the different forms of kinship and marriage in the different castes 
of Rwanda to the unequal distribution of power between them. At the same 
time it will be shown that there were also different status,groups within 
the castes, though not cross-cutting them,,.
The Tutsi, Hutu and Ttoa status groups, which may be called castes (see 
chapter l) were ranked in that order by Tutsi, with themselves highest. 
Ideologically, the largest descent category, the patrician (ubwoko), 
contained members of each of these castes. However, the patrician was 
not a corporate group: it was dispersed, non-exogamic and there was no
observance of mutual obligations of even the most superficial kind, between 
those in different castes who used the same clan name (Maquet, I96I, p.48)« 
Even within the caste, the clan was not a corporate group except in 
certain of the peripheral northern and western areas, like Bushiru, Busozo, 
Bukunsi and'Mulera, where the Tutsi were very few in numbers and exercised 
only sporadic control over Hutu petty kings until installed there by German^ 
and Belgian military campaigns (Pauwels, 1967* P*259* see helow). In 
Tutsi-dominated areas of central Rwanda and Gisaka the common clan name 
did not signify special relations between groups of Hutu and Tutsi, even 
at the local level. A map of the distribution of households in Remera, 
a Hill in Gisaka, shows that although Hutu of the same clan tend to cluster 
together, and Tutsi to do the same to a lesser extent, those in the 
different strata do not. I should point out that the reason for the cluster
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ing concerns the corporate activities of lineages and not the clan. Thus 
in one example, we find that Hutu of the Abasindi clan are found mainly at 
the top of the Hill, Tutsi of the same clan are found at the bottom. (Gravel
1968, p.39)
There were fifteen clans in Rwanda, according to Pauwels (l965T p.280). 
Maquet (1961) gives thirteen, but his informants were taken almost entirely 
from the central region, unlike Pauwels*. Their main functions are best 
seen as the delineation of status within the wider caste groups. Within 
the Tutsi caste, the highest status was held by lineages of the royal clan, 
Abanyiginya*, secondly of the Abashambo and Abahondogo clans - which were 
acknowledge as *brothersf of the Abanyiginya, and could not provide Queen 
Mothers; thirdly, of those clans which had provided Queen Mothers.
The most important of these was the Ababega clan, which had provided the 
Queen Mother for four of the last six reigns of the- pre-colonial period.
(Vansina, 1962, appendix; Pages, 1933} p.9 6). There seems to have been 
a process of assimilation to Ababega status, since the other two clans 
known to have provided Queen Mothers historically, the Abakono and Abaha, 
both claimed to be Ababega segments. (Pauwels 1965* p.273). There were 
three other clans claiming to have provided Queen Mothers in the early 
period of the kingdom, the Abasinga, Abazigaba and Abagesera. Only the 
last of these had provided a historical Queen Mother. The recognition of such 
claims at any time would clearly depend on the clan*s power. It is in 
such terms that the explanation for the considerable differences in the 
proportions of Tutsi claiming to belong to the different clans must be 
sought, since Tutsi pursuing political 'power had to attach themselves to 
high status clans. Thus d*Hertefelt & Goupez (1964, p.483), in discussing 
the various uses of the category * Abanyiginya1, mention that it 
could refer "to any rich and successful Tutsi elevated to the rank of the., 
clan". Both the Abanyiginya and the Babega^ the other most powerful clan 
were over C^ffo Tutsi in membership. Tbe three clans mentioned above as also 
claiming high status through having provided Queen Mothers were over JO/o 
Hutu. (Pauwels, 1965 pp.260-262). This need not have prejudiced the caste 
status of their Tutsi members, but it indicates their weakness as political 
bases in the intra-caste competition. Competition for power took place 
between the Tutsi lineages of the clans of highest status - as d*Hertefelt 
says:
"II semble que le strate proprement politique comprenait
anciennement quelques milliers d*individus..appartenant a
un nombre beaucoup plus restreint de lignages" (1960a, p.455).
It seems that in the immediate precolonial period political office was 
virtually monopolized by Tutsi lineages of seven clans — the Abanyiginya and- its 
^brothers*, and the ,fIbibandaf clans (Abega, Abakono, Abaha and
42
Abagesera) who could provide Queen Mothers (see d'Hertefelt & Coupes, P.512) 
and I suggest that these were the 'noble1 Tutsi to whom earlier writers referred 
i.e. those who were not 'Tutsi b 'impanga' or bahozi. Mobility was attached 
to political office, (see below).
This is not to say that high status could not be achieved. Tutsi 
b 'impanga were occasionally raised to power (d'Hertefelt, 1960a, p.455)- 
M *G. Smith has also pointed out the difficulties of using the model of 
ascribed and achieved roles in a dichotomous way. (Smith, 1966). It is 
clear that even Hutu and Itoa could be ennobled by appointment to political 
office (Pauwels, 1967, p.227). The precolonial mwami most concerned 
with centralizing the kingdom, Kwabugiri, is known to have appointed several 
Twa as chiefs in newly conquered and peripheral areas (see chapter 3).
Pauwels gives an example of the Tutsi chief of Kingogo in the early Belgian 
period, who was said by his enemies to be lying in his claim to belong to 
the Babega clan, and whose children by Hutu mothers also claimed Babega 
clanship. Since the clan did not involve multiplex relations between 
its members, changes were relatively easy for Tutsi who built up their 
political and economic power by other means. But although we cannot 
speak of rigidly ascribed status delimiting those who might compete for 
political office, those whose 'noble.' Tutsi status was actually ascribed 
were much better situated to manipulate the moral relations which were so 
important in that competition, and to acquire the necessary political skills 
by.training at the courts of the mwami or the greater chiefs. .'Noble'Tutsi 
symbolized their higher status by avoiding commensality (see below) or marriage 
with the Tutsi b 'impanga or Bahozi, that is, the low status Tutsi. These 
were often suspected of having ennobled Hutu and Ttoa among their ancestors. 
(Pauwels, 1965? p.260). Such ideas were current enough in 1956 to be repeated 
by a European settler (see letter of M.A. Maus, 25/4/56, p. 14 R*P.)
The clan was only important as a status category among Tutsi, maintain­
ing the boundary between the political elite and those who had some ideological 
claim As Tutsi to join it. Hutu and Twa were excluded by more general 
caste categories from competing for power at the level of the kingdom. At 
the level of competition between Hutu, the Hill, status was allocated to 
descent units according to different criteria - chiefly,length of time 
established there. ‘ Hutu political processes centred on gaining the favour 
of Tutsi patrons. Clan status was immaterial since Tutsi did not 
recognize any differences between Hutu of the different clans, not even 
of the royal clan. Only in those peripheral areas where the Tutsi did not 
have regular political contioL, mainly in the north and west, was the clan 
an important unit for Hutu, The dominant clans in some of these areas
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claimed to be the first settlers, and had established petty kingdoms 
whose kings were called abahinza in the north and abami in the south-west.
(see chapter 3). The ruling Abagesera clan of Bushiru, described by 
Pauwels, is one example. The clans of these areas were often localized groups 
involved in feud. The patron-client relationship was absent, except in 
so far as the ;*first settlers* were able to secure recognition of their poli­
tical authority from other clans in exchange for the right to settle.
TJven after the Tutsi had established their chiefs in these areas, backed 
by the colonial governemnts, they were unable fully to supplant the Hutu 
authorities who continued to function unofficially, (Pauwels, 1967* p.288). 
Lemarchand (1966a pp. 609-610) has even argued that in the peripheral areas 
the revolt against the Tutsi of 1959-62 was not the social revolution that 
it was in central Rwanda, but part of a longer pattern of rebellions against 
centralization in favour of local clan and lineage authorities. The clan 
here was clearly much more than the informal, interstitial (cf. Wolf, 1966 
p.2) category in the political structure which it was in central Rwanda.
But it involved only Hutu in its corporate activities.
The most corporate (c.f. Lewis, 1966p, IO9 ) descent group in Rwanda was 
the primary lineage (cf. Maquet, 1961) (inzu, pi. amazu, in all Rwanda except 
Gisaka, where it was called umulyango. pi. imilyango - this is not to be 
.confused with the central Rwandan secondary patrilineage of the same name). 
The different organizational forms of the inzu in the different strata may 
be related to their unequal access to political power at different levels. 
These forms helped to maintain unequal relations, by limiting the organi­
zational range of the lower strata. The term inzu might be used for Hutu 
descent groupings of varying depth, tracing their links agnatically to a 
common ancestor, who was usually not more than four or five generations 
ascendant from the oldest living generation. This "transitory group 
about six generations deep" (Maquet, 1961) is usefully referred to as the 
"primary" lineage, since it was the smallest politico-jural unit. The 
context in which such terms as inzu are used determines their meaning.
Thus Gravel describes the primary lineage in Gisaka as being very shallow, 
of only three generations. The group thus formed is known as umulyango, 
and there is no group corresponding to the inzu. However, Gravel mentions 
that the term ‘.umn 1 yango can refer to a deep lineage, and has no .great 
precision (1968, p.ll8) It seems that the unit to which Gravel is 
referring is a localized group, while that which Maquet describes is not - 
being rather the most immediate group which is politically significant in some 
way. The different processes of segmentation which Maquet and Gravel
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describe for the two units support this argument. Gravel*s umulyango 
segmented automatically with the growth of each new generation;
Maquet*s inzu segmented only if it was politically relevant to do so.
As Maquet describes it, even if a political group descended from ancestor 
B decides to ignore its links with other persons through B*s father A f 
the descendants of B*s brothers.might well continue to recognise A 
as their focal ancestor for several generations, i.e. as long as it is
politically relevant. There is evidence in the case study, to be given
below, that ^deep lineages could be of importance in political competition 
in Gisaka, since higher status and a certain amount of authority were 
allocated among Hutu to those lineages which could establish a claim to be 
longest settled on the Hill. This would require the retention in 
genealogies of politically significant focal ancestors, although these 
might not be the ones which a localized segment used in order to explain its 
diffuse corporate activities. Furthermore, Maquet*s evidence f:or his 
description of the inzu relied heavily on Tutsi- informants; and it is clear 
that Tutsi lineages were deeper than Hutu ones. Pauwels says that Hutu 
lineages could reach five or even six generations before segmenting but:
"Babituellement cepandant, surtout de nos jours, des
scissions peuvent se produire au sein de la parentele
avant qu*elle ait atteint ce developpement" (P;301, 1965)
For these reasons I suggest that the organization of primary Hutu lineages in 
central Ewanda (Maquet) and Gisaka (Gravel) was not essentially different 
as first appears. This is an important preliminary step in establishing 
that the form of Hutu lineage organization was determined by the distribution 
of power between the castes and helped to maintain that distribution.
For central Ewanda and Gisaka were both areas where Tutsi control was 
best established and Tutsi were most numerous - though not, of course, more 
numerous than Hutu.
Three generations were conceptually important in the Hutu primary lineage, 
and indicate the ease with which ancestors were forgotten. An Ego referred 
to all males and females of his own generation as his abavandimwe, of his 
parents* as his ababyeyi, and of his childrens* as his abana, (Pauwels, 1965 
p.313-315; Gravel, 1968, p.119). These terms referred to each generation 
as a group, within the primary lineage. There were certain role—expectations, 
stressing solidarity between members: economic co-operation was expected 
between males of the abavandimwe, and exchange of wives was recognized in 
the form of rights of access (ideologically, referring to the past) and 
first refusal of widows. The boundaries of the primary lineage was also 
symbolized by the joking relationships and avoidance between a person and 
the occupants of those roles in his ego-oriented kin-SJiip network which were not 
lineage members, i.e. those potentially hostile persons with whom co-operation 
was
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necessary, (cf. Rigby, 1968; Mitchell» 1956).
The affairs dealt with by the primary lineage were of two main kinds; 
the internal allocation of economic resources; and the policies to be 
adopted in relation to patrons, political officials and other lineages. 
Communication of decisions took place through the lineage head. The 
latter, called umutware w *inzu in central Rwanda, and umukungu in much 
of the north, did not stand in a simple administrative-hierarchical relation­
ship to lineage members, although he did gain a certain amount of power from 
his intercalary position between the lineage and the state system. The 
lineage head was responsible for assigning individual contributions both 
to military service and the tax levied on each inzu, with both functions 
enforceable by the political authorities. He was also responsible for 
representing lineage members in their dealings with outsiders, except in 
the case of criminals, whom he was supposed to turn over to the state.
On the other hand, lineage members had several sanctions which they could 
operate against overbearing leaders. Succession to the position was 
allocated by the incumbent from amongst his sons, and was usually the 
eldest. The heir received his father.*s wooden stool, lances and bow; and 
also his wives, which he might marry himself or distribute among his 
abavandimwe. However, he had to be approved by the political authorities, 
and in cases where the lineage members themselves disapproved of the choice 
they could appeal to the patron of the dead man (see chapter l). This 
sort of appeal was available in other circumstances, like dispute-settlement 
or the punishment of offenders, and severely limited the powers of lineage 
heads.
The organizational differences of Tutsi lineages from these patterns 
lay in the greater depth of Tutsi genealogies, with the relative un­
importance of the shallow lineage. (My data in the next three paragraphs 
are found in Gravel, 1968, especially in chapter nine). Moreover, they 
had wider geographical connections, and were less oriented to economic 
co-operation. Here there were considerable status distinctions within 
the Tutsi caste, reflecting political and economic power. Poorer Tutsi 
lineages had little more genealogical depth or geographical spread than 
Hutu ones, which can be correlated with the need for economic co-operation 
and localized political concerns. On the other hand, there were certain 
noble Tutsi lineages of great genealogical depth, though still unsegmented. 
These did not function at the level of the Hill, being, rather, important 
in linking political officials at the mwamiTs court and scattered throughout 
the provinces. At this level genealogical depth established these lineages
as belonging to the higher status group among Tutsi, while the lack of seg­
mentation reflects the control of the mwami over political appointments, with 
the goals competed for lying outside the lineage itself. The leaders of 
such lineages were those who held political office and the best opportunities 
for patronage, and the abaami did not weaken their position by allowing 
lineage heads to institutionalize any special claims for themselves. 
Furthermore, the use of these lineages as informal sources of support in 
the central political struggle for office meant that segmentation was 
not in anybodyfs interest, in these circumstances.
It is clear then that the advantages of maintaining as large a group 
as possible fell off among poor Tutsi, and still more so with Hutu lineages, 
when balanced against other factors. Tutsi competition for power required 
agnatic links to as many people as possible, in order to mobilize as much 
support as possible in intrigues and to increase the chances.,of ties with 
the most influential persons. Tutsi moved around the country much more than 
Hutu - with appointment to new offices, following their patrons, or visiting 
the mwamiTs court — and their life-style was adapted to these conditions so 
that lineage solidarity did not depend on economic co-operation to the same 
extent. These remarks apply more to noble Tutsi than to the Tutsi b * impanga. 
The inability of Hutu and poor Tutsi to organize extensive political groups 
was an important factor in their continued subjection, and was itself a 
function of the patron-client relationship which militated against allegiance 
to wider kinship groupings. In the northern areas where the ubuhake ; 
relationship was unknown, where the lineage often had extensive land holdings 
(ingobyi; or ubukonde), and where the feud was uncontrolled by central 
political authorities until the second half of the colonial period, kinship 
groupings were much larger than in areas where the Tutsi dominated mili­
tarily (Lemarchand, 1966a, p.605).
But even at the level of the hill, there were considerable differences 
between Hutu and poor Tutsi life-styles. Within the lineage, the household 
(rugo) might be composed of various categories of persons, though typically 
it was made up of the nuclear family. In many cases there were also some 
of the father*s brother*s children. The members of Hutu lineages tended to 
live in contiguous households, and to co-operate economically. They also 
co-operated in groups of neighbouring lineages. Tutsi, on the other hand, 
settled around their patrons.
As Douglas has pointed out, women are the symbolic tgates* 
of entry to many status groups (1966, p*144)i and. some form of endogamy 
is important in maintaining a status hierarchy. Marriage was not completely 
unknown between Tutsi and Hutu, and Maquet *s bald statement that neither
47
would ever marry Hra- must refer to ideology, since there are oases of 
politically successful Itoa being accepted in about two generations as 
Tutsi (Pauwels, 1967? p.227). But such marriages were extremely rare, 
concerning only those who managed to dispose of their Itoa status by the 
special favour of the mwami. Hutu and Tutsi gave different answers to 
Maquet (1961, appendix) as to whether marriages between the^castes were 
frequent or not; Tutsi claimed that their so-calLed Hutu wives were in 
fact concubines. For Tutsi such marriages clearly involved a loss of 
prestige, and noble Tutsi avoided even those Tutsi clans which were suspected 
of contracting them (see above). Wealthy Tutsi patrons traditionally gave 
their sons "Hutu temporary concubines* wives or daughters of their .. 
clients" (Maquet, 1961, p.77). It is almost impossible to say to what 
extent the ideology of caste endogamy was breached pragmatically, 
except to say that the number of pragmatic exceptions never threatened to 
establish a new rule (cf. Bailey, 1969, pp 205-6). Such exceptions were 
overcome, if a Tutsi father was involved, by forgetting the motherfs origins, 
provided the father was powerful enough to enforce this. If he was not 
powerful enough his children, and perhaps even himself, would be de- 
^Tutsi-ized* (Gravel, 1968, p.23) by being treated as Hutu by the other 
Tutsi - in the same type of process as that described by Bailey (1969, p-98) 
in which caste-climbing in India through securing the services of an appro­
priate ritual specialist is foiled by the higher castes avoiding the 
latter. On the other hand, some abaami found it expedient to appoint a 
few Hutu and Twa chiefs during the nineteenth century (Pages 1933), and 
these had the power therefore to fTutsi-dzef themselves by acting as 
patrons to Tutsi. Often they consolidated this position by taking 
Tutsi wives, if they could(Pauwels 1967 p*227).Well-educated Hutu sometimes 
attempted this strategy in the late colonial period (see chapter l), but 
these cases were very rare as well. Caste endogamy remained in practice 
as well as ideology. It is significant that Gravel, who surveyed 
several aspects of marriage in Remera hill, does not attempt to investigate 
incidence of intercaste marriage, and seemingly assumes it did not occur 
in Remera at least, except in the one case mentioned below.
There were differential marriage patterns in Remera, correlating with 
caste membership. This may be ascribed to the differing functions of 
marriage alliances at the levels of politicalccompetition available to the 
different castes. Hutu lineages could participate in politics only 
at hill level (see below), and were concerned with marriage alliances in 
their mutual competition for the hill chief*s favour — to make themselves
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more attractive as clients. In the colonial period, there was an attempt 
at Remera (1939-1958) to unite the Hutu lineages against the Tutsi hill 
chief. :Even though the latter could not use formal sanctions the 
attempt failed (see below),and there is no direct evidence for Gravel*s 
assertion (1968, p.179) that this strategy sometimes succeeded in the 
precolonial period and led to some Hutu becoming Tutsi. The suspected 
examples of caste-climbing concern the peripheral regions where there were 
few Tutsi,and where the abaami sometimes exploited Hutu clan rivalries rather 
than import a Tutsi governor (cf. Lemarchand, 1970, p.104). Gravel also
ignores the control of appointment exercised by the mwami.
Poor Tutsi lineages living on a Hill avoided marriages with Hutu, 
seeking to maintain the status boundaries which gave them a privileged 
access to political and economic patronage. The political considerations 
in their marriages were much more oriented to patron-client relationships 
than to the lineage alliances sought by Hutu. This is seen in the notable
differences between Hutu and Tutsi in the categories of persons who sought
the bride on their behalf, and made the betrothal gifts of calabashes of 
beer. In Gravel*s survey of 40 Hutu and 19 Tutsi first marriages (p*134)
85% of the former had their brides sought out by their fathers, and only 
5% by their patron. In contrast, 37% of the Tutsi had their brides sought 
out by their fathers, and another 37% by their patrons. ;Even more signif­
icantly, it is clear from another survey of "The distribution of 182 Remera 
wives according to class and distance from their place of origin" (p.135)? 
that Hutu seek marriage alliances locally, while a much greater proportion 
of Tutsi seek theirs in a wider area offering better political rewards..
Thus in the category of wives from contiguous hills we find 72.1% of Hutu 
and 31.6% of Tutsi; in the category of those from 2-14 miles away, there 
were 26.6% of Hutu and 18.8% of Tutsi; in the category from over 15 miles 
away, there were 30% of Tutsi and only 5-6% of Hutu. Because of the number 
of Tutsi wives from unlocated hills, i.e. not contiguous at least, this is 
probably an underestimation of the proportion of Tutsi seeking marriages beyond 
15 miles away, by about 10% (Gravel, p.135). That is'to say, not only 
did Tutsi marry at a greater distance than Hutu but *noble1 Tutsi also tended 
to marry further away than the Bahozi. Whether this is true or not, it is 
clear that as late as i960 there were significant differences between the 
castes in the patterns of marriage alliances which they sought to establish, 
and these may be related to the levels at which political goals were available 
to them. At the same time the marriage patterns themselves helped to 
maintain that distribution of power.
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Marriages followed the acceptance of betrothal gifts or elopement. 
Bridewealth was usually paid after the birth of the first child, consisting 
of hoes — in the case of most Hutu, or cloths or a cow in the case of 
most Tutsi. Following the end of the ubuhake relationship in the 1950s) 
more Hutu had access to cows and tended to pay bridewealth in this form.
"Divorce is easy" (Gravel 1968, p.131), and only the first marriage had 
the minimal degree of ritual described above. Often the bridewealth was 
not repaid, when the divorce took place after the payments had been 
completed, and the father*s lineage retained possession of the children.
The mother*s lineage only retained the children in the case of elopements not 
ratified by the lineage councils. Itoo factors are relevant to stratifi­
cation here. Firstly, "The rate of divorce among the Hutu seems to be 
much higher than among the Tutsi" (ibid, p.132), and most Hutu made 
several marriages in a lifetime. Gravel found that the reasons for 
divorce were mostly ^ personalT. However, we cannot presume that Hutu 
found simply less personal satisfaction in their marriages than Tutsi.
Tutsi marriages were involved in political alliances at higher levels 
than Hutu, as we saw above, and it is likely that: (l) more weight was 
on each individual marriage to maintain an alliance; (2 ) political 
alliances at these levels were decided rather less by economic factors 
involved in a marriage. Secondly, within the Tutsi category the status 
of the man who provided the betrothal gift was in inverse relation to the 
number of calabashes he gave, so that the hill chief of Remera gave only 
one. This is one example of the way in which exchange in Rwanda was 
unbalanced, stressing status differences without even the redistributive 
effects seen in, for example, the hpaga payment among the Kachin of 
Highland Burma (Leach, 1954) P*154)» ^  seems also that relations between
marriage allies within the Tutsi category were more hierarchical than those 
between Hutu, a fact which corresponds to the greater importance of the 
patron-client tie among the former.
A Hutu was dependent on his lineage for his power and status. The 
weaker his lineage and his position within it, the less valuable he was as 
a potential client to a Tutsi patron, and the less likely it was that he could 
use the women of the lineage to create advantageous marriage alliances. At 
the level of the hill, Tutsi did not depend so heavily on their lineages, as 
their tendency to marry at a distance illustrates. Their status depended 
on their capacity to act as patrons, and this in turn depended on their 
rebcbions of clientage "-fco patrons outside the hill. For Hutu this
relationship was possible only in the exceptional cases where there were
no Tutsi competitors - in some peripheral areas of northern and 
western Rwanda; or where Hutu became absorbed as Tutsi, through political 
office. Where Tutsi had firm military control as in Remera, these 
possibilities were precluded. How a Hutu in even the most advantageous 
circumstances could not establish a power base through kinship and marriage 
to challenge Tutsi powers of patronage is clear from the following case 
(Gravel, 1968, chapter XIX).
The Abavuna lineage had a higher status than other Hutu lineages in 
Remera, being at least ideologically one of the longest established on 
the Hill (ibid, p.170). The lineage head in 1939» A,was well placed to 
capitalize on this prestige since (l) he had a strong core of supporters, 
composed of two brothers and three matrilateral allies, (2) his seven 
surviving children were all daughters, (3) be possessed cattle in his 
own right as spoils of war (umuheto). His father, however, was a client of
the hill chief of Remera, When his father died, A tried to free himself
from this relationship by refusing to acknowledge that the hill chief had 
given his father a cow, and he had to be forced to admit it in a court case 
Following this A consolidated his support among his matrilateral allies 
by marrying one of his own, and one of his brother’s, daughters to them.
He then married three more daughters to three different lineages of high 
status among Hutu (expressed in terms of length of residence in Remera), 
which had themselves avoided marriage alliances with ’’long -standing, 
faithful." (ibid, p.173) clients of the hill chief. Ties between 
these high status lineages were strengthened by further inter-marriages 
in the next generation. In the meantime, the hill chief had been succeeded
by his son, Rwamabyogo. A ’s prestige had reached a height at which he was
able to win away by marriage alliances the loyalty of two of Rwambyogo’s 
Hutu clients, one of whom (K) had the important position for a Hutu of 
being -his patron’s cowkeeper. A forced K to give up this position by
threatening to take his daughter away.
Against this growing threat to his prestige, Rwamabyogo manipulated 
his patronage ties to great effect. First he secured influence in the 
Abavuna lineage, and broke its corporate opposition to himself by 
tricking A into giving him a daughter in marriage. A was trying to secure 
an alliance with another high status lineage by marrying his daughter to a 
man who also happened to be Rwamabyogo’s client, and the hill chief paid 
the bridewealth. Within a few days the husband died in suspicious 
circumstances (ibid, p,173) and Rwamabyogo exercised his right, as the 
payer of her bridewealth, to marry the widow, despite the fact that she
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was a Hutu. This manoevre illustrates the extent to which A represented 
a threat. Secondly, he prevented his cowkeeper from getting a cow to pay 
the bridewealth for A's daughter by becoming another Tutsi's client.
The latter was Ewamabyogo;'s client, and it was twice upheld in court that 
Rwamabyogo as patron had the first claim on the cow. Thirdly, having 
broken the solidarity of the Abavuna lineage, he secured as his client A's 
brother's eldest son, who was the probable (later, the actual) heir to the 
lineage headship. When this man supported Rwamabyogo against A in an 
important court case it was clear that the Abavuna lineage was no longer a 
viable support for A's attempt to secure autonomy from Tutsi patronage. 
Fourthly, the court case itself was the result of Rwamabyogo's inheriting his 
father.*s claim to be A's patron, which A had acknowledged..in the 1939 court 
case, and deciding to pursue it. In his conclusion to this case, Gravel 
remarks that Hutu lineages must have been able to limit Tutsi power by this 
process of building marriage alliances. I suggest that on the contrary, the 
inability of Hutu to create extensive patron-client ties, and their reliance 
on ties of kinship and marriage, ensured that they were unable to limit Tutsi 
power. Gravel also says: "A play for power was necessary to reach some 
sort of equilibrium., such incipient :'rebels,' among the Hutu lineages 
appeared regularly. It is possible that the history of their resistance 
overlapped each other in time, in order that a balance of power should be kept 
within the community", , Such teleological arguments are redundant, as Hutu 
attempts to avoid Tutsi exploitation were limited by their lack of resources 
to organization through kinship and marriage, which were vulnerable to patron- 
client organization. As a Hutu proverb said: "let a Tutsi into your house
and he will soon crowd you out", (ibid, p.122).
Besides the primary lineage, there was also a secondary patrilineage 
called umulyango. It should not be confused with the primary lineage 
of the same name in Gisaka. It was the result of the flexibility in the 
system of descent which I described above. It was a group tracing agnatic
relationship through an ancestor ascendant from the recognized inzu ancestor,
and who had been, or might have been, an inzu ancestor. It was again subject 
to the process of forgetting ancestors as they no longer were relevant to 
sought relationships. It enabled wider groups than the inzu to establish 
these links if necessary, though it had less scope in terms of corporate 
obligations (Maquet, 1961),
The Tutsi umulyango was a functioning entity, with considerable 
authority, while the Hutv.seldom organized in this way. It was particularly 
_ important among noble Tutsi because of the influence it gave at
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court. .Among* Hutu, at least by 1916 when the Belgians took over the 
colonial administration, the authority of umulyango heads varied jgefeily 
with the effectiveness of Tutsi occupation. Particularly in areas like 
Bushiru where Hutu abahinza ruled, the -umulyango head was an important figure. 
But after the Belgian military forces installed Tutsi administrators in 
these areas, the office was reduced to a dwindling ’moralTauthority.
(Pauwels, 1965, p.320).
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2: IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL IN RWANDA
(a) STATUS IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL
Maquet lias provided data on. Tutsi status ideology in 1952’ 
which indicate the symbolic lines on which the differentiation 
of status groups was made in Rwandsp, even if we cannot accept 
his conclusion that individual Hutu and Twa necessarily accepted 
the Tutsi evaluation of their position (1961,passim;cf.Berreraan,
1 9<51 ; Gravel, 1 9^8, pp. 1 91-2) . I have already indicated that Tutsi 
political domination did not depend on their monopolizing cattle 
possession and avoiding cultivation* The occupational distinction 
was valid only in ideology, although this does not necessarily 
reduce its significance.
Tutsi control of cattle was stressed as a symbol of their 
superior life-styles as^  patrons,, not as a mundane need. They 
claimed to consume only liquid foods, mainly milk, which they 
held to be proof that they were a different, 'purer* sort of'race' 
from Hutu and Twa. Amidst all the references in the royal ritual 
complex to liquid foods, reference to basic solid food occurs 
only once (d'Hertefelt & Coupez,p.17)• There were clear stereo­
types of the Hutu and Twa as phenomenally greedy, and generally 
governed by the vulgar emotions (see below). These corresponded 
to the physical stereotypes - the Twa were seen as ape-like, and 
the Hutu as somewhere between this and the Tutsi aesthetic ideal 
of slenderness and light skin-colour - and the moral stereotypes. 
The few Hutu in Maquet's survey agreed with the Tutsi that a Hutu 
educated as a Tutsi might improve his character somewhat, but 
could never attain equality because the differences were 'natural! 
The ideology of dietary differences had the latent function of 
integrating the Tutsi caste: 'noble' Tutsi avoided commensality
with the bahozi«, but all were ritually concerned in efforts to 
avoid 'impurities* in milk - which were believed to harm the 
cattle. The control of cattle,, and the ritualized pastoral life­
style, were a soi-t of 'open secret' (cf.Worsley,1957) of Tutsi 
superiority. There were magical sanctions to prevent the Hutu 
servants from revealing that their masters sometimes ate solid 
food.
The virtual endogamy of each of the 'racial* categories, 
with its clear implications for status distinction (see 
above) was supported
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by a functionalistic schema of ideal marriage partners in each category which 
shows the Tutsi view of a .'good Hutu* or a 'good IWa*. For a Tutsi, the 
ideal man was rich in cattle and good at political intrigue; the women were 
good at commanding servants. A Hutu man should be a good labourer and 
client; a woman should be a hard worker in the fields. A Twa man should 
be a good craftsman, hunter or bufoon, liked by a Tutsi patron; women 
should be skilled potters.
Distinct life-styles were indoctrinated from an early age, 
and the behaviour of other status categories could not be easily acquired 
as in precolonial Buganda. The Tutsi were educated by specialists for 
a superior, leisurely life at the court of the mwami or one of his chiefs.
This system continued officially until after the Second World War, and still 
went on surreptitiously in i960 (Gravel, 19^5j p.326) The ideal picture of 
a Tutsi man was composed of military courage; the quality of manhood, which 
meant trustworthiness, moral courage, generosity to friends and to the 
poor Tutsi; and self-mastery, in contrast to the vulgar Hutu and Twa.
The latter learned their more mundane skills within the family.
Gravel provides data on ritual behaviour concerned with-status distinction, 
in his description of "Life on the Manor in Gisaka" (1965). Although he 
writes here of 'nobles.' rather than 'Tutsi,*, it is clear, as he says explicitly 
in (1968, p.2l), that he uses these terms interchangably. The hill-chief 
in Rwanda is likened by Gravel to a medieval lord of the manor: the lord 
and the surrounding community were bound together under the former's personal 
dominance:
"The manor in Rwanda was characterised by a quasi-total 
self-sufficiency, in the sense that it could subsist 
alone rather than in the sense that it did. The 
manor house was the centre of activities, and the 
fortunes of the community were made and undone here, 
headed and arbitrated by the lord-chief let. In a very 
real, sense, therefore, the chieflet, as head of the 
. manor, was the community, and represented the community 
to the world at large. But in the eyes of the community 
he was also the representative of a centralized admini­
stration" (1965, p.324)
Thus the social relationships of the community were focused on the hill-
chief.'s .'manor'-court. Frequent visits had to be paid there, and fgifts.!
brought to him. By i960, when Gravel was there, many ’gifts.* and compulsory
services were officially abolished:
"Nevertheless, there were 'gifts * given sub rosa and 
very widely - the still not forbidden gift of banana wine"
(ibid, p. 325)
The hill-chief used part of these .'gifts* for his own tribute to his patron 
part to entertain his clients and part for his own consumption. Fven after
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the abolition of clientage, some Tutsi tried to enforce purely symbolic 
duties, acknowledging their superiority, by taking defaulting Hutu 
clients to court (Gravel, 1968,pp.l80-l8l)*
The hill-chief determined status-rankingwiihin his community, and 
the daily processes of his administration reinforced and indoctrinated 
the Tutsi status ideology* Representatives of the lineages of the 
community competed at his court for his favour f As his clients they 
were allocated duties according to their status and rank. Hutu clients 
provided manual labour such as guard duties and going on errands, besides 
providing Jgifts*. Tutsi clients served the hill—chief more byway 
of accompaniment, political advice and discussion. They formed a 
retinue as the hill-chief carried out his daily administrative tasks, 
such as dispute settlement. Usually they held the court offices of 
higher prestige ( and thereby acknowledged their patron’s superiority), 
and this was one way the Tutsi b Timpanga were attached to noble Tutsi.
All Tutsi lineages on a hill were attached to the lord in what Gravel 
(1968. .p.158) calls the "nuclear feudal cluster". In Remera, the.fnajor- 
domo 1 who ran the administration of the hill-chief.’s domain was a poor 
Tutsi client of his (ibid.p,32T)» though here the client supervising 
the distribution of land among Hutu was himself a Hutu.
The hill-chief held court each evening, and was attended by both 
Tutsi and Hutu household heads. The ritualised behaviour of paying court 
indoctrinated the ideology of the status hierarchy. The chief was 
usually the only man seated on a chair; the others sat on the floor.
He could only be addressed in an extemely flattering manner, and men 
gained favour by their skill in this art. The flattery was very formal 
and "each client tried to outdo the others in telling of his devotion 
and fidelity" (ibid,p.329)• It usually followed a period in which 
Tutsi clients advertised themselves, each reciting in turn their ibyivugo 
- poems with special rules and vocabulary which they had composed them­
selves telling of their bravery, skill in intrigue, and past successes, 
(cf. Vansina, 1962,p.33). Joking was a significant element in relations 
between castes present, as one might expect between potentially hostile 
persons (cf. Mitchell, 1956). IWa were always present as court enter­
tainers, and there were no limits to the insults and home truths they 
might make to their patrons. Occasionally there was joking between 
Hutu and Tutsi, in which the latter were accused of tyranny and greed.
But these joking relationships were much more difficult than those with
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the TWa: -there was constant emphasis on the fact that they were joking. 
Normally it was unthinkable that a Hutu should insult a Tutsi.(Gravel, 
1965,p.328)
(b) RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL
All Banyarwanda recognised a creator god, Imaana, who had entrusted 
Rwanda to the mwami. It is significant that there was no cult organi­
sation devoted to Imaana - the name referred more usually to the flow of 
mystical life-force than to any personification - so belief in the 
creator god did not offer any opportunity to challenge the mwami in his 
name. On the contrary, the belief helped to legitimate the mwami*s 
rule because he was held to be the supreme possessor of Imaana,even by 
many of the Hutu of the peripheral areas. According to dfHertefelt 
and Coupes:
,Tle rituel royal n*est autre chose que la description 
des techniques qui permettant dfen diriger les effets 
benefiques sur le pays entier" (1964^ . 460)
The ideologies and ritual legitimating the rule of the mwami had 
an essentially religious content; by contrast, religious symbolism 
was only one relatively minor element in the legitimation of the kabaka:fs 
rule in Buganda. Extensive royal ritual activity was regularly necessary 
to maintain the religious welfare of Rwanda; this both required the 
participation of the mwami as a guarantee of cosmic order in times of 
danger, and gave him the religious power on which his position partly 
depended, (ibid,p.3) Tbe significance of these religious rituals was
shown by their frequency and regularity, in strong contrast to their 
virtual absence in Buganda Moreover, the religious welfare of the whole 
country was identified with that of the mwami as its incarnation: the
death of the mwami was referred to as a ^return to normality" because the 
health of the country was believed to decline as did that of an aging 
mwami (ibid,p,4).
Most of the royal rituals were highly esoteric, both in knowledge 
of the forms to be followed and in performance. The abiru who possessed 
this knowledge were from the noble Tutsi lineages, and could only be 
replaced by others of the same lineage. Each mwiru had knowledge of 
only a fragment of the whole complex, except that, in order to prevent 
this giving each one a strong lever of persuasion, the four most import- 
ant abiru knew the whole ritual complex. Since the lineages they repres­
ented were in competition for political office, it was virtually im­
possible for the abiru to unite in opposition to the mwami and control
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him through their monopoly of special religious powers. On the other hand 
the necessity for the performance of the rituals united the competing 
lineages under the mwami. The abiru lived under threat of extreme material 
and metaphysical sanctions if they forgot or divulged any of their secret 
knowledge. They carried out their rites without public witness, and popular 
participation was limited to ritual acknowledgement of the fact that rites 
were taking place. The religious powers of the mwami and his specialists 
remained mysterious and absolute. The population therefore depended wholly 
on the mwami as the source of cosmic welfare. For instance, a crucial 
periodic ritual indoctrinated- this dependence of the whole kingdom. It 
took place at a time when maximum danger was about to be faced, just before 
the start of the dry season, when food was at its scarcest and disease at 
its height. The ritual lasted from the disappearance of the moon in May 
(gicuraasi) until the reappearance of the new. moon. In this period, all 
other ritual activity, including the playing of drums and marriages, was 
forbidden throughout the kingdom. After the mwami had performed his secret 
ritual and the new moon appeared, the renewal of life was celebrated and 
drums were played all over Rwanda to echo the royal drums. As the ritual 
instructions say:
"A ce moment il n*est personne/qui n fait de biere dans le
Rwanda/On dit: fFfforcea-vous d Taller voir les ceremonies de
ficuraasi,/de peur que cette lure ne reste dans vos enclos*" ibid, p.75)
This period of maximum ideological unity was also- the time for the collection 
of important taxes.
D*Hertefelt (1964) distinguishes five main themes in the Rwandan 
myths or origin. Firstly, the Tutsi are of divine origin, being 
descended from the two sons (iCigwa and Mutuutsi) created for a sterile 
goddess by Imaana. Secondly, unalterable natural differences existed between 
Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. These were recounted in many myths in which stereotypes 
of each caste were established (see above). In one myth, Imaana gave a pot 
of milk to a member of each category to guard for the night. The Twa showed 
his gluttony by drinking his pot. The Hutu showed his incapacity and 
clumsiness by falling asleep and knocking his pot over. Only the Tutsi 
carried out this task successfully, and for this reason was put in command 
of the others by Imaana. It is unlikely that Hutu told this type of myth 
to each other. There was a thriving popular Hutu literature in which 
Tutsi domination was recognised and satirised (Maquet, 1964? P*559)*
However,Hutu probably often heard such myths at their patron*s courts, 
where the clear ritualization of existing inequalities of power would 
preclude total cynicism - which may account for the ,fresignation* which 
d*Hertefelt detects in popular Hutu literature (1960b, p.ll8).
Thirdly, the Tutsi brought civilisation to the Hutu and Twa, who then
recognised their right to rule over them. '.Either Kigwa and Mutuutsi or 
Gihanga, the mythical founder of the royal dynasty, were said to have brought 
fire, iron, cattle, pottery and the arts of hunting, agriculture and 
pastoralism to Rwanda. Fourthly, the myth of Kigwa states that revolt 
against the Tutsi would bring down divine wrath on the Hutu. ' Fifthly, 
in the elaborated dynastic poems of the abaami they were presented as the eyes 
and face of Imaana in Rwanda, metephorically-or as an aspect of Imaana 
himself. Some of these myths functioned in uniting the Tutsi group under 
the mwami, and were unknown in the general population; others, particularly 
those concerning inequality between the categories and the supreme goodness 
of the mwami, were well-known by all and used by Tutsi conservatives as an 
argument against caste equality in 1958 (see chapter 7)«
It has been argued that the fact that a Christian was made 
mwami in 1931, by non-traditional means, and that he did not initially keep 
up the ritual practices, undermined the kingship and the ideology it was 
associated with (van der Meeren, 1969). However, we should remember that 
(l) mass participation in religious rites extended to little more than 
recognition of the mwami*s activities, except in the case of the cult of 
Kubandwa (see below). I should note briefly that the propitiation of 
malevolent ancestors involved no corporate obligations between kin (Gravel,
1968, pp.144-5)) and was sought instead from local or national heroes, 
the imandwa (Pauwels, 1957, p.112) by individuals through diviners. (2 )
The symbolism of kingship and the special education of young Tutsi were retained 
in the 1950s, the mwami emphasized strongly his role as channel of the life- 
force, and Christian symbolism did not at all supplant traditional royal 
symbolism. (d*Hertefelt, 1964). (3) The ideological efforts of Tutsi after
1945, and of one Hutu party in 1958, centred on encouraging belief in the 
mwami as the ’father of Rwanda* (dj’Hertefelt, 1960b). (4 ) The main means
of communication of the ideology of the Tutsi and the royal lineage within the 
caste was the cult of Kubandwa, particularly of Ryangombwe (Vidal, 1967)-, 
not the esoteric rites themselves.
Ryangombwe was by far the most famous of the imandwa, and his cult 
was joined by most people (Maquet, 1961). They were believed to^ go 
to a special place when they died, where they lived much more pleasantly 
than other spirits. Heusch (1966,.p,172) argues that the myth of 
Ryangombwe, and the process of initiation, provided a periodic mystical 
negation of the stratified social order. The argument is that it may have 
acted as a safety-valve for accumulated hostility between the castes (cf.
Turner, 1969). Thus, in the myth, Ryangombwa’s followers included Tutsi,
Hutu and Gtoa, and they were so loyal that they could not bear to be parted 
from him even in death, commiting suicide when he was killed.
59
Initiation in the cult involved the use of phrases like ,'We are-all Twa* 
and ,*I don't like cattle* (Arnoux, 1913r p.7^5)* The validity of 
Heusch;*s argument is difficult to test. Within the context of Banyarwanda 
cosmology, the statements reported hy Arnoux might well simply indicate the 
liminality of the ritual of initiation (cf. Turner, 1969). Vidal has argued 
that the cult of Kubandwa was the means by which royal ideology was pop­
ularized - not by the 'word* of the royal dynastic secret rites, hut by 
contact with the 'shrine* (cf. Gellner, 1969» PP*7-8)* Royal ritual 
remained secret but it was 'copied* in the initiation rites of the cult 
(Vidal, 1967, pp. 153-5)* Vidal disputes Heusch's interpretation and 
concludes that Kubandwa
"revele, au contraire, 1 'assujettissement, joue dans un
ritual, de toutes les castes a la royaute" (p,15l).
The ritual itself took place within the lineage and so did not bring Tutsi 
Hutu and Trfa together. Membership of the cult was widespread, but did 
not involve recognition of any corporate rights and duties, propitiation being 
made individually. (Pauwels, 1957) pp.128-9)
The Wyabingi cult which was found in the north (ibid, p.235) and 
spread to the east in the early colonial period at the time of resistance 
to Tutsi rule, did have an ongoing organization. Wyabingi had various 
mythical "identities, but the main point was she had somehow managed to 
succeed her father as king of Mdorwa. She was a Tutsi, but the mwami of 
Rwanda had her murdered and then annexed Wdorwa under loose military control. 
According to myth Nyabingi was invisible, not dead, and was a very powerful 
protector of her people (ibid, p.236). Her protection was obtained through 
the mediation of male and female spirit mediums. The latter were hereditary 
and had much political power, since they received large payments for their 
services and used this to create extensive military retinues of clients 
(ibid, p.242). The formal organization of the cult was suitable for 
co—ordinating resistance to the mwami among the small political groups of 
the north, and was utilised in several rebellions ( d'Hertefelt, 1962, p.86: 
Pauwels, 1957) PP«245j 253: Lemerchand, 1970 pp 59-60 & 100-102).
The abaami attempted to stamp out the cult by executing its leaders 
(ibid, p.245 & list of names on pp.253-254). After its use in the early 
period of colonial rule, the Belgian Administration officially banned it 
in 1922. It continued to exist illegally, and Gravel met members in i960 
(1968, p.147). What is clear, both in the north and in Gisaka, was its 
adoption as a .'blueprint * for organizing the disparate groups opposing the 
mwami and the Tutsi of central Rwanda in the nineteenth century and the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, the period when the conquest of the
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peripheral areas took place. However, it did not play any 
documented part in the Hutu revolt which began in 1959* I 
suggest that this was the result of the struggle of Hutu 
against Tutsi rule, which it represented, taking a 'secular 
activist' form (cf•Worsley,1957>P •255)•
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INEQUALITY IN RWANDA
The purpose of this chapter is the provision of a model for under­
standing the political institutions through which unequal relations between 
the castes were practised, and for the preservation of which the dominant 
political group tried to ensure the observation of the symbolic boundaries 
of the supportive status hierarchy. As in other chapters, it will be a 
model in the sense that the data will be analysed to elucidate the socio­
logical sources of the unequal distribution of power, and it is not 
intended to provide a historical reconstruction of the Banyarwanda 
political system at any particular stage or series of stages. Thus I will 
lay more stress than have other writers on the position of the army in 
maintaining stratification in the precolonial period, even though this 
structure was formally abolished by the Belgian Administration in 
1926. In this way I hope to show the significance of the dialectical 
interaction of cultural and structural processes, which change at different 
rates (Cohen, 1969b). A straightforward historical analysis of the 
relationship between the arny; structure and the status hierarchy cannot 
show both their interdependence and the historical existence of the latter 
without the former after 1926. Nevertheless, the model seeks to show pro­
cesses of change, and historical data will be used to analyse the interaction 
of the structural and cultural variables, as these have been isolated by 
the model.
Before 1926, in the areas where the Tutsi had institutionalized their 
military control, every Munyarwanda was assigned to an army company 
(umutwe, Vansina, 1963, P*349) from birth. However, only Tutsi could carry 
arms and form the warrior*s section (ingabo). There were several armies at 
any time since each new mwami organized one at the beginning of his reign, 
and authorized army chiefs (umugabe, or umutware w * ingabo) to raise others 
to meet various exigencies (Vansina, 1962, p.57)* My data on army 
organization in Rwanda is found mainly in Maquet, 1961.
The core of each ingabo was made up of the young Tutsi men fwho 
were chosen1 (intore) to have military training to be warriors, at the court 
either of the mwami or the army chief. They were all sons of the direct 
clients of the king, the bagaragu b ,ibwami bakuru (Lemarchand, 1970» p.154). 
They formed companies of about 150 to 200 men, and several such companies 
were formed in each reign. They were trained in warfare by an army chief 
and indoctrinated in the Tutsi ideology and life-style of superiority.
Around this company of intore was formed the rest of the army, unarmed and
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recruited in inzu groups under -their inzu head (see below). The intore 
companies of armed warriors at the king’s command did not represent any 
regional or lineage-based interests within, in the country as a whole or 
within the status group of noble Tutsi. They were well-placed to maintain 
discipline in Rwanda’s political organization without threatening the 
corporate interests of the status group from which they were recruited.
The border regions were occupied by the intore companies, and the new 
ones formed by a new king replaced the old ones as soon as their training 
was completed. The old intore did not disappear, but withdrew to the 
central regions. The military functions of the army consisted of conquest 
and raiding rather than defence, for Rwanda was in a process of expansion 
throughout the nineteenth centruy. Its armies constantly undertook campaigns 
against her neighbours, from base camps in the border regions. Usually these 
were raids lasting only a few days, on the army chief’s initiative, with 
the purpose of bringing back cattle. But the kings did sometimes undertake 
more extensive campaigns, like Rwabugiri’s in the north and west of Rwanda 
(Pages, pp. 193-5)* Raiding in border areas was frequent before 1900, 
and tax collection there was little distinguished from raiding.
There was also a herdsman’s section (umushumba.), tending the herds of 
cattle attached to each army. The army chief was responsible for these 
cattle, and had under his command several chief herdsmejj. The cattle 
were classified according to the rights in them held by different persons. 
Ownership in an absolute sense was not a concept used; the nearest to it 
was the ideological ownership of all cattle ultimately by the mwami (Gravel 
1968, p.24) - thus all cattle held by other ‘means than clientage were known 
among other things, as inka z 'umwami (the mwami *s cattle). The important 
rights were those enabling a person to use the cattle to record a relationship 
of patronage to another person (see chapter l). Thus the army cattle were 
classified as: (l) those which only the mwami could use, the nyambo and 
mabara. Nyambo were rare long-horned cows associated with the kingship, 
and all belonged to the mwami; they had considerable symbolic importance. 
Mabara were ordinary cows used by the king to record clientage. (2) 
those which the army chief could use, some of which were attached, to his 
office and some of which were his personally. (3) those which an intore 
could use. (4 ) those which a herdsman could use. A man holding cattle 
as a client might have the usufruct of them, and be able to use them himself 
to record clients of his own. Gattle which were not obtained from a 
patron were of several kinds: those obtained by exchange (impahono), or
bridewealth (indogoranyo), war booty (umuheto) or gift (inka z’ubuntu).
All these classes were known as imbata, or as the mwami Ts cattle (see above). 
However, the imbata of herdsmen were taxed, while those of the intore were 
not.
The intore were recruited on an individual basis, as the sons of the 
mwami*s clients, and they were all Tutsi. Other Tutsi, who formed-he 
herdsmen’s section, and Hutu and Twa who acted as carriers for the intore, 
were recruited through their primary, or sometimes their secondary, lineages.
The political and army chiefs dealt with the inzu heads and not with indiv­
idual members. The inzu head, who had to supply a certain amount of tribute 
or a number of men to the army, decided which individuals within the group should 
s_uppl35ffcb.ese demands. Maquet argues that this ”integration into one single 
structure of two systems which embodied different principles of grouping" - 
i.e. the recruiting of intore on the basis of personal loyalty to the mwami 
without regard to kinship or regional groupings;an4the kinship base of the 
recruitment of the other sect ions,-contributed considerably to social 
cohesion. (1961, p.119). This formulation is simply tautologous, and 
ignores the more important question of the mode of integration. Kinship 
groupings were clearly subjected to armed groups of the mwamifs clients, and 
had no autonomous resources of military power. Social coheBsion in these 
circumstances may be ascribed less to mechanisms of the social structure 
than to physical constraint.
The kinship groupings were also limited in their autonomy by the 
dependence of their leaders on the army for powers of enforcement in the 
discharge of their responsibilities for taxation and recruitment. This 
took the form of confiscation, for the army and not the inzu head, of all the 
property of a man who refused to p.ay* Some writers(Maquet 1961, van der 
Meeren 1961, Lemarchand 1970) claim that appeal to the army chief was possible 
against inzu head’s over-exploitation or victimisation of his political rivals. 
Success in this venture was probably more successful than other types of 
appeal (see below), since it was generally to the army chief’s advantage 
to break up the unity of lineages which, in the Tutsi category at least, 
might be used to organize informally against his incumbency of the office.
On the other hand, the inzu head had to be supported in his efforts to secure 
tribute; and van der Meeren (1969) mentions that the inzu head was the 
normal channel of appeal to the army chief.
The army was one means of taxation in- Rwanda, and this took several 
forms. Firstly, there was the indabukirano gift of a cow to the mwami 
by each lineage of the army at his accession. At the same time, there was 
a ritual called murundo, at which all the army cattle in Rwanda were countei
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and classified, and presented to the mwami, who then took some of them 
for his own use. Thirdly, certain of the cattle taken in raids were said 
to belong to the king. Fourthly, the Tutsi in each army were responsible 
for the upkeep of a part of the royal residence. Fifthly, each army 
had to keep some of its cows near the royal court in order to supply the 
mwami.with tribute in fresh milk. These cows formed a special herd 
called intamara, and again they were taken only from those of Tutsi in 
the herdsman section. They had to supply the court daily with the 
milk tribute and slaughter animals; and with cattle used for divination 
purposes. All these taxes could only be paid by those who had cattle, 
mainly Tutsi. But Hutu and Twa also paid taxes through the army 
structure, in agricultural produce and craft products (see below).
Like the mwami, the army chief received an indabukirano to recognise 
his authority when he took office, and he also took umurundo cattle if the 
mwami granted him the favour of a numbering ritual. The army chief could 
also use the cattle attached to his office through taxation. He had 
rights over certain of the cattle taken in raids. Less formally, he 
often received a cow from a subject in his army who wanted to secure his 
intervention in a dispute. It is here that we can see the reality of
the freedom of subjects to appeal to the army chief against over-
exploitative patrons and lower chiefs, on which Maquet and other writers lay 
so much stress. It seems that Goderei’s description, so strongly criticised 
by Lemarchand (1966a, p.604), of the ’^protection* offered in this way 
as being not of the type offered by Chicago gangsters (1962, p.86), is 
broadly accurate*
The main function of the army taxation system was to re-distribute 
wealth in favour of the noble Tutsi, first of all, and then of the whole 
Tutsi caste. It channelled labour and consumption goods to the mwami. 
Secondly, it re-distributed cattle with the result that status and political 
roles were congruent. By the means described above, cattle were channelled 
to the mwami. Almost all these cattle were used to record ubuhake
relations with his arny chiefs. They in turn could grant the usufruct of
the same cattle to their own clients, j. However, this did not give them 
any opportunity to build up an autonomous power—base, for instance in a border 
region, from which to challenge the mwami: the army chief was a client of
the king, and instantly dismissable from the office which gave him the ability 
to act as a patron. The mwami had several armies at his 'disposal - to 
enforce these relationships in any one of them,as ©an be seen from the 
fate of the Tutsi first governor of Bushiru under Rwabugiri (Pauwels, 1967)
P.287).
65
Cattle were -thus transferred from lesser Tutsi and Hutu to the nohle 
Tutsi and this difference corresponded to the relative positions in the 
hierarchy of political administration. The Hutu and poor Tutsi obtained 
their cattle principally by clientage, but also by bridewealth and looting 
the enemy after the army!s share had been captured by the special section 
of drivers, the abakoni. Cattle acquired by these means were constantly 
brought under the control of political officials through taxation. They 
were then redistributed from the top in the recording of patron-client 
relationships, through which the clients gained their usufruct. Control 
was thus maintained over the symbols of power, and no opportunity for 
independent patronage given.
Many writers have stressed the protection which an army is said 
to have afforded its members. Political struggles often took place through 
judicial processes. It was essential to have an influential patron supporting 
the case, since decisions were determined by the relative political powers 
of the contestants (Gravel, 1968, p.l66). Maquet and van der Meeren 
write that the army chief could not refuse to help one of his subjects.
Their evidence for this statement is highly questionable, consisting of (l) 
a statement by Kagame (1952, p.38) - a leading Tutsi politician and ideologist 
(see chapter 7)» who, according to Vansina (1962, pp 5~9)» made extensive 
use of historiography as propaganda - that three army chiefs were dismissed 
by Rwabugiri for such refusal; (2) answers to a questionaire given by Maquet 
to informants who were almost exclusively Tutsi (Maquet, 1961, p.179 appendix 2). 
Furthermore, Maquet himself mentions that the army,chief could refuse assistance 
if the subject had in any way been disloyal - a question which he himself judged. 
A tutsi who was in dispute with his army chief might theoretically seek the 
patronage of another, but this was a risky business, as I showed in chapter 1.
There is no evidence that Hutu had access to the army chief or the mwami, 
and considering other aspects of stratification it is most unlikely. The 
army was the instrument of Tutsi domination and, I suggest it maintained the 
social order less by its 1 prptective functions1 than by preventing the 
organisatb n of Hutu political groups larger than the lineage. In the 
north and west, where such Hutu groups existed, Tutsi had only sketchy 
control and were subject to constant rebellions. It was only an increase 
in the military force at their disposal, provided by the German and Belgian 
Administrations, which ultimately enabled the Tutsi to establish their 
administration over all modern Rwanda (Vansina, 1962, p*96ff.)
The army administration fitted in with the territorial administration, 
which should be seen as its more institutionalized form (see Vansina 1962, 
p.57). Each army had a pasture area, within which all hill chiefs were
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appointed by the army chief, with the approval of the mwami. The Hill chief 
in Tutsi-controlled areas administered the pasture lands of his hill 
(igikingi, pi. ibikingi), on which all army cattle except the royal inyambo 
were grazed. The inyambo had to graze on the army chief’s hill. The 
hill chief did not allocate ibikingi from those under his control without 
permission from the army chief. The Tutsi holder was secure so long as 
he paid tribute. He could reserve some of it for his cattle, and grant 
the usufruct of the rest to his Hutu clients who provided the food products 
which he needed (see chapter l).
Hot enough attention has been paid in the anthropological literature 
on Rwanda to the considerable differences in the forms of political 
administration in the diverse regions. The proportion of the dominant 
Tutsi category in the population varied considerably in different regions 
of Rwanda, from under 5f0 1° over 4&/o. There were two main areas of difference 
in the 1950s: central Rwanda (over 1 million inhabitants), and the
eastern and western areas - in all of which the Tutsi population averaged 
about 20fa and the north and north west (about 600,000 inhabitants) where 
they were never more than 10^ S (d’Hertefelt , 1960a, pp.452-3).
Administrative differences corresponded with these different degrees of Tutsi 
settlement. And even in the recently-conquered eastern and western areas, 
where the administrative structures were the same as in central Rwanda, 
there were revolts at the end of the nineteenth century when the centre was 
weakened by civil war. In the north, some Hutu petty kings kept a 
considerable amount of autonomy until the 1920s. In these areas, such 
Tutsi administration as there was, was overtly military, as in the taxation
campaigns. In the central area, taxation was more regular and
institutionalized; but it was also administered by chiefs who were tied 
to the mwami or to an army chief.
There were three main categories of local political structure in
the peripheral areas of Rwanda, where there were relatively few Tutsi, by 
1900 (Vansina, 1962, p.68): (l) the military provinces under army chiefs, 
where the administrative systems of central Rwanda were being slowly 
introduced: (2) the areas ruled by petty Hutu kings, the abahinza .
(3) the areas ruled by Hutu clan heads, the abakonde (note: category 2 sometimes 
were referred to by this name, cf. Pauwels, 1967j p.210). The areas in 
which these structures were found — listed by Pauwels (1967, p.209)—describe 
a wide arc around central Rwanda from the north-east to the south-west 
through the north-west, Tutsi rule was established over all this region 
in the colonial period, but some abahinza and abakonde survived informally 
to play an important part in the Hutu revolution of 1959 (Lemarchand, 1970,
p.104).
The abahinza ruled petty Hutu kingdoms, within which they had 
considerable powers. Ideologically, these powers rested on their 
claims to desc ent from the original settlers of the country, and 
were associated with the maintenance of its fertility and welfare: 
abahinza were rainmakers and essential participants in harvest 
rituals. The abahinza received tribute from clan heads. Like the 
mwami, they established their wives as politically reliable agents 
on estates throughout the country. (Vansina 1962) Generally, they 
accepted the sovereignty of the mwami of central Rwanda, and paid him 
tribute.
The abakonde were considerably less powerful than the abahinza 
both internally and externally. They were lineage heads, controlling 
small areas in a state of considerable political flux (Maquet & d 1 
Hertefelt, 1959* P«9) Like the abahinza they paid a token tribute 
to the mwami of central Rwanda (Pages 1933, p.690-691).
The political administration of the central and eastern regions 
of Rwanda has usually been described schematically as consisting of 
units at different levels, and this' does in part reflect the taxation 
system. But as I argued above this was not a neat hierarchy through 
which the orders of the mwami were executed. The terms for the differ­
ent areas administered were as flexible as those for kinship groupings 
of varying size and scope. Rather than signifying abstractly con­
ceived administrative areas such terms refer to the relationship between 
a ruler and the person who appointed him. Furthermore, different 
officials had authority over the same area in different spheres. 
Boundaries between administrative areas were altered at the convenience 
of the mwami to meet new situations, particularly at the provincial 
level. (Vansina, 1962, p.57).
There were 70 to 9® ’districts* in Rwanda in the late nineteenth 
century (Maquet, 1961, p.lC4). At this level there were two sorts of 
chiefships. They were independent of each other except in the rare 
cases where they were.held by the same individual. Several factors 
were operative in their appointment, which perhaps accounts for the 
disagreements in the sources over who did appoint them. But while 
patrons of different kinds might recommend them, only the approval of 
the king was decisive. Both chiefs were principally concerned with 
taxation: the land chief (umunyabutaka) with agricultural tribute,
and the cattle chief (umunyamukenke) with that from cattle. Thus the 
land chief was responsible for organising the payment by Hutu of tribute 
in labour, harvest produce (uguhunika) and bananas for beer (amavu).
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He might use any of the lower officials to assist him - hill chief, 
neighbourhood head, or lineage head. The cattle chief was responsible 
for tribute from cattle-holders, who were mostly Tutsi, in jars of milk 
and cattle (inkuke). These taxes (ikoro, Pages, 1933) were collected 
at the local royal residence which existed in each district, administered 
usually by one of the mwami*s wives, or a concubine. Both district 
chiefs took a proportion of the tax which they collected. .Estimates 
of how much they took can only be conjectural, since the method of 
collection was that the land chiefs were responsible for a certain 
amount and then collected as much for themselves beyond that as they 
could. '.Even Maquetls Tutsi informants said that land chiefs took about 
one—third of the total amount collected. In theory, cattle chiefs 
could not take anything for themselves, which may point to a further 
difference in the treatment of Tutsi and Hutu.
Within the district there was a more or less permanent administra­
tive area corresponding to Rwanda*s most notable topographical feature, 
the hill (umusozi). The hill chief became in 1926 the colonial •sub- 
chief1; as most personnel and many aspects of the role remained un­
changed, I follow Gravel in retaining the same term for the whole period, 
specifying changes as relevant, and referring to ^sub-chiefs* only in 
regard to official statistics and documents from the later colonial 
period. Maquet states that the hill chief was subordinate to the 
district chiefs, but produces no evidence for this statement (p.140), 
and Gravel (1968, p,24n). considers that he has overestimated theirpower.
The appointment of hill chiefs was determined largely by the army chief, 
with the mwami*s approval (Lemarchand, 1970* P*37)* They assisted the 
district chiefs in tribute collection, and themselves appointed agents 
as heads to neighbourhood clusters of families on the hill. These heads 
were known as umukoresha, and together with the inzu heads they did the 
actual collection of the tribute. Hill chiefs also took a certain 
amount of tribute - perhaps as much as the land chief if Maquet (1961, 
p.102-103) is right. District chiefs were themselves also hill chiefs, 
on their own hills. Hot all the hills in a district were subject to the 
ordinary hill and district chiefs. There were always several hills 
held by direct clients of the mwami, or persons bound to him by categorical 
moral ties; (l) ibikingi hjibwami, held by personal clients of the king; 
(2 ) estates of the abiru (see below); (3) estates of the army of pro­
vincial chief; (4 ) royal residences, managed usually by one of the king*s 
wives or concubines; there were 21 of these in Rwabugiri.*s reign, and 
another three held by the queen mother (Kagame, 1952 p.124); (5) royal
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burial places, of which the most famous was Rutare, near Kigali. All 
these were exempt from tribute to the district chiefs. Thus the more 
bureaucratic administrative system was cross-cut by the estates granted 
to favourites, relatives, and the abiru. This provided the mwami with 
an efficient ./alternative Staff*, in the sense used by Weber in his dis­
cussion of the growth of patrimonial government. It is here rather than 
to the administrative and military structures that we should look for the 
competition of staffs (cf. Maquet, 1961 - see below), though it still 
should not be overstressed. The estates were integrated in the army 
administrative system as far as the cultivators who lived on them were 
concerned; but their holders did not have always to pay the same tribute 
to the mwami as on the ordinary hills.
The usefulness of structural models of the territorialT, ’military* 
and ’patron-client.* institutions in Rwanda should not lead us to regard 
them as empirically separate entities, as do many writers (e.g. Maquet,
1961, p.154; d’Hertefelt, 1962; Gluckman, 1965* pp .156—7 .$ Hemarchand,
1970, p.273). For these writers, the key to understanding the precolonial 
political system in Rwanda lies in the ’cohesion-producing conflict,* (cf. 
Gluckman p.xxii) of the ’’several structures’’ (Maquet) or ’’parallel hier­
archies” (Lemarchand). Firstly, this enabled the small group of Tutsi 
to retain their unity under the mwami, despite their intense struggle for 
power, for purposes of ruling the Hutu and Ttoa. Membership of the 
’’parallel hierarchies” cross-cut each other, so that the formation of 
interest groups which might change the system was impeded. Secondly, 
the Tutsi did not provoke the Hutu and TWa to revolt, by going beyond 
’’moderate and intelligent exploitation” (Maquet), because their own 
struggle for power enabled the lower castes to play off one Tutsi patron 
against another. In my view, these theories of ’balancing structures* 
are inaccurate and misleading as regards Rwanda.
I have already dealt with the argument that army membership and, in 
particular, appeal to an army chief afforded any protection to Hutu, and 
concluded that it did not. Secondly, the playing-off by Hutu, of one 
Tutsi patron against another, particularly in judicial processes, was not 
practicable: this is clear from the conclusions of Reisdorff*s survey of
legal cases in precolonial Rwanda (1952,p.148, quoted by Codere, 1962,p.62):
”Le recours du (shebuja) etait possible a condition ^u’il 
s*interesse au sort de son umugaragu et que 1 ’adversaire 
de celui-ci ne soit pas de ses amis..ou un personnage trop 
influent pour 6tre mis en accusation.. .He toute maniere un 
proces durait plusieurs annees".
This assessment is supported by Gravel (1968, p.162), and we should
remember that the probation period for a Hutu seeking a new clientship
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to a Tutsi was 2-3 years (chapter l). Even Maquet.'s hypothetical 
illustrative case (1961,p.154-) admits that gifts would he required to 
persuade an army chief to act against a man *s patron - and a priori 
reasoning suggests the latter would he in a better position to offer 
such gifts; I have already shown that such a course was open only to 
Tutsi. Mo evidence from a non-Tut si source has ever heen given to 
suggest that the playing off of patrons occurred or was possible, or 
that district, hill and army chiefs ever confronted each other over 
their Hutu clients* interests. Thirdly, the district *chiefs* were 
tax—collecting officials, without formal authority over other hill 
chiefs. They were rewarded with the right to collect what they could 
beyond the mwami *s ikoro for themselves, i.e. this process wits a type 
of tax—farming; I suggest these offices were distributed as a favour 
to his most loyal hill chief clients by the army chief or the mwami.
A more plausible process than appeal to army or district chiefs as 
alternative patrons would be appeal by a man to his hill chief against 
their exploitation; whether this would produce any result or not would 
depend on the factors mentioned by Reisdorff (above). Hutu could ex­
pect advantage from patronage by Tutsi only in their struggles against other 
Hutu, and as the best available chance of security of life and land- 
holding (chapter l). Fourthly, the patron-client system derived from 
the political system and did not constitute a separate or parallel power 
structure which might cross-cut it (chapter l). Most hill chiefs in a 
province were ubuhake clients of the army chief; those who were not, 
were direct clients of the mwami, the queen mother and the abiru ( Gravel, 
1968,p.24) " this type of clientage did act against an army chief building 
a regional base, as did the mwami*s practice of moving hill chiefs at will, 
and employing Twa as police spies. Finally, I have shown that the 
'territorial' administration was only a more institutionalized form of 
the army administration.
The same type of argument is brought forward to explain the
power of the mwami - i.e. that he could play off competing chiefs
against each other and prevent the formation of large groups and
factions (see also van der Meeren, 1969 j d'Hertefelt, 1960a). However,
this is contrary to the historical data provided by Vansina (1962,p.72ff.)
"Depuis Rujugira (d.circa 1768) au moins.. il y eut deux factions 
a la cour. L'une Itait representee par le favori du roi, qui 
tenter de faire distribuer des fiefs et des richesses a ses 
partisans, 1 'autre etait formait dejiignages, qui tentait de 
perdre le favori aux yeux du > roi et de le faire remplacer par 
un de leurs. Cette lutte des factions Itait toujours 
favorable a la royaute parce qu'elle emp£chait une coalition
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des vassaux contre le roi el qufel]a affaiblissait chaque 
parti, puisqu.*elle le rendait de plus en plus dependant de 
luin. •
Vansina's own explanation here is open to doubt, since succession wars
were very frequent ('he himself suggests open war followed the deaths of
one in every two kings), despite such devices as co-ruling heirs. The mode
of succession (see below) means there were usually several possible heirs
and, as in Buganda (cf. Southwold, 1966), I suggest that the victor was the
one who could secure the best military-political support through his matrilateral
alliances (see role of queen mother, below) and patronage. This is born
out by the struggles which followed Rwabugiri*s death, in 1895-7 (see below).
Since a mwami was usually installed by the most powerful group of nobles, whether
he was their ;fpuppetT or not depended on his ability to use the institutions
they had put in his hands. In the late nineteenth century, the mwami*s power
was at an unprecedented height, built up by two exceptionally able and
long reigning abaami (cf. ibid.): Ewogera (c, 1830-60) and Ewabugiri
(c. I860i_l895). But the succession of a young, inexperienced mwami in
I895 was followed by a revolt and the installation of a boy as the Abanyiginya
fpuppet* of the Abega clan (Lemarchand 1970* £*57)*
The mwami was formally an arbitrary monarch, in the technical sense 
of this description; he was the ”source and symbol of all authority"
(ibid. p.27). That is, he was not limited by custom - in fact, Ewabugiri 
had the power to alter customs on his own initiative (Vansina, 19&2, p.71) - 
in his control of persons and property in Ewanda, He was not accountable 
for his actions, and as a judge his decisions were final. This was the 
theory of the administrative process (cf. M.G. Smith), and it was supported 
by extensive ideology and ritual. The limitations on his power were those 
of the political process, for he had always to ensure the support of his own 
Abanyiginya clan and not to range all the noble Tutsi lineages against him.
The position of the mwami as hypostatised by the colonial powers was, 
in fact, the product of a recent process of rapid expansion begun by 
Ewogera and achieved particularly by Ewabugiri (l860-l895)* Besides his 
extensive campaigns in the north and west, which were fairly successful, 
and those in Congo and Burundi, which were not, Ewabugiri extended his power 
over the noble Tutsi lineages by preventing hereditary succesion and centra­
lized further the authority of local chiefs. He reorganized territorial 
units, altering their boundaries to prevent the growth of local loyalties, 
and increased the number of provinces to 21 (Vansina, ibid.) But the 
power of the mwami was still not uniform throughout Ewanda, even after the 
colonial Administration had enforced Tutsi rule in the peripheral areas by 
1925-30.
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Succession to the kingship, symbolised by the royal drums (kalinga) 
was by the mwamij’s choice from among his own sons. In theory, the 
choice was not announced but entrusted to three of the abiru called jfthe 
keepers of the secret1. But this practice was not exclusively followed 
at least by Rwabugiri, (see below). As a method, it facilitated succession 
disputes, which Vansina concludes were frequent (see above). The formal 
powers of the mwami may be summarised as follows. He appointed the provincial 
army and district chiefs, and his approval was required for the appointment 
of hill chiefs. He fixed administrative boundaries and raised new armies, 
or allowed them to be raised by a few trusted clients. There was no form 
of administrative or political process of which he was not the head. He 
had complete contol over individual rights (cf. P.O. Lloyd, 1965, p. 9®) 
in that he could order the arbitrary execution of any person, or reverse 
executions determined by the courts. That he exercised this power can be 
seen from the list of noble Tutsi executed by Ewabugiri given by Pages 
(1933, pp 190-192). He was able to retain control of recruitment, and 
even Tutsi of the highest rank were individually insecure in office.
The role of queen mother (umugabekasi) had a certain amount of 
patronage to dispense, and this, together with her influence with the 
mwami, made it a target of noble Tutsi competition. The role had 
always to be occupied. When the mwami ’s own mother died she was replaced 
by an Official.1 mother appointed by the king. She travelled everywhere 
with him, and she had her own court. Pauwels gives one example of her 
patronage powers: Ewabugirifs queen-mother gave Kingogo to a favourite
and. he raised an army to assert this right (1967, p.22l). However, her 
power was entirely dependent on the mwami*s, and when he died she became 
once again a commoner. Most writers state that in the nineteenth century 
the queen mother was always chosen from the Abega clan. But Pages (1933, 
p.96) states that Rwabugiri’s queen mother was an Abakono, and that the queen 
mother of his designated successor, Rutalindwa, was also from that clan.
If this is true it gives some insight into the long-term political processes 
involved in the succession struggle immediately before the German occupation. 
By custom, an ’official1 mother could not be the genetrix of one of the king’s 
sons; this would have created a dangerous rivalry. Ewabugiri violated 
this rule by appointing one of his wives, a Mwega, who had already born 
him a son called Musinga, as official queen mother to his designated heir, Rut­
alindwa. Lemarchand suggests he did this to keep Abega loyalty while he 
edged them out of power (1970, p.57)* But when Rutalindwa succeeded in 
I895, the Abega clan rallied behind Musinga and put him on the throne after 
the palace murder of Rutalindwa.
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As a result of Musinga! *s installation with a Mwega favourite, Kabale, 
the Abahega benefited at the expense of the Abanyiginya, who had been mono­
polising the provincial chiefships (Pages, 1933* p.20l) but were divided 
by Musingai’s revolt (ibid. p.189). In these struggles the position of 
the queen mother was clearly crucial in gaining access to office and, in 
this case, to the kingship itself. • The historical evidence suggests a 
process in which the Abanyiginya royal clan was seeking to decrease its 
dependence on various clan allies, as Ewogera and Ewabugiri played off 
the Abega and Abakono against each other in the competition for the queen 
mothership. It was in their reigns that the power of the mwami increased 
considerably in Ewanda (see above). Finally, it is clear that, as in 
Buganda, the queen mothership gave clans other than the royal one access 
to the kingship, thereby increasing its legitimacy. In Ewanda it ensured 
the ability of noble Tutsi to act as a political group vis-a-vis other 
units in the society, despite their internal struggles.
Few offices were hereditary even within the clan in Ewanda; besides 
the mwami, there were only the abiru (Lemarchand, 1970* p*32). These 
were very important officials concerned with the preservation of correct 
ideology in the kingship and the kingdom. This knowledge was esoteric and 
they were charged with its practise in ritual. Each of them had a 
specialized part in the whole ideological complex, and their co-operation 
was essential to the mwami!*© authority. They were ranked in a fixed 
hierarchy. They were not wholly independent of the king, despite being 
exempted from tribute and having a hereditary element in their appointment, 
for he could dismiss them for disloyalty. But the abaami had not been 
able to dispose of them or create a rival hierarchy of ritual experts.
It may be that the ideological functions of the abiru were too important 
or, more likely, any attempt to remove them completely would have produced 
conflict with the noble Tutsi lineages, which had vested interests in the 
offices since the incumbents were drawn from them, and they were a means of 
exercising some control over the mwamij’s behaviour. This control should 
not be exaggerated, and they declined very much under Ewabugiri (Vansina, 
1962, p.72), but it was at least significant that when a mwiru was 
dismissed his successor had to be appointed from the same lineage.
The duties of the abiru, of whom there were ten (Vansina, 1962 and tty* 
Hertefelt, 1962, p.7l) to twelve (Maquet* 1961), consisted of memorising 
the secret rules for the various rituals, and for the succession of abaami 
and abagabekasi. The three most important abiru were the [*Keepers of 
the Secreti* who were responsible for announcing the name of the king*s
heir after his death. The abiru had assistants* also from their 
lineages,., whom they trained to succeed them. This necessary 
training must have limited the ease with which the abaami could 
replace them. Each lineage was responsible for a part of the 
complete ideological complex, and this constituted an important 
property emphasizing the corporateness of the noble Tutsi 
lineages. The abiru were also said to have decided the order in 
which queen mothers were taken from the noble lineages (Maquet, 
1961,p.127). However, in the nineteenth century this does not 
appear to have been effective,(see above).
The most important chiefs were irregularly consulted by the 
mwami in council. The council had neither regular membership }
nor corporate authority (Lemarchand,,1 970, p. 29 ) «
The introduction of colonial rule in Rwanda reduced the 
political system from its autonomous position to one of a sub­
system. The colonists were concerned principally with maintaining 
order, and they consistently supported the existing authorities. 
The first civil resident of Rwanda wrote:
"Our political and colonial interests demand the support of 
the king and the maintenance of Tutsi domination which 
goes, together with a strong dependency of the great mass 
of Rwanda"(quoted in d'Hertefelt,1960a,p.452).
The Belgians consciously followed the Germans' practices* as
was declared in a report of 1921; especially in order to
"Assurer la paix et l'ordre public en maintenant l'equilibre 
qui existait entre les groupements indigenes"(ibid,p,459)•
Naturally, such 'indirect rule' did not prevent the colonial
Administration dismissing individual chiefs who were 'inefficient},
but they kept the Tutsi caste in power. This was the keystone
for future policy. An administrative report of 1938 declared
that the government was still, certain that:
"il doit s'efforcer de niaintenir et de consolider le cadre 
traditioimel de la classe dirigeante des Tuutsi, a cause 
des grandes qualites de celles-ci, de son indeniable 
superiorite intellectuelle et de son potentiel de 
commandement. " ( ibid,.p, 459 ) •
Even when there was; a minor attempt to redistribute power, in
the decree of 14th July, 1952 introducing councils,, it only did
so within the Tutsi caste; and it gave even more control over
the appointment of chiefs and subchiefs in the Supreme Council
to the mwami (see below).
75
The colonists not only supported the existing authorities, they also 
helped them to extend their power over the whole country. The Germans began 
expeditions into Rwanda in 1898, at a time when a violent succession struggle 
was not resolved, and Tutsi pre-occupation with power at the centre gave the 
peripheral areas the opportunity to assert their independence. This was 
not unusual activity; rather the expansion achieved by Rwogera and Rwabugiri 
was unusual. Continual revolts under these kings are described for the 
north by Maquet (1964, p*559)j Pauwels (1967, passim) and Lemarchand (1966a), 
and for the west by Vansina (1962, p.9 4)* Tfven in the east, the conquest of 
Gisaka was only acheived by Rwogera^. The wars of succession of 1897—1900 
were ended by German intervention, but the revolts which they . facilitated 
continued to focus on this issue until the Belgian conquest of the north.
The victor in the succession struggle, Yuhi Vi'Musinga, was only 13 
or 14 when he came to the kingship in 1897* He was, in fact, the 
puppet of the leader of the Abega faction, Kabale. The Tutsi themselves 
dealt with the initial revolts in northwestern areas like Busigi and Bugoyi, 
where abahinza took advantage of Musinga|*s minority to stop paying tribute. 
But after the German occupation, it was they who led the suppression of more 
serious revolts in the east and north. In 1900, a rebellion in<: Gisaka was 
led by Tutsi of the old royal clan; and again in 1909, a rumour that the 
Germans were about to depose Musinga led Hutu in eastern Rwanda to revolt 
against their Tutsi chiefs. Several writers have argued that the revolts 
in the peripheral areas were parochial, directed against the centre by 
local Tutsi leaders, rather than attempts by Hutu to rid themselves of the 
Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1966a and van der Meeren, 1969). Yet the evidence does 
not seem to bear this out. It is true that the great northern revolt of 
1912 was led by Hdungutse, a brother of Rutalindwa. But he was supported 
by the Hutu because he promised to free them from the obligation to work 
for Tutsi (Maquet, 1964, p*559)* And- the German resident reported in 
1914 that the recent first tax collection in the north was a great success, 
with the Hutu paying willingly because they believed the Germans would thereby 
protect them against "the despotism and injustice of the' Tutsi" • Clearly, 
the line between parochialism and social revolution would be hard to establish 
for this area where Hutu so greatly predominated in the population. But 
whatever the cause, the opposition of Hutu peasants to Tutsi chiefs continued 
throughout the colonial period. German askaris suppressed the revolts of 
Hdungutse (1912) and Rukara (1909). The Belgians had to conduct military 
campaigns there in 1924-26 in order to install Tutsi chiefs in some areas, 
and it was only in 1926 that the first Tutsi chief appointed to administer
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Bushiru dared live there, though officially it had been Tat si-administered 
since Rwabugiri»fs reign* (Pauwels, 1967* p.288).
My expensive use of data from the precolonial period is justifiable not 
only because the colonial period has been so little studied by anthropologists, 
and other students have been concerned with formal administrative changes, 
but also because the sociological studies of the immediate pre-Independence 
years (notably Gravel^s) reveal that the institutional structures through 
which power was exercised/relatively little altered. Either they were 
preserved, formally or informally (see Lemarchand, 1970? P*64)? or if they 
were abolished and not preserved informally (as, for a time, with the army 
organization) the power relations which they maintained were embodied in new 
administrative institutions. Thus military support for Tutsi rule was notfr 
provided by the colonial powers, and it was only when they withdrew from this 
commitment that the Hutu revolution became possible (see below; Lemarchand, 
pp.109-111,170-171? 197)* At the time when the army organisation was 
abolished, Belgian-led military forces were extending Tutsi rule over all 
Rwanda•
The Germans did not alter the character of the power structure they found 
in Rwanda. They went little further than giving the Resident judicial power 
over the mwami, and renaming the hill and army chiefs as !*policel* and ^govern­
ment!* chiefs respectively (Louis, 1963? pp.llO-lll),. More important, they
matk.
recognized Musinga as mwami, and^secureA the Abega- revolt. Moreover, they
suppressed further revolts, and began the consolidation of Tutsi power in the
peripheral areas (see above).
Erom 1916-26, the Belgians used the same system of military administration
as their predecessors. They stated to the League of Rations in 1929 that
their mandate in Ruanda—Urdndi from 1924
"had been set up in a country which had for practical 
purposes never really come under European supervision - 
where there was but an embryo of an administrative 
occupation and no European business interests at all., 
the mandate experiment was not influenced by any colonial past"
(quoted by Lemarchand, 1970? P»65)
It will be seen that I rely heavily on Lemarchand for data on the administrative
changes of the 1920s and 1930s.
Erom 1926—30 the Belgian .Administration made certain formal administrative
changes, whose effect was to increase Tutsi power. They had already 'rationalized*1
along German lines - replacing Hutu rulers in the north and west with Tutsi
governors. The offices of army, land and cattle chiefs still existed in
1926, but had been misunderstood by the two colonial la,dministrations who tried
to use them interchangably - resulting in "protracted chaos" (ibid. p.7l).
T7
The district chiefs were finally abandoned, as the Germans had tried to do
just before losing the territory (see above), and the army chiefs replaced
by "chiefs". Hill chiefs were renamed "sub-chiefs", and in 1930 some of
the smaller hill chiefdoms were amalgamated, though this was exceptional.
According to the Tutsi ideologist, Kagame (1952, p. 7), the abolition
of the army chief upset the traditionally harmonious relations of Hutu and
Tutsi. Lemarchand (1970, p.72) considers this overdrawn, but represents
many anthropologists with his view that
"it is entirely plausible to assume that, by destroying the 
pre-existing bhlance of forces on the hills, the 1926 reform 
prepared the ground for the emergence of a more starkly 
authoritarian system, centred on the rule of a single and 
virtually omnipotent chief".
I have already argued against this view, but it is interesting to note 
that Gravel, in the only study of a hill unit that we have, found a ^balance 
of forces^ still operating there in the 1950s and up to 1961 (1968, pp.198-200) -
in his analysis, precisely Sb3cau.se the administration — wittingly or not -
had reinforced the established authority". I suggest that ^balance,* is an 
analytical device that may be ^plausibly assumed**, with varying usefulness, 
in explanation of any situation. But is should not be taken for an 
empirical process; its use in the case of Rwanda is misleading. Tutsi 
exploitation probaHLy increased (Lemarchand, 1970, p.123) after 1930 
because the Administration and Roman Catholic hierarchy in Rwanda deliberately 
set out to make new sources of power available only to Tutsi. Colonial over­
rule meant that the Tutsi no longer monopolized armed force, but so long as 
the Administrations supported their rule their dominance could not be militarily 
challenged.
Under pressure from the Catholic hierarchy (ibid. p.73), "the Admini­
stration decided to commit their bureaucratization of indirect rule to the 
Tutsi alone, by formally institutionalizing Tutsi -political hegemony.
Lemerchand describes Belgian measures as follows:
(1) "a rigorous control over all educational opportunities" 
as I described in Chapter 1, and
(2) "the introduction of a judicial machinery designed to
perpetuate the subjection of the Hutu caste" (ibid, p.73)
Bureaucratization depended on the use of a new category of Catholic mission- 
educated Tutsi, and the removal of unco-operative conservatives led by 
Musinga - whose use of colonial overrule for his own purposes had enabled 
precolonial patterns of Tutsi rule to be preserved. However, the chaos of 
Tutsi intrigue was unsuitable for the Belgians^* conception of bureaucracy; 
and Musinga was implacably hostile to the reforms, the Catholics and their
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converts. In 1931, Musinga was dismissed and exiled in Shangugu. He 
was replaced "by an 18-year old son, Rudahigwa, who took the dynastic name 
Mutara III. Mutara was a mission-educated Catholic, nominated hy the 
Church, though later he became deeply (•traditionalistl1. His court was 
bureaucratized; a 'iconseil du roii* of* 4j later 6, great Tutsi nobles 
advised him; and the abiru lost formal recognition, though they survived 
informally to play an important role in the monarchist coup dj’etat of 
1959 (see chapter 7)« Appointments continued to be made formally by the 
mwami until 1943, when it was recognised that approval was required formally 
from the Governor (for chiefs) or Resident (for sub-chiefs).
The bureaucratization of the chiefly hierarchy led to an increase in 
exploitation of the Hutu, both in the process of Tutsi chiefs satisfying 
Belgian demands and through illegal use of chiefly powers. Thus in 
Bushiru the Tutsi chief, Nyangezi, was appointed by the Belgian Admini­
stration (Pauwels, 1967, pp.29O-298); in 1950 he had fourteen subchiefs, 
later reduced to eleven. All were Tutsi, The well—reported difficulties 
of intercalary roles (e.g. Gluckman, 1955; Fallers, 1966) were multiplied 
by the opposition of Hutu to Tutsi overlords, so that they were doubly 
intercalary, Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs were charged with new duties by 
the Belgian Administration: the Hutu were to be foiv-ced to grow new crops
like coffee, to improve cultivation methods by such methods as antierosive 
terracing which required corvee labour^ taxes had to be paid regularly, 
even in the peripheral areas; roads had to be kept in good condition. Hot 
only were many such functions not ^traditional;* as the Belgians claimed, but 
in many areas the Tutsi chiefs had no legitimacy other than appointment by 
the Belgians. Financial incentives, by which chiefs received supplements 
to their salaries - or were fined - according to the Administration^ 
estimation of their efficiency,were designed to ensure loyalty to bureaucratic 
obligations (Lemarchand, 1970, p,12l). Nevertheless, they were seldom 
able to mobilize the peasants for increased production, and many chiefs were 
dismissed by the Belgian Administration for |*demagoguery|f, that is, failing 
to execute orders because they could not do so without provoking a violent 
response (Lemarchand, 1966). However, their new powers of coercion 
enabled them to increase their exploitation of the Hutu (see evidence to 
TJ.N:. Mission (1948) quoted Lemarchand, 1970, p.123). Pauwels describes 
how Nyangezi extorted cattle and hides in Bushiru. The subehiefs, 
in particular, made what they could from office as quickly as possible since 
they were unpaid by the Administration. They were frequently dismissed 
for corruption by Nyangezi, who found this an easy way to win popularity by 
seeming to oppose the colonialists. The Belgians allowed chiefs and 
subchiefs to take what fields they needed for subsistence, which enabled 
them to take much more, and of the best.
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Pauwels sums up the situation by stating: (l) there was no formal limit to 
the tribute in goods and services which the chiefs could demand, (2) Hutu 
who complained were prosecuted and deprived of their lands, (3) all the officials 
to whom complaints could he made were Tutsi, who supported each other.
The Belgian Administration made some legislative attempts to 
reduce Tutsi exploitation, though in practice this meant little as they 
would not listen to complaints brought against chiefs (Lemarchand, 1970, p.
120) and made dismissals only on the bureaucratic grounds of inability to 
execute orders (},demagogueryt - see above) until the policy changes of the 
1950s, In 1917, they tried to deal with famine conditions by ordinances 
requiring Tutsi who took a Hutu^s goods to restore double the amount, and 
another ending igisigati rights (see chapter l); in 1923, ^domestic slavery* 
was abolished; in 1924} the ubuletwa labour tribute was reduced from 2 
days in 5 to 2 days in 7 (Pauwels, 1967} P*299)} and in 1927 to 1 day in 7 
(Gravel, 1968). In 1932 it was decreed that the chief was entitled to only 
three days tribute per year from every adult man, and the subchief, ten days. 
However, chiefs continued to call out women and children as well (Pauwels, 
p.299). So in 1952 the services were commuted to a money payment, fixed 
each year by the mwami and his supreme council. But abuses continued, and 
in 1955-57 when Belgian policy changed, 152 chiefs of both ranks were 
dismissed (ibid.)
In 1924} there were other dues in kind abolished, including imponoke 
which was the tribute in cattle taken by a patron from his clients if his 
own herd was lost, and indabukirano which was paid not only to the mwami 
and army chief (see above), but also to the hill chief - and paid in agricul­
tural produce by Hutu just as in cattle by Tutsi (Gravel, p.150). In.1933
some types of tribute in labour and kind were commuted, for higher status
categories, for cash; though the corvee was retained for the rest because
it supported the subchiefs|* authority. Between then and 1949
commutation was extended gradually to the whole population, though some 
forms of compulsory labour still remained in 1959} according to Lemarchand
(1970, P.146).
Moreover, the new judicial system of ^native tribunals!* introduced in
1936, far from correcting abuses
"became the instruments through which the ruling Tutsi 
oligarcjay not only retained but abused its priviliges.
Their function was not so much to dispense justice as to 
legitimize abuses and wrong-doings (ibid. p.76)
All tribunals were headed by Tutsi chiefs. Appeals to the mwami^s tribunal
were theoretically possible, but met only delaying tactics; only 60 cases
per year were tried; by 1949 there was a backlog of about 900 cases (ibid.).
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Tutsi continued to monopolize political office after the reforms of 
the 1920s. The situation on Hov.l, 1959» when the Hutu revolution began, 
and several years after the Belgian Administration began to reverse its pro- 
Tutsi policy, was as follows: 43 of the 45 offices of chief were at that 
time occupied, all by Tutsi; there were 559 subchiefdoms, of which 549 
(over 3&fo) were occupied by Tutsi. Of auxiliary governmental personnel, 
such as judges, assessors, agricultrual assistants etc., 88$ were Tutsi; 
given their educational advantages, it is likely that they occupied a much 
higher proportion of the higher posts, (ibid, p.125).
It is only by understanding the informal maintenance of precolonial 
forms of Tutsi rule that we can understand why the Hutu revolted against 
the whole Tutsi caste, without differentiating noble Tutsi, or Tutsi chiefs, 
from the Tutsi b:limpanffa. Otherwise we are left with a question-begging 
answer like Lemarchand|*s (ibid.) - that Tutsi officeholders attracted 
hostility as agents of colonial domination (which they did) and that this 
"was bound to reverberate, sooner or later., on the Tutsi as a group". I 
will show that Tutsi domination still depended on their superior organization 
in the caste as a whole, by informal means. The colonial period added to 
Tutsi exploitation the analytically separable problems of satisfying the 
demands of the j*bureaucratic—colonial^* state (cf. Apter, 1961), but it did 
not supplant (or even formally change very much) the precolonial forms through 
which it was organized.
In 1946 the U'ifN. renewed the Belgian mandate, with provisions for 
the liberalization of Rwandans political institutions and increased 
participation by its inhabitants (Agreement of 13 Dec. 1946)* hn 1952 
the Belgian Administration confirmed the existing councils (decree, 14th 
July) and added provisions for j* conseils de territoire^and |*conseils de 
sous-chefferief*. According to the department of demographic enquiries 
(JMDMORU), there were in 1956: 9 Jterritoires; 46 |*chefferiesi*: 603 ^sous
chefferiesf*. The average number of registered adult men (H.A.V.) per chiefdom 
was 9,339; per sub-chief dom it was 712. However, the actual numbers 
varied considerably: 19 chiefdoms had over 10,000 H.A.V., while 4 had under
5,000.
Article 28 of the 1952 decree set up the following provisions for the 
councils: (l) the sub-chiefdom council was to consist of 5-9 members at
a rate of one member per 500 inhabitants, and to be presided over by the 
sub-chief; election was to be by an electoral college of ^notables!*, 
numbering not less than twice the number of councillors, each approved by 
the chief and the Belgian i*administrateur du territoirej* after selection by 
the sub-chief. (2) The chief dom council was composed of lCfc-18 members,
8l
5-9 being sub-chiefs elected by the other sub-chiefs and 5-9 being ('notables *j 
these 'notables' were chosen by an electoral college itself chosen by the 
subchiefdoms councils from among their members. The total number of 
chiefdom council members was decided according to the size of tax-paying pop­
ulation, but the. numbers of 'notables'and sub-chiefs was always exactly 
balanced. (3) The chiefdom council was composed of the following: (a) 
the chiefs, (b) an equal number of sub-chiefs, elected by the other sub­
chiefs, (c) a number equal to the sum of both these categories, of 'notables.*; 
these were elected by an electoral college of fnotable* chiefdom councillors 
from among their number. It was presided over by a President and vice- 
President elected by itself from among its chiefs. (4 ) The Supreme Council 
was composed of these Presidents;; 6 chiefs elected by all the chiefs; a 
^notable* from each territorial council, elected by their .'notable* members;
8 co-opted 'educated notables*. It was presided over by the mwami. All 
councils were elected for 3-year terms, and members were eligible for re- 
election. All councils had only advisory powers, (Maquet & d'Hertefelt,
195913, p.65).
Maquet and d'Hertefelt (11959&, p.21ff*) calculated that in 80fo of the 
chiefdoms the 'notable* electors to the sub-chiefdoms councils were less than 
5 t-imes’'more numerous than the persons to be elected, and never more than 7 
times. They conclude that "Le decret ne semble point vouloir el©miner 
les possibilites de pression" (1959^ P»25)* Furthermore, since the councils 
at the bottom were effectively chosen by the sub-chief, the elaborate system 
based on them could not be representative. The aim of the Belgian Admini­
stration was clearly to diffuse power from the mwami and chiefs, but only 
among the Tutsi status category (ibid. p.26). This can be seen in the 
proportions of persons from the different status categories who made up the 
councils (see table below). In particular, from the chiefdom up, Tutsi 
made up about JO/a of the council members.
By a letter of 4th August 1956, I*1e governor of Ruanda-Urundi made 
new provisions for the 1956 elections. In the place of nomination of the 
notables of the electoral college by the sub-chief himself, there was 
to be direct "election” by secret ballot of all adult men. However, the 
persons elected still had to be approved by the chief and the Belgian 
territorial administrator, and the sub-chief could himself nominate any persons 
not chosen by the ballot. As Maquet and d'Hertefelt comment: "II s.'agit.. 
d'une consultation populaire et non pas d,*une election proprement dite"
(ibid, p.3l).
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TABES OF ELECTION RESULTS: 1983 and 1956
1986 1963
TOTAL PROPORTIONS TOTAL PROPORTIONS
Ho
Hutu Tutsi Hutu Tutsi
Ho.
Hutu Tutsi Hutu Tutsi
Sub-chiefdom 
'.Electoral college 6501 3223 66.7# 33.1# 7674 5442 58.4$ 41.4#
sub-chief dom 2261 1895 54.4# 45.6# 1995 2190 4 7.7$ 52.3#
Chiefdom 107 597 15.2# 84.8# 79 613 11.45? 88.6#
Territorial 21 163 11.4# 88.6# 19 185 9.3$ 90.7#
Supreme 1 31 3.1# 96.9# 3 29 9.4f» 9 0.6#
The results of the 1956 elections are relevant to the consideration of 
the effects of values associated with social stratification on political 
change.
Firstly, it is clear that Tutsi retained control at the chiefdom level 
and above. It was only at these levels that councils had any executive 
power at all (in a few specified instances). Secondly, Hutu elected as 
notables or as members of the subchiefdom councils did not use their majorities 
where they had them to elect Hutu notables to the higher councils, on which 
Tutsi retained 85#-95# membership. This does not, however, necessarily 
indicate Hutu '^dependence1 on Tutsi rulers. It seems rather to reflect better 
Tutsi political organization in the chiefdom-wide arena: it is noticeable
that there is a sharp rise in Tutsi membership proportions from 4-5 -6$ at the 
subchiefdom level to 84.8% at the chiefdom level. Tutsi political 
groupings had always covered a much wider area than had Hutu political, groupings 
(see chapter 2 ), with such symbolic patterns of organization available to 
the former as kinship and marriage alliances at this level. Beyond the 
Hill or group of Hills, comprising the sub-chiefdom, such means were not 
available to Hutu. There was only the category ^utu* to unite them, and 
in 1956 this had not yet been made a positive political symbol.
Thirdly,,Tpopular consultation1 in the choice of the sub-chiefdom 
electoral college !notables:T had the effect of increasing the Hutu 
representation, though not to the point where it wouLld-'- be equal to the Hutu 
proportion of the population (note that this point is of analytical interest 
only - the fact that the Hutu had a potential majority in almost every 
constituency means that they could have prevented any Tutsi at all from 
being elected, if they had acted as a political party and.voted en bloc).
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We may follow Maquet and d'Hertefelt in assuming: that this means that many
Hutu must have voted for Tutsi. These writers believe that the 1956
results indicate an apparent contradiction, after comparison with the ;1953
results (when there was no './popular consultation.*):
"d'une part, certains votes hutu manifestant un desire 
(^'Emancipation de leur caste; cL'autre part, des 
resultats indiquent une attitude de dependence et 
de soumission des hutu a la caste superieure” (ibid,
p.208).."Par consequent, on sera porte a elire des
hommes appartenant au groupe reconnu depuis des 
generations particulierement apte a gouverner, doue 
de prestige de la puissance et de la richesse et qui 
a joue le role de-'protecteur „f eodal de la masse 
socialement plus faible” (ibid. p.209).
If this argument were correct one would expect to find that in the peripheral
regions, where Tutsi rule had only been intermittent and partial in the
precolonial period - and only established by the colonial administration — s
there was a much lower vote by Hutu for Tutsi than in the central regions.
And indeed, Maquet and d*Hertefelt find that this was so, though their
mode of analysis is in this case highly disputable.
They base their claim on the fact that in the north-west (Ruhengeri
and Kisenyi territories), the proportion of Tutsi notables*' in 1958
had fallen 5®fa — PP 70$ in some areas - compared to 1953; while
in central Rwanda (Kigali, Nyanza and Astrida territcares) the proportion
fell only about 10$ on average, and in some areas showed an increase
in the Tutsi share (ibid, p.212). But these figures indicate only
proportions of change in proportions: it is possible by this means to
obtain meaningless figures, such as that the proportion of Hutu in the
Supreme Council fell by 67$, because the actual number fell from three
to one. Moreover, these figures tell us nothing about the distribution
of aniiv.-Tutsi feeling among Hutu, or the latter *s degree of dependence *,
for the base-line of the caste composition of'notables'in 1953 is a
false one. That is to say, in 1953 this composition may have been less
representative of the caste proportions in the population in the peripheral
regions than it was in central Rwanda, and the .->1956 elections merely
redressed this imbalance somewhat. Other figures given by Maquet and
d*Hertefelt support this suggestion. If we examine the degree of
*notable* representation of the caste proportions in the population, we
find that in 1956: in both the north-west and in central Rwanda the
proportion of 'notables* elected from the Tutsi category was just over
twice as high as the proportions of Tutsi in each regions' population. In
Ruhengeri and Kisenyi: 14.2$ av, of .'notables' were Tutsi; 7$ Qf the
population. In Kigali, Nyanza and Astrida: 41$ av. of 'notables' were
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Tutsi; 18.5$ of the population. (Calculated from Table 10, ibid, p.120).
In the face of this evidence, Maquet and d'Hertefelt would need better and 
more direct evidence than they actually produce if their explanation of Hutu 
voting for Tutsi were to be validated. Indeed, that the Tutsi of Kisenyi, 
commanding only 5*8$ of the potential vote (approximately, since this was their 
proportion of the population of the territory), captured any /notable' 
positions at all, let alone the 15$ which they did get in 1958, suggests 
explanation in terms of their organization as a 'party*, i.e. voting en bloc 
for a few agreed candidates, or in terms of considerable Hutu voting for 
them. Hutu /dependence*, if it was such, would not seem to have been less 
significant here than in Astrida (central Rwanda, and one of the two 
territories where the Tutsi proportion of 'notables* actually rose in 
1958), where the Tutsi were 22.3$ of the population and captured 45*9$ ike 
'notable* positions.
Nevertheless, it remains true that Hutu had potentially enough votes 
in all areas to oust the Tutsi from the electoral colleges for the 
subchiefdom councils, and their failure to do so might seem to bring us 
back to the hypothesis of Hutu /dependence* for lack of better explanation.
I have already shown that this hypothesis rests on the assumption of equili­
brium processes among 'balanced structures' which is not historically or 
empirically convincing. Furthermore, to analyze the 1958 elections as 
a contest between Hutu and Tutsi castes, without any evidence that both 
regarded it as such, is to make an unwarranted assumption. There was a re­
markably high turn-out for the elections (by comparison with, e.g. Tanzania 
1985) at between 70-75$* "but not even Maquet and d'Hertefelt take this as 
a sign of fervent participation and conflict (ibid, p.70). They 
comment:
"Les habitants ont.. pris 1 'attitude habituelle vis-a-vis 
d'initiatives emanant des autorites europeenes qui est 
l'accomplissement assez passif et sans enthousiasme de ce que 
1/on demande" (ibid, p.7l)
In some areas, sub-chiefs used threats to get voters out (ibid, p.70).
The elections were very indirect, with much weighting to ex officio (and
thus almost completely Tutsi) members at the levels with even minor executive
control. Thus it would not be surprising if Hutu did not regard the
elections as an opportunity to end Tutsi domination — they were not. And
in 1956, enough Hutu were closely tied to Tutsi patrons for a symbolic
vote against them to be an unprofitable luxury (note, the secret ballot
was hardly secret at all, since most of the population was illiterate and
their means of voting was then with the aid of & scribe (ibid, photo 10).
85
Above all, Hutu were not organized as a political party, and were not able 
to register any resentment they might have felt against Tutsi (of. Marx's 
famous description of the nineteenth century French peasantry failing to 
take corporate action, despite their common economic intersts, because they 
lacked any sense of 'community' or political organization* (1962, p.334): see 
also Weber, 1970} PP 183-4). The Hutu had a more developed sense of (status) 
community, but still lacked the means of political communication). At a 
more abstract level, the Hutu caste was not prepared for action in the legal- 
political order (cf. Weber), while the Tutsi were. The latter could communiii- 
cate.'both formally through the hierarchy of government offices, and informally 
through kinship and patron-client ties.
I suggest that the .Hutu failure to realize their electoral potential at 
the 1956 elections occulted principally because of their lack of organization 
for that purpose, and not because of some psychological dependence on Tutsi 
leadership, particularly in view of the fact that less than three years later - 
having acquired some political organization - the Hutu began their successful 
social revolution by violent overthrow of Tutsi rulers (see chapter 7).
Four factors in the ’195^ elections, mentioned briefly by Maquet and 
d'Hertefelt, are relevant here. (l) The period between the announcement 
and holding of the elections was much too short to alkvw the necessary 
propaganda and organization: it varied from territory to territory from a 
maximum of 27 days to a minimum of 6 days (1959 a-* p.34). !Even these short 
periods were not used for propaganda or organization purposes. (2) Although 
there is no precise informatin, for obvious reasons, about the pressure 
exerted on Hutu by individual Tutsi*.”11 n.'est cependant point douteux quEL 
y en ait eu" (ibid, p.4 2). (3) In several areas, the purpose of the election
and its secrecy were openly doubted; it. .was suspected as a new means of 
census taking, or to decide whom to send on forced labour in the Congo (p.4 8).
(4 ) Very few Hutu and no Tutsi raised the issue of Tutsi domination.
Elections were completely new in Hwanda, and regarded as simply an activity 
required by the TJuropeans in the process of administration (see above).
They were not regarded as even a minor political change which could be 
capitalized on to bring major political, social and economic change - as Maquet 
and d'Hertefelt seem to assume in their concluding discussion (ibid, pp.216- 
222)., M6‘.Hutu political organization existed which could express, and make 
credible, such potentialities as aspirations in the form of a program. To 
satisfy a patron, avoid taxation, and other immediate concerns were pf major 
importance in elections which did not offer any tangible power or seem to 
have more general bearing on personal futures.
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PART TWO
chap™  pour
BUGANDA: ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND POWER STRUCTURE,
The p-urpose-of .this chapter and the methodology used are the same 
as for the complementary chapter on Rwanda. The major problem with the 
literature on Buganda is a failure to analyze the structure of economic 
relations, and a consequent overemphasis on cultural aspects. Thus 
Wrigley and Pallers discuss the increasing differentiation of social 
roles in terms of changing evaluations of status, as if the status hierarchy 
was '.identical with the structure of economic relations. This is the result 
of their conception of ’class1, as they use it to discover how one’s occupa­
tion determines one’s place in the stratification system. Thus FalLers 
considers ’class * as refering to:
"broad groups of occupations similarly evaluated in the 
stratification system and sharing similar subcultures"
(1964, p.120).
Wrigley’s "economic classes", based on an assessment of income, are
literally an analyst *s classification:
"If the population of present-day Buganda is to be 
classified in economic terms... it is only in a very 
limited and abstract sense that any such classification is 
now possible" (1964, p.52).
On the other hand, Worsley considers that the figures for class- 
different iat ion given by Wrigley (in Hunter, 1962, see below) are the 
"statistics of latent revolution" so obviously that they "hardly require(s) 
comment" (1967, p.220). ' In this chapter my main purpose will be to 
comment on the economic aspects of the question which Worsley correctly 
poses: what kind of property-based classes were there, and what were their 
power relations? As before my model includes relevant historical data 
from different periods of time.
The natural environment of Buganda was much more suitable for agriculture 
than most other areas of East Africa. (Richards, 1954, p.22l). Its 
soils were deep and fertile and it was supplied by an unusually regular 
rainfall. (Mukwaya, 1953, pp 3-^ }-). There were roughly/ two areas of 
settlement: the (’long’ - or ’elephant’ - grass area of south and east 
Buganda, and the short-grass areas of the north and west. The former was 
excellent for bananas, sweet potato and cassava, and carried a more dense 
population than the less fertile short-grass area. Agricultural prod­
uction was based on the banana grove, which yielded a year-round crop, 
and very seldom needed to lie fallow. It required relatively little 
heavy labour after it had been opened up for. cultivation. The 
average population density in 1953 was 77 persons per square mile, with
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a total population of about million. Thus there was, as the Agricultural 
Productivity Committee reported the following year: "land to spare for the 
expansion of the human population” (ibid. p.13), though much of this would 
be in the less fertile regions.
Ih the precolonial period, these conditions permitted a clear division 
of labour between men and women, with the latter doing most of the routine 
work of subsistence food production. Hunting and fishing, done by men, 
provided only a minor element in subsistence. There were relatively few 
cattle in Buganda, compared to neighbouring kingdoms, and herding did not 
have the symbolic significance attached to it in the latter. The division 
pf labour between the sexes remained important in the colonial period 
after cash-cropping had been widely adopted; in the main, men produced 
the cash crops. During the precolonial period, men employed their time 
tfreed1 from subsistence production in the service of a patron chief.
The domestic unit was composed of a man, his wives and children, and 
sometimes one or two other kin. Each such unit was independent in food 
production, with its own banana grove and fields for other crops. Each 
unit of land was held by an individual client of the chief, and there was a 
lack of co-operation between households in cultivation (Wrigley, 1964, p.22). 
However, the extreme measures taken to preserve the individual client*s 
land rights - such as the death penalty for attempts to steal land — 
probably reflect less the idea of "private property" as Wrigley thinks 
(ibid.) than the chief*s assertion of his power to allocate holdings and 
discipline or protect his clients.
Besides the role of women as cultivators, the most important occupational 
distinctions lay between (l) men without political office, whose role 
included principally military and labour services (in fields other than 
cultivation), and (2 ) political officials, who organized these activities 
and redistributed wealth (see below) which they received as clients of the 
king (kabaka)« Apart from beer, goods produced by women lay outside the 
tribute system (ibid. and p.109—110); when I write of *wealthT I refer to 
goods produced by men or gained by raiding, and the ability to dispose of 
labour - this refers to rights attached to political office, and to slaves 
taken in war. It should be stressed that *wealthf in this sense was neither 
convertible nor a form of capital; the power to distribute wealth and land 
was attached to political office (see below). Receiving wealth and land 
from a patron chief was a benefit of clientship, not merely a Hoken* of 
the relationship like cattle in Rwanda,though it served that function as 
well. Relative wealth was an important component of the distribution of 
prestige, which was thus also to some extent under political continL. Men
appointed; to political office were thereby ’appointed* to high status and 
wealth, andkst it on dismissal. There was no differentiated economic 
order of institutions in precolonial Buganda, nor a power structure of 
economic classes. Distinctions between persons in the field of wealth 
did not derive from economic processes.
The most comprehensive and reliable data available on the precolonial 
patron-client system in Buganda is found in Falters (ed.1964), and it is 
on this source that I rely mainly in the following analysis.
The patron lived with his wives and immediate retinue within his own 
enclosure, marked off by a reed fence from his surrounding clients 1 
residences. An *ordinary man1, bakopi (Fallers, p.68), made himself 
client (omusa.i.ja; musenze) to such a patron chief or lord (mukama; mwami) 
(ibid, pp.121-2; Southwold, 1964, P*212-4). The lowest-ranking political 
officials, entitled to receive a share of the kabaka’s tribute (Fallers, p. 
160), were those in the pillage1 (kyalo) - the village chief and, in some 
cases, his assistants (batongole). A mutongole had at least five clients, 
according to Kagwa (1952, p.165, quoted by Thllers, p.l60). But Southwold 
(quoted ibid, note 7) stresses that this was the minimum figure, with an 
average number of around twenty clients for each mutongole. A chief’s 
subjects were his clients through receiving an allocation of the land under 
his jurisdiction. They served as his warriors and political supporters, 
and benefited from his distribution of goods received in war or from the 
kabaka. The patron gave his clients a means of contact with the higher- 
ranking chiefs, and thereby the possibility of political advancement.
In particular, a patron might introduce a client’s children in the court of 
his own patron, and even that of the kabaka. This meant the possibility of 
the child becoming one of his wives, or being trained for political office.
A chief received many services from his clients besides their following 
him in war: they provided labour for his person and enclosure, and on
other construction work for which he was responsible, like the obligatory 
road from his enclosure to the kabaka’s court; they paid him tribute from 
their‘wealth and labour. All these demands were substantial, particularly 
with the increase in military, campaigning as the nineteenth century went on 
Fallers estimates that:
"bakopi men probably contributed as much to the support
of the nonproductive superstructure as they did to their
'own households" (1964, P«83)
But neither they nor their wives ever laboured in the patron’s banana groves
or otherwise provided for his subsistence — this was done by his own wives.
Moreover, they differed from clients in Rwanda in two crucial respects.
Firstly, they were not members of a "closed status group" - i.e. one with
"status by descent" (Weber, 1970? P*405) - or caste which was excluded from
acting as patrons to members of a higher caste, as were Hutu in Rwanda
(see chapter l). Their situation was structurally the same in this
respect as that within the Tutsi caste in Rwanda - any client could, in
ideology, attain political office and become a patron, or a patron lose
office and become a client. However, there was a difference in that Baganda
clients who were not also patrons (i.e. those without political office, mostly
bakopi) did not, like Tutsi clients who did not act as patron^s to the
other Tutsi, have a subordinate caste to patronize. Secondly, in notable
contrast to the Hutu in Rwanda, the Baganda client could leave his patron
(a named process c- ’kusengukaT) without great difficulty and, apparently,
was ready to do so (Southwold, 1964, pp.213-4). In order to satisfy
their superiors’ demands and avoid dismissal, village chiefs had to be
careful not to alienate their clients (ibid, p.214). Chiefs competed for
clients. As Southwold says, in the resulting situation
"The musenze lacked constitutional checks, not because his 
position was too weak to obtain them, but because it was 
too strong to require them" (ibid.)
This was the reverse of the position of the Hutu in Rwanda, who were too 
weak to obtain them.
hand was the most important of the goods redistributed by the chief.
A man who wished to cultivate and settle on the land under a chief’s 
jurisdiction had to become his client (kusenga)by the same process of 
rendering goods, services, obedience and military support as did the chief 
to his own patrcnr; Land was more than a token of the patr:on—cl ient relation­
ship because, unlike cattle in Rwanda, it was essential in itself for the 
subsistence of the client; but i-fc did have the aspect of a token as well.
A Mukopi could not be the client of any other patron than the one from 
whom he held his land, and the latter was necessarily his political chief.
The right to allocate land, and thus to establish a clientage, was exclusively 
limited to political authorities. A man who was dismissed from political 
office also lost his land and clients. The land grant can be seen in 
its aspect as a token in that the chief had no interest in the economic 
activity carried out on it, and exercised no supervision, so long as the 
client paid his dues and services.
It has been pointed out by Mukwaya (1953, pp.6-7) that the most useful 
analytical approach to land tenure in precolonial Buganda would examine 
the distribution of several different kinds of rights among persons and 
categories of persons, with allowance for overlapping. This is in contrast
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to the analytical approach of Mair (1934) which only examines rights as 
attached to incumbency of particular statuses, or membership of corporate 
groups, giving an orerly-uniform and static picture. In Buganda persons might 
achieve rights of different kinds by combining roles, and there was much 
variation because of the insecurity of those rights and the kabaka's frequent 
intervention. So Mukwaya isolates four main kinds of precolonial rights 
over land: (l) obutaka (clan rights) (2 ) obutongole (rights of the kabaka 
and his chiefs) (3) obwesengeze ("individual 'hereditary rights") (4 ) 
gbiban.ia ("peasant rights of occupation").
Firstly, lands held by clan rights were places where ancestors were 
buried. This established the clan's claim either that the land was held from 
before the arrival of the first kabaka, or that it was a grant from an 
earlier kabaka. Clan lands were never contiguous blocks larger than a few 
villages, and often much smaller than that. They were scattered throughout 
Buganda, though there tended to be a concentration around the original 
nucleus of the kingdom (Fallers, 1964* PP»85-87)» Their inhabitants 
were rarely composed in the majority by members of the clam 1 claiming the 
obutaka rights, because the politic! power of the state had made mobility 
possible within a wide area, and made ties of clientage more important 
than those of descent - so that if a patron was transferred to another chief- 
ship his clients usually went too (see above). Furthermore, the kabaka 
sometimes made heritable grants to favourites who were then buried there 
by their families, establishing rights similar to those of the central or 
.'original* clan lands. Clan or lineage (siga) heads tended to be more 
powerful patrons in the areas furthest removed from the kabaka's capital, 
for there was less competition from other types of chiefs. Their power 
was also increased greatly if they were appointed as higher administrative 
chiefs.
Secondly, the kabaka and his chiefs held estates attached to their 
offices, the number increasing with the importance of the office, . This 
applied not only to the administrative chiefs, but also to officials of the 
palace. The point here is that these lands were granted personally by 
the kabaka, and not attached in any formal hereditary way to the official.* 
All these grants included political rights, but only at the lowest level 
could they be delegated by anybody other than the kabaka. They were inst­
antly revocable by the kabaka, and returned to him at the holder's death.
The holders had the same power over the officials they appointed on the 
lands (with the kabaka's approval). The more important estate-holders 
were not taxed, but expected to present gifts to their patron. .
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Thirdly, the kabaka might give permanent, hereditary rights of tenure 
of a small holding to a favourite; most of the chiefs received such land, 
which carried no political rights and was free of labour obligations by its 
peasant occupants to the chief.
Fourthly, all peasants could hold land from a political chief as 
their patron, with a marginally better chance of favour if a kinship link 
could be established - it was not necessary to seek this (see above); 
good patrons were followed by their clients as they were transferred around 
the kingdom. The rights of the client were to security of tenure and 
inheritance,' and certain common rights to pasture, water and fuel, so long 
as he paid his dues in beer, food, labour and military service to his 
patron. The tenure to which a client sought security was under the 
political and social protection of the patron; his actual holding might 
move from one part of the patron*s land to another.
Thus the kyalo, was the basic political unit (Southwold, 1964, p.212). 
under its chief who was usually directly appointed by the kabaka, (Fallers,
1964j p.175)• The inhabitants of the kyalo comprised neither a localized 
kin-group, nor a group of persons bound to that particular piece of ground.
They were the chief^s clients, bound by ties of political allegiance.
But the introduction of the mailo system of land tenure (see below) in 1900 
and fragmentation of the estates later, turned the kyalo into a "collection 
of independent peasant families each owning its own piece of land" (Southwold 
1965, p.9 5)* by the 1950s many landlords, great and small were absentees - 
a survey of 685 landlords in 2 subcounties in Busiro and 1 in Kyagwe found 
respectively 26$, 28% and 18% were absentees (Richards, 1966, p.105).
The economic function of the chiefs as redistributors of tribute and 
war booty was formally ended in 1900. From 1888, groups of the kabaka*s 
chiefs had competed for power in a civil war which was only settled in 1897.
The settlement was consolidated under British overrule in the Agreement of 
1900, in a way that institutionalized the power of the victorious groups of 
chiefs against rivals and against the kabaka - mainly by creating private 
property in land (mailo tenure) and distributing it to reinforce the new 
political power structure (Fallers, 19^4? p.163).
In the 1900 Agreement the kabaka, his close kin and the great chiefs 
received the ownership of 1,003 square miles of land (clause 15; see Low 
and Pratt, i960, pp.359-60) Initially, about a thousand lesser chiefs and
clients of the kabaka,chosen by the great council, the Lukiiko, received another
8,000 square miles (ibid.). However, many other chiefs and clients managed to 
establish a claim to a mailo allotment, since they were the clients of those 
who already had them (ibid. pp.115-122); and in the end, 3,945 chiefs of all
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ranks shared the total 9»©0© square miles (ibid.). Hie British Protectorate 
Government took the remaining 10,50© square miles of forest, waste and un­
cultivated land (ibid, p.359)*
It was only over a long period that political rights and duties were 
differentiated out from land ownership; after the mailo allotments the 
landowner continued to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, 
the collection of taxes and the political representation of his tenants at 
the lower councils. These duties required attendance on the estate or, 
where thebholdings were not contiguous, the appointment of stewards 
(abasigire). Mailo was different in other ways, specified in the 1908 
Land law, from ordinary English freehold: (l) mailo land could only be 
leased or transferred to another person of the Uganda Protectorate?unless 
there was special permission from the Governor, (2) customary rights of 
way and access to water had to be maintained, and in the absence of a 
will customary procedures of inheritance and succession followed.
Despite these limitations, up to 30 sq. miles of land might be held in 
individual ownership very close to freehold. Mailo land was given to a 
small category of office-holders, but mainly in perpetual economic ownership 
dissociated from political office. Thus the kabaka did not have overlord­
ship of all estates any longer, and the 1908 law specifically stated that 
mailo owners did not have to pay any dues to .*a chief who is superior to 
him1. Their tenants paid them dues as landlords, and were not thereby 
exempt from taxation through the political system. Nevertheless, for at 
least the first generation, the personal biographies of mailo holders provided, 
as intended by the British, a continuing association of land and power.
The ownership of mailo land was increasingly efficiently defined by 
law, by registration ordinances inl9©8 and 1922, and a land law of 1939*
Thus legally enforceable rights in land became much curtailed in respect of 
the number of claimants - although this development will be exaggerated if- 
we forget how limited the claims of the peasantry were in practice in the 
precolonial period. Much more important was the creation of economic 
classes in different relations to the means of production, i.e.landlords 
and tenants (see below also). The position of the peasants settled on the 
mailo owners* land was not legally defined until 1928. In the intervening 
period, mailo owners continued to act as patrons - though now as economic 
rather than political .'protectors. However, this meant that they had 
considerable political power over their own estates, which they used to extract 
tribute in goods and labour. With the introduction of a cotton cash-crop, 
and the rising world price in it after the First World War, this *tribute* 
had an economic value. landlords tried to increase their demands, and the
structure of power between the economic classes began to be reflected in 
political relations.
Besides the ordinary mailo holdings, there were also the lands held 
by the Grown and the kabaka. Because Crown lands were largely un­
cultivated, and not administered differently from mailo land, tenants did 
not move io them in any numbers, as can be se:en from the small proportions of 
the population there in 195© (Mukwaya, 1953, p.17). In the 1900 jAgreement 
the kabaka received 350 sq. miles of mailo land attached to his office and 
150 sq, miles as a private person. Over half the official mailos were in 
the one county of Kyagwe, and much of the rest in Kyadondo, Bulemezi,
Busiro and Buddu. Like the other 4-16 sq. miles of official mailo 
attached to other political offices, the kabaka had only their usufruct 
while in office. They were held in trust by the minister of finance of the 
Buganda government, but they were administered in all matters except finance 
by a special servant of the kabaka, the katikkiro we byalo bya kabaka. It 
seems that the kabaka*s private estates were administered in the same way, 
and also could not be sold. The kabakaTs tenants (31,000 on his private 
estates in 195©) had 'khe same rights and obligations as elsewhere except 
for paying an extra tribute of albunch of plantains each month, and leaves 
and fibre as required (ibid.).
The original allotments, even aside from the special amounts received 
by the kabaka, his close kin and the great chiefs, were large. At first, 
mailo was alloted in units of one square mile, and no original allotment was 
for less than a quarter of a square mile. This is reflected in the survey 
of 1953 (by E.A.I.S.R. - see Richards, 1954) of two areas in Busiro and 
Buddu counties. At the time of first registration in about 1920, when some 
fragmentation had already taken place, the bulk of mailo land was held in 
estates of one sq. mile or more (see Mukwaya, 1953, p.29): in the Busiro
area, where there were a great many different claims and some difficulty 
in securing contiguity of estates, 71*24$ of* mailo land was held by 17 
estates in thi§ way (with 32.05$ in two estates of more than two sq. 
miles); in the Buddu area, where mailos more often began as single 
estates, fragmentation was about the same as in Busiro, and 84.42$ was held 
in 23 estates of over one sq. mile (with 38.23$ in two estates of over two 
sq. miles). In both areas together, there were 98 estates held by 78 
persons, and this accounted for 1.620$ of all estates in Buganda in 1920 
(Mukwaya, 1953, p.29). By 1950 there had been considerable fragmentation 
of holdings, and there were 487 estates held by 687 registered proprietors. 
In BUganda as a whole the 6,050 estates of 1920 had become shared by about 
50,000^-60,000 persons (ibid; Wrigley, 1964, P*49)» though Fallers estimates
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that 60% of these persons owned less than 10 acres (1964, p,144).
The apparently startling fragmentation of the estates should not lead 
us to imagine a loss of power hy the original mailo elite or a widening of 
the power group. To return to the sample areas: while there was a considerable 
increase in the number 6f owners of the smallest mailo holdings (in 1950 
there were 415 estates of under 21 acres; in 1920 there had been only 19), 
the numbers of the larger estates were little, if at all, reduced (in 1920 
there were 21 estates of more than 600 acres, 31 of more than 300 acres; 
in 1950 these were respectively 14 and. 32 estates). The proportion 
of land held in the category of estates over 600 acres declined considerably 
from 57*62% to 33.8% but that in the 300-600 acres category remained 
constant at 26.33% (1920) and 2 6.42% (1950). These figures support Mukwayafs 
statement (1953, p.32) that the great estates did not disappear dramatically; 
rather small pieces were sold, and the estates tended to stabilize 
at a large size in each generation. The sales did not necessarily indicate
declining economic power, often being the means of raising cash for invest­
ment in more rewarding sectors of the economy (see below). And as land 
owning became relatively less directly important in mobilizing political 
support, as it became available to a larger number of people and as 
economic criteria took on greater importance, the amount owned was an 
important element in social status and the distyinctiveness of the elite.
This can be seen in the behaviour of the owners of the larger estates. In 
195$ in 'the sample area, 75*3% of the land was owned by 13.2% of owners, at 
an average of 427 acres each; while 24-7% of the land was owned by those 
with less than 100 acres (86.8% of owners at an average of 21.4 acres each).
Among the larger landowners there was a greater hereditary element in the
means of acquisition of their estates: only 15.6% of those estates over
100 acres had been acquired by sale, as against 64.25% of those under 100 
acres. lost of the larger estates were acquired by first registration 
or inheritance, and there were only 2 cases of transfer by gift as against 
123 cases in the smaller estates category. (Mukwaya, 1953, p.30-31).
Inheritance itself did not lead to the fragmentation of the larger 
estates because of the widespread practice of leaving the whole, or most, 
of the estate to a single heir. This applied to half the estates in the 
sample which had changed hands since 1920, i.e. 40 out of 80, with 18 un­
changed. On 20 of these estates the main heir received more than two- 
thirds, and the rest was shared among 53 other heirs. Multiple ownership 
drawn from a single dynasty was also very common in Buganda (Richards,
1966, p.102). But it appears that below a certain size of estate there 
was roughly equal division among heirs. Thus in so far as inheritance lei
to fragmentation of estates, it did so mainly among the smaller holdings.
Gifts of small holdings of mailo were made to clients and close kin ■, 
just as traditionally the higher chiefs had distributed lesser political 
rights to their following, with the kabakaTs approval. Thus gifts to 
close relatives probably helped to maintain the main estate for a single 
heir. All gift-acquired estates were politically tied closely to the 
interests of the larger estates, which acted against a polarization of 
their interests emerging as political conflict (ibid.).
Most land transfers in the category of estates under 100 acres were 
by sale. Among the more important motives of the great landowners for 
sale were those involving some kind of long-term investment, as in 
raising capital for commercial and construction investment, or for 
educating the children. Land was also bought as an investment, in higher 
social status, greater political opportunities (Richards, 1963, p.273) 
and to some extent, profit from rent, (Wrigley, 1959) P«52), . .rather 
tk'an from agricultural production. In Richards* 1954 sample, landlords 
on average cultivated only 6 acres as against the average tenants 
2-^— 3 acres (p.37). Thus those who bought land were not an aggressive, 
entrepreneurial class challenging the dominance of a landlord class, but 
rather the latterrs imitators. Mbr did they buy land simply in token 
quantities while their main economic interests were elsewhere, for the normal 
method of buying was to acquire as much as possible with the money avail­
able (Mukwaya, p.35). There were even very few entrepreneurs exploiting 
the difference betweenlland prices as charged to different categories of 
kin, and the ^economic’ value of the land; perhaps only eight such spec­
ulators in Buganda, according to the Registrar of Titles (ibidr p,40).
The British Administration also limited the commercial exploitation of 
landownership by prohibiting the mortgaging of mailo to non-Baganda, 
unless rights of foreclosure or sale were excluded. Thus only 1.5% 
of the land in the 1954 sample was mortgaged, about half each to the 
Uganda Credit and Savings Bank and to Indian businessmen.
Ownership of land failed to remain the basis for an economic class 
principally because the Busulu and Unvujo Law of 1927, passed under strong 
British pressure, (Low & Pratt, i960), virtually ended the economic content 
of the landlord—tenant role relationship. This legislation and the 
interest in ownership for social and political, rather than economic, 
reasons reinforced each other in limiting conflicts of economic interest 
between landlord and tenant. The dues paid by a tenant were fixed, and 
soon had only 'nominal' value (Southwold, 1964, pp.215~6). They consisted 
of: a busulu of 10 sh.p.a., and an envu.jo of 2Sh per brewing of beer,
plus a scheduled, payment on cotton and coffee cash crops of 2Sh.per acre in 
five of the counties and 4-Sh. per acre in the others. There was little scope 
for economic exploitation of landlordship. ‘ As long as a tenant had a 
ticket to show he had paid his busulu he could only be evicted by a court 
order for failing to cultivate for over six months; the court could grant 
compensation for improvements by the tenant; the tenant had rights to trees 
and pasture; tenancies were heritable; changes in the ownership of the 
mailo could not affect the tenants* standing. Few landlords could live 
from rent aloh(e, or use their land as capital, anc^ most landlords did not 
hold fundamentally different positions in economic processes from most 
Bagan*-da tenants. But wherever landlords attempted to exploit their position 
the^  conflict emerged (Richards, 1954; Gutkind, 1963, p.179)* Won-Baganda 
could not establish rights to cultivation by living on vacant or rented 
land, as Baganda could. They only had security of tenure in their huts, 
so long as they paid the rent (which was not fixed). ' And in areas where 
landowners could see the value of exploiting the land themselves, partic­
ularly in the best coffee regions and those around towns, conflicts emerged 
between Baganda over such issues as boundaries; the growing practice of 
landlords of demanding an entry fee for a holding; their keeping some holdings 
for migrant cotton cultivators who, as temporary residents, were not protected 
by the Busulu and Fnvujo Law from high rents (up to 5©Sh. acre); attempts 
by the tenants to avoid the landlorcl's right of reversion if they moved.
While the main reasons for the acquisitiion of land were thus political 
and social, its value in these fields also declined. The owners of smaller 
mailo holding of less than 100 acres (86.8%) had little1 chance of capitalizing 
politically on the association of power with landholding, except at the village 
level, for they were unable to fill the patron's role adequately. Mukwaya 
estimates (p.74) that the most such a landlord could earn from rent would 
be about equal to an unskilled labourer's wages — about 50QSh. pa. A 
landlord could not increase his income by farming all the land because the 
tenancies were protected; nor could he raise the rents fixed by law.
He could only resort to unpopular pressure: by renting land to immigrants,
demanding entry fees or trying to enforce reversionary rights even in 
temporary absences. These measures were too irregular to ensure an 
income. Southwold found that by the 195©s the muluka chiefs (the lowest 
levelofficially recognised - see chapter 6), were receiving authority and 
income from office and not landownership, and few could live off their estates; 
that their unpaid assistants, the batongole, were increasingly difficult to 
mobilize; and that *
"the distinction between chiefs and peasants, which was formerly
made on the basis of the ownership of land, is disappearing 
as more and more people acquire land; and consequently even 
at the lowest levels the authority of the chiefs is becoming more 
purely bureaucratic". (1956, P.95)
In other words, the top status (see below) group had ceased to rely purely
on landholding to legitimate its status and political power. Following
the land reform of 1927? landownership ceased to define an economic class.
More slowly, it lost its "traditional"function, reinforced in the early
years of the mailo system, of indicating high status, Richards (1954, p.
173) considers batongole still had much power and authority over their
tenants, if they were landowners, but it is clear that their actual
authority would depend on how they interpreted their role (cf, Southwold,
1964, pp.229-30  ^ chapter 7)- At the local level, holders of mailo land
could claim somewhat higher status than customary tenants, (Richards, 1963,
p.274).
Here it is necessary to examine briefly a question which I take up
further in chapters 5 and. 6: the part played in the economic power
structure by symbolic patterns of group organization. I have emphasized the
extent to which access to the capacity to act as a patron was controlled
by political rather than economic or cultural processes in the precolonial
kingdom. It is necessary to qualify this in respect of status stratification,
while emphasizing that this was not 'closed* by descent as in Rwanda either
in ideology or to anything like the same extent in practice. There was
an element of inheritance, nsikirano (Fallers, 1964, P»l69) in accession
to some political offices - mainly the bat aka offices (see chapter 5) and
the kingship itself. But such succession did not go automatically to a
particular person, and even quite distant collaterals were eligible -
though this latter ideology may not have been extensively practised, at
r.least in regard to the kingship (Southwold, 1966), there were invariably
several possible claimants among close agnatic kin. Moreover, the kabaka
had to approve1, all successors to political office. It remains, though,
that there were strong elements of agnatic linkage in succession to
political office - it was one relevant factor. Fallers refers usefully
to "dynasties" of chiefs, such as that to which Sir Apolo Kagwa belonged
(1964, p.171). The chances of a man of bakopi status becoming even one
of the lowest-level chiefs were very limited, although they always existed
(ibid, p.175). Fallers considers that;
"throughout the nineteenth century..there had existed an 
elite class of persons with great power and wealth - an
elite class in Marx and Weber's sense of a category of
persons occupying an 'objectively' advantageous political 
and economic position" (ibid, p.176-7).
While I find the term 'elite class' extremely useful (see Introduction),
I think that Fallers.' use of *class:*, in reference to a situation in 
which no differentiated economic power structure (in, as I see it, Weher's 
sense) can be analysed, begs important questions about the sources of power 
in precolonial Buganda. And although there was "throughout the nineteenth 
century" an i'elite*' status group (not class - and essentially 'subjective') 
it did not use its own symbolic pattern of organization, occupation of 
political office, to control recruitment. It lacked non-political symbols, 
a subculture giving a sense of common identity (ibid, p.163), which could 
become more important than status distinctions between political officials. 
This 'problem* was overcome when some political officials took up the 'new 
religions* of Islam and Christianity in the later nineteenth century (see 
chapter 5)*
The convert elite which seized power from the kabaka Mwanga in the
civil war, under protection of the British, established itself as an
economic class of landowners after 1900. It had already acquired
symbolic organization through Christianity and, to a lesser extent,
Islam (Wrigley, 1959? ©ee* 1958)* Bu~t with the spread of these religions,
the elite had to find other ways of maintaining distinctiveness (cf. Cohen,
1969a). This was achieved by the adoption of a 'British* life-style,
including‘gentlemanly*manners and status-symbolic goods such as brick
houses, tea-drinking, wearing watches etc. (see chapter 5). The
educational system, beyond the reach of most of the non-elite, played
a vital part in the indoctrination of this new form of distinctiveness
and ideology. As Richards says (1963, p.272)):
f.The first Ganda landowners began feverishly to realize their 
assets in order to secure a quasi-European standard of living 
as to housing, furniture, clothing and education. They sold 
parts of their new estates....Peasants began to buy land...but 
the great landowners had about 20 years,* start. The first 
landowners also used their money to acquire access to European 
boarding schools for their sons and daughters and even to send 
them overseas to be educated. Their sons thus became specially 
fitted to fill posts in the Protectorate or Buganda Government 
as clerks, supervisors or chiefs."
In the precolonial period there was a specialized form of education for 
potential chiefs, who went as pages (bagalagala) to the kabaka's court.
They were recommended by the existing chiefs, and very largely consisted of 
their sons and other kin (Fallers, p.171). There is no evidence given by 
Fallers, in his discussion, to make us consider the stories of slaves 
being sent in the place of their own sons by chiefs, because the latter feared 
the kabaka.'s harsh treatment of his pages - which Fallers considers a 
significant element in traditional mobility (p.176) - were more than 
ideological statements by political enemies or those who wished to emphasize
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the mobility in the traditional system, like Kagwa from whom the data was 
obtained. In the absence of more convincing evidence we must regard this 
mode of recruitment of the political class as ensuring a considerable 
hereditary element in the sense discussed above. This pattern of 
education was reproduced at each chief's court for recruitment to lower— 
level posts.
class
After the landlordftwas established in 1900, (see below), its predominance 
was ensured by the creation of new schools for the education of the elite, 
modelled on the "English boarding school. There were no scholarships, and 
the fees restricted entry informally to the kin of chiefs, who alone had access 
to the amounts of cash required, as intended by the missionaries (Fallers 
1964j p.183). The leading schools of each denomination were Mengo High 
School (Anglican) and Hamilyano (Catholic); later they were, respectively, 
King's College, Budo and St. Mary's college, Bisubi. Recruitment to the 
political elite was restricted by this mode of entry (Low, 1962, p.22).
Places were fewer than those offered by the old chiefs,' courts; and the 
missionaries encouraged the chiefs to send only their own sons (and often 
only those by their 'ring' wives). However, chiefs continued to finance 
kin other than their own sons, so that in the elite sample of 1957-8 
(Fallers 1964f p.201), it was found that 8l$ of 'those who had had |only 
primary education were neither sons nor grandsons of original mailo allottees; 
66tfo of those with secondary education; 63fo of those with higher education.
In the absence of other evidence, it is curious that Fallers should take 
this as evidence of the openness of his 'elite;.* category through education.
That about one third of a very broadly defined category (of doubtful 
relevance, see chapter 6 ), were the direct descendants (sons or grandsons) 
or original mailo allottees speaks of a considerable inheritance factor, 
particularly in a society in which equality of collaterals was such a 
strong value and not entirely removed by the Christian emphasis on the .'ring' 
wife (ibid. p.202), The inheritance factor was probably considerably 
higher in what I would call the elite - the group, not Fallers,* status 
category (see chapter 6 ). The elite of 1900 remained a distinct status 
group, and passed its status to its children.
Educational opportunities remained limited.In 1956? there were about
300.000 children of school age in Buganda: there were school places for
70.000 (primary); 4>®00 (secondary and technical); and 200 (post-secondary); 
a few persons studied abroad (ibid, p.139)* Even in the 1957-8 elite sample 
of 298 ,'elite* members, nearly half went to King's College, Budo or St.
Mary's, Kisubi; and in certain political categories the proportion was
much higher: 9 out of 10 party leaders; 4 out of 7 nominated Lukillco members;
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7 out of 8 Legislative Council members; 15 out of 19 county chiefs; 37 
out of 56 Buganda civil servants; 12 out of 15 Uganda civil servants;
5 out of 6 ministers.
I want now to analyze the structure of economic power relations 
during the colonial period, in order to show what conflicts of ^objective,1 
interests there were, and how they were related to perceived conflicts - 
to which the preceding part of this chapter will be seen to be relevant.
The Agreement of 1900 established two economic classes with different 
relations to the means of production: (l) landlords, living by tribute 
(rent) and sales - they lacked a way to exploit the land directly, apart 
from its use as a capital asset through sales, until cotton became established 
as a cash crop; (2 ) tenants living by 'peasant production (cf. Wolf 19663 
p.10; Stinchcombe, 1967T p.185).
With the introduction of the cotton cash crop the opportunity for the 
landlords to establish a new base in the processes of production by 
exploiting their holdings seemed to be available (Richards, 1963, p.272). 
However, they did not have the political or economic power to turn 
their client-tenants into plantation labourers, as happened in the Eastern 
Province of Uganda (Wrigley, 1964* P»35)r although they did try to divert 
the new corvee (lcasanvu) demanded by the British to their own estates 
(Powesland, 1957? p.20). Tenants could too easily move or find other 
employment. Land was not scarce: in 1921 there was only an average
population density of 45 per square mile on fertile land. Conversely, 
labour was scarce, and there were relatively many employment opportunities 
outside cultivation, as for example small traders and cotton-buyers, clerks, 
carriers, labourers, drivers, artisans. Without the means to compel their 
tenants to work on their behalf, landowners remained essentially un­
productive (Richards, 1963, p.272) it was only from the 1920s that this was 
offset to some degree by immigrant1labour. ; Their ten^ants individually 
cultivated a small amount of cotton and, later, coffee besides the subsistence 
crops grown by women. Other Baganda did not rely on landownership or cash— 
crop cultivation alone, and took advantage of the growing variety of non­
agrarian employment opportunities.
This situation is often analysed as the background to the distinction 
which developed between landowning and political office holding. The number 
of landowners grew considerably (see above), and possession of a large 
estate was no longer necessarily associated with political office. Wrigley 
states:
"A clearer distinction could now be drawn between the official
hierarchy of administrators and the economic class of landed 
proprietors. The aristocracy as a whole had gained new 
administrative functions which to some extent replaced its old 
role of leadership in war, hut it had lost its former direct 
control over the production and distribution of wealth"
(1964, p.37-38).
Such an analysis fails to recognize the exent to which the larger landowners 
used their land as capital for acquiring the means to retain political power 
and take advantage of the new elite employment opportunities. Land owner­
ship, as I showed above, did not offer the .means to control production and 
distribution of wealth. It could only be a resource in the pursuit of 
political power if converted into cash to pay for education or commercial 
investment.
The great landowners retained their economic situation, and even in the 
1950s some Baganda could afford to live from fixed dues (Wrigley, 1964? P*50) - 
which is not to say that they limited themselves to this. Except in their 
case, the amount cf land actually cultivated became a more significant element 
in economic power than the amount of land owned, or whether it was held in 
ownership or tenancy. Cotton developed rapidly as a cash crop after its 
introduction in 1904, with the value of the total crop in Uganda rising from 
£1,089 in 1905-6 to £165,412 by 1910-11, and over £4jh*i« 1924—5 (of which
Buganda produced about one third). (Wrigley, 1959» PP*15 & 47)• After 
the second World War the value continued to rise fast, though production fell 
in the 1950s (dbid. p.6 8). Coffee was later developed as a cash-crop.
After the Second World War it became even more valuable than cotton, with 
high prices on world markets until the second half of the 195©s» Most coffee 
was produced in Buganda - over 85$ of the 1956 crop, for example (ibid. p.74)» 
At about this time, cash incomes in the Mmengo region of Buganda were about 
700-100QShs, per year, (Southwold, 1965? p.110). There was generally a 
rapid increase in the real income of cash-crop cultivators, which ensured 
a market for locally-manufactured goods. The rise in urban population as 
local industries became established, provided a more diversified market, 
in food, for cultivators. This upward economic spiral is in notable contrast 
with the precolonial !vicious circle1 of low income and productivity described 
by Ehrlich (1956). Cash was used to pay taxes (from the Hut Tax of three 
rupees made as partcf the I9OO Agreement), rent, and sometimes hired labour 
for construction or the fields. A cash income became necessary for setting 
up a household, with a plot and a wife, and most young Baganda had to find 
wage-employment at some period of their lives.-
While most cultivators held only two to three acres of food crops, and 
one to three acres of cash crops (Mukwaya,1953, & Southwold, 1965, p.110), 
there now existed after the second World War much larger cash farming units
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of up to 150 aores, with the hulk of such holdings in the 10 to 30 
ac-'res range. Analytically, we may distinguish three economic classes. 
Firstly, those capitalists v--who lived Toy rent or employed labour on 
a regular basis in commerce and industrial and agricultural production. 
Richards (1954) restricts the use of the term 'agricultural capitalist' 
to those farming with hired labour on 100 acres or more. This 
quantitative criterion gives too static an analysis of economic relationships 
and its relevance to empirical processes is not clear; I do not use it. 
Secondly, those farmers who produced cash crops with their own labour, 
while their women cultivated subsistence crops. They might irregularly 
employ an extra labourer. Stinchcombe (1967) would call them ’small­
holders'. Thirdly, landless labourers.
Although there may have been overlapping and marginal cases, as 
one would expect in a situation of relatively high economic mobility, 
these three 'ideal' relations to the means of production represent 
the significant discontinuities. Even Wrigley, who considers that 
there was a continuum between categories two and three of mine, admits 
that by 1956 there was a class who owned little more than their banana 
grove, and depended considerably on wage-earning for their cash income.
By this time land had ceased to be a 'free good', and there were high 
initial payments for tenancies. (1959? P*79)» Professionals, traders, 
skilled and semi-skilled workers form significant economic categories 
but cannot be seen as distinct classes because they were cross-cut by 
differential property relations, or formed only part of a wider class 
(cf. Bottomore, 1964? chapter IV).
Baganda traders comprised more than/half the African traders of 
the Protectorate in 1953 (6,683 African traders were resident in 
Buganda - Fallers 1964? P*145)? while Baganda were only a quarter of 
the total population. But only 20$ of these traders made £249 op more 
net profit, and almost an equal proportion .(18$') made a loss (ibid.).
As Fallers says: "Shopkeeping remains largely a side-line". Thus most 
traders fall into the second or third categories as outlined above. Only 
a few were themselves employers, and thus 'commercial capitalists'.
There were 85 Baganda directors of 36 limited companies in a variety 
of activities, including publishing, food processing and marketing, 
and construction. The leaders of the bigger co-operative societies 
for processing and marketing should be considered as salaried prof­
essionals. There were 379 societies in 1954 (ibid. p. 147).
The professionals varied greatly in their class affiliations.
Religious officials and teachers were recruited from all classes, with
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a noticeable tendency for the more prestigious and well-remunerated jobs 
to he held by those with more capital to invest in extended education 
(ibid, p.139)t i*e. those from'my ’capitalist1 class. This applies 
to all the ’professions’. Those from ’capitalist1 class families 
were much more significantly represented in those occupations requiring 
the greatest capital investment: the law, and western medicine. Top
politicians and journalists wereldrawn from the foregoing professional 
occupations together with direct recruitment from the landlord and 
agricultural capitalist class. Thus in 1956 the leaders of the three 
main existing parties whose occupations were known were: six teachers, 
six merchants, three landowners and ’gentleman farmers’, three doctors 
three journalists, a lawyer, a building contractor, a printer and a 
’professional politician1 (Fallers, 1964* P*154)* 1“he major journalists 
were politicians as well (ibid.).
Landless labourers were principally African immigrants - over­
whelmingly so in agriculture (Richards, 1954)• There were about
100,000 wage-earners in Buganda in 1956 (Fallers, 1964* p.147)•
Industrial employment was only a small part of urban employment, which 
consisted mainly of public and municipal serviees - about a quarter of 
all Kampala employees -r- commerce, transport and domestic service (Elkan 
and Fallers, I960, p.243)» Because of their better education and 
strategic position in their own homeland, such Baganda as were wage- 
earners tended to be in the better-paid jobs, as white-collar and skilled 
workers (Elkan, I960, Table 7» PP*44~47) though they form the most
stable labour-group (Elkan, 1956), they tend to regard the town and 
wage-labour as temporary phases, and to retain their links with rural 
areas. Elkan and Fallers comment:
’’Many Baganda town workers ’commute’ daily from rural 
holdings, where their wives cultivate both food and 
cash crops. Others maintain an urban lodging for use 
during the week but return every weekend to a rural home 
many dozens of miles away1’ (i960, p.249)«
Thus Baganda wage-earners do not simply fall into the class of the
landless, as most,, of the immigrants do. In 1950 between 55-75$
immigrants worked in agricultural labour, and most of the remainder
went to unskilled urban labour, which Baganda avoided (Richards, 1954
P-94)•
We may arrive at a crude estimation of the proportions of the rural 
population in the different classes by examining carefully the descriptions 
of the characteristics of his five categories of agriculturists, divided 
analytically by wealth, given by Wrigley (n.d., quoted by Hunter, 1962 
p.99) . His categories are (a) Larger Farmers: 2% (b) well-to-do Peasants:
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19$ (3) Middling Peasants: 27$ (4) Poor Peasants: 32$ (5) Land­
less; Labourers: 20$. Large Farmers may employ as many as 100) 
labourers, though 12-20 is more common. The Well-to-Do Peasant
”generally employs one or two porters (labourers) fairly 
regularly, and 1 or 2 more occasionally, but he nearly 
always does some manual work himself0.
The Middling Peasant ’rarely employs hired labour”. Thus we find
at most 21$ in my first economic class (and many of these will
undoubtedly be much more like the second class ) 59$ in* my second
class (comprising Wrigley's ’middling’ and ’poor’ peasants, and,
I suggest, many of the ’rich’ peasants); and 20$ in my third
class; of landless; labourers.
Wrigley himself attempts to identify ’economic classes” in 
Buganda in the late colonial period (196k ,.pp. 52-60) , and concludes 
that: ’there is very great economic differentiation but hardly
any clear-cut stratification,” (p. 60) , There are two analytically 
distinct points confused here, (1) There were economic classes in 
the sense used by Marx, and elaborated by Weber (see above),
(2) Consciousness of class, was inhibited by the existence of
\
cross-cutting status groitps. These have often been referred to 
as ’objective’ and ’subjective’ criteria for class, respectively. 
However, they should not be confused in an. attempt to analyze a 
single scale of stratification. Weber has made a clear distinc­
tion between, 'class’ in the economic order of institutions, and 
'status group' in the social order (1970,p*193)* Wrigley fails 
to recognize this distinction when he identifies 'economic 
classes’ in Buganda by different levels of income,, and possession 
of certain critical items such as a car. He is,,, in fact, thereby 
analyzing one aspect of social, status in Buganda - which is,. as: 
he says, not clear-cut. The lack of clarity in the system of 
status .stratification,, and its not being coextensive with the% * 1
economic class system,; is significant in the study of political 
change in Buganda. It is particularly so if we are to explain 
the appai’ent identity of political interests perceived by persons 
in the different economic classes in the decade before Independ­
ence, (see chapter 7)« Classification into strata on the basis 
of wealth does not provide us with significant variables unless 
it is demonstrated that each stratum was conscious of corporate 
interests in status, or that its members had similar economic 
interests.
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Much of the same criticisms must he applied to Fallers1 model of strati­
fication in modern Buganda (1964, p.187). He describes an occupational 
elite of about 10,000 out of the 360,000 adult male taxpayers of 1956* The
criterion for inclusion are those, of status evaluation and not those of 
economic class: ”1,076 Protectorate government civil servants; the Buganda 
government civil servants who made 500 Shs. or more per month; the 3T354 
teachers, 289 Christian priests and Muslim sheikhs, and 54 doctors and 
lawers; the 85 company directors, some 1,200 traders who made more than 
£250 per year net profit, and the 2,500 (more or less) owners of more 
than 10 acres of mailo land with five or more.tenants. (ibid.). Fallers 
admits the arbitrariness of this grouping - even so, it is difficult to see 
its value in analysis. The first category includes drivers, carpenters, 
a cobbler, different grades of clerks and jailers besides senior officials 
(1964, pp.132-4). Most of the teachers, priests, traders and landowners 
would be part of local rather than national elites. More than half these 
teachers taught in vernacular grades (Apter, I96I, p.372). Between the top 
status grouping and the mass of about 300,000 peasants and .unskilled workers, 
Fallers places about 50t^00 persons in a ’middle group1 comprising about
20,000 ’substantial’ farmers and landowners, 25^000 skilled workers, and 
about 5,000 lesser traders. Again, this ’hierarchy’ has no demonstrated 
empirical reality in social interaction.
The significant point about the economic classes as I have analyzed 
them, is that from soon after the passing^ of the Busulu and Envujo Law in 
1928, very few Baganda made their livelihood 3oy exploiting the labour of 
other Baganda. Firstly, only the very largest landowners could afford 
to live from busulu and envu.jj0 , for these fixed dues .soon became unrelated 
to the economic value of the land in production. These landowners and 
their families often took employment in other sectors of the economy, but 
were notably unsuccessful in establishing themselves in commerce.
According to Wrigley:
"there have been a number of ambitious ventures into wholesale 
distribution and large-scale.produce marketing, mostly led by 
•men drawn from the upper ranks of society, men of property and 
education...with very few exceptions these have been total 
failures”. (1964? P-50))
Differentiation of economic roles among the landlord class therefore centred
on professional and higher administrative careers. Secondly, Baganda without
their own land to farm very seldom became agricultural labourers; they
migrated to the towns where they worked on their own account as petty traders
or as employees of Europeans and Asians in a great variety of occupations
(see above). Elkan and Fallers found that Baganda usually worked in town
until they had enough money to buy a substantial plot or set themselves up 
in a small business; and all assumed that they would eventually become 
self-employed (1964j pp*248,250); Landless persons who worked for Baganda 
employers were mostly immigrants. Thus the development of economic 
classes in Buganda after 1900 did not, after the initial period in which 
a landlord class exercised economic power directly at the expense of 
their tenants, mean that conflicts of ’objective' intersts between 
Baganda in terms of the economic power structure were perceived as more 
important than other intersts - notably in status (see chapter 75 
Stinchcombe, 1967, Weber, 1970? p.l86). Such conflict did exist between 
Baganda employers, on one side, and immigrant landless labourers and 
temporary tenants, Baganda of all classes were strongly united against 
aliens: the Asian and European employers; the British colonialists;
petty Asian trade competitors; competing African immigrant labourers 
and temporary tenants who also, it was claimed (see Elkan, 1956, p.23), 
undercut Baganda living standards.
Common Baganda hostility to aliens should not be seen to imply consensus 
inwall fields of social relations, and should be examined in the full socio­
economic context of immigration. In 1948 the Baganda population of Buganda 
was 855,362 which was 66$ of the total African population; immigrants 
comprised 441,339 or 34$ of the total. The distribution of the immi- 
grants varied steadily throughout the country from 3*7$ in Bi|ngazzi county 
to 52.3$ in Mawogola (Richards, 1954, P*95)- Between 1931 and 1948 the African 
population of Buganda increased 49*6$, but there was a particularly 
noticeable rise in the immigrant, especially Banyarwanda and Barundi 
populations. The latter two peoples produced 4 2.8$ of the increase, other 
immigrants 33*3$ and the Baganda only 23,9$ (ibid., p.116). By 1959 iHe 
Baganda proportion of the Buganda population had declined frodm 66$ to 
55$ (1,006, 101 out of 1,834, 128: Southwold 1965).
There were four main ways immigrants became involved in the cultivation 
system: as paid labourers or ’porters* (abapakasi); as tenants under the 
protection of the Busulu and Envujo law (abafunye bibanja); as other kinds 
of tenants, mainly seasonal (abapangisa); as land buyers (abalina etaka).
A sample of three counties - Busiro, Kyagwe, Buddu - showed that an average 
of about 60$ of immigrants were settled as customary tenants (ibid, p.130), 
though they probably had to pay a large entry fee and take up previously 
uncultivated ground (see below). About 12$ were seasonal tenants, paying 
well abov.<e the customary sum - much more a real rent. Some became tenants 
on Crown land, at ten’.shillings for temporary occupation; or tenants or 
the plantation on which they worked; or on- one of the three ex-soldier
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settlements in Buganda. Those who were 'porters or unstated' in the 
sample varied from 22.6$ in Busiro to 44*2$ in Buddu (ihid. p.133), whereas 
most Baganda were landlords or customary tenants. Alien landhuyers were 
very rare, among other reasons because of Baganda feeling against giving 
land, associated residually with political rights, to non-Baganda. In 
1951? the Great Lukiiko tried to pass an amendment to the 1908 Land Law 
extending prohibition of land sales to anyone who was not a Muganda.
Hostility between Baganda and the whole category of aliens (abanamawanga) 
was considerable (ibid, p.222). The main opposition to immigrants came 
from the Baganda tenants with whom they competed, according to Southall's 
Alur informants (ibid, p.156), not the landlords who profited from their 
presence; and in the urban areas the petty traders and landlords clashed 
over the admittance of competitive but rent-profitable Asians to previously 
restricted districts (Gutkind, 19^3, pp.215, 223,227). The hostitility 
was expressed through the symbolism of distinctiveness (chapter 5)«
Despite universal Baganda xenophobia, landlords and tenants retained 
different attitudes because of their different economic situations.
Chiefs and landlords continued to give out plots to immigrants because of 
their increasing difficulty in (l) attracting servants and labourers - 
work which Baganda would .not do; (2) in securing an income from fixed 
dues of diminishing value. Baganda tenants opposed this competition and 
demanded the expulsion of aliens who were undercutting their cost of living, 
though they did not oppose the employment of immigrants as porters alone, 
i.e. work they were not competing for (ibid, .,p.l97)» Thus there 
remained conflicting class interests as well as cohesion under the symbol 
of tribal unity among Baganda.
In this chapter, I have analyzed the changing economic power structure 
in Buganda, in order to show where conflicts of 'objective1 interests lay. 
Unlike Fallers and Wrigley I did not find a growing 'classlessness' - and
I showed their finding was the result of conceptual confusion of economic
and status forms of power, which Weber showed should be kept analytically 
distinct. On the other hand, I found that the economic class structure 
pointed to by Worsley requires a good deal of. comment to explain the 
continuing 'latency' of class conflict. Worsley's assumptions hide
the importance not only of the particular nature of an economic class
structure - particularly the types of economic processes in which relations 
are formed - but also of cultural-historical variables in political change. 
Economic class structure was extremely important in determination of the 
nature of political change in Buganda, but not in the way suggested by any 
of these writers (see chapter 7)•
CHAPTER FIVE
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THE SIHBOLHSM OP INEQUALITY Hf BUGAHDA
PART ONE: K3HSHIP AMD MARRIAGE
This section examines the relationship between social stratification and 
the system of kinship and marriage in Buganda* In Rwanda it was clear that 
the different patterns and functions of kinship and marriage occupied a central 
place in the maintenance of symbolic boundaries between the ma^or status 
groupings. In the precolonial period in Buganda status was not ascribed in 
the same ‘closed1 degree that it was in Rwanda, and while no doubt chiefs 
looked for marriage alliances with other chiefs this produced a ‘statistical* 
rather than a 'normative* pattern in the distribution of prestige through 
marriage (cf* Leach, 196 lj There was no strong ideology linking status 
and the purity of a group*s women - thus women were available for creating 
categorical ties whereever this was politically necessary. A Patron often 
gave his clients women from his household, as wives as well as eoncubines 
(Richards, 1966,p.20)* Descent categories and groups were much more im­
portant in ascribing status to persons in Rwanda than in Buganda* Several 
cultural-historical and structural factors must have been important here, 
which it would be beyond ray scope to discuss and on which the evidence i£ unclear, 
Baganda descent group leaders, the bat aka, were mostly excluded from 
formal political power in the 1900 Agreement - and those who were not were 
included by virtue of other roles they played simultaneously - and held 
authority in a well-differentiated field of internal corporate administration*
I examine this situation briefly, though the main interest focuses on the 
formal and informal symbolic uses of kinship and marriage customs to draw 
boundaries, as in Rwanda, between unequal status, economic and political 
groups. In the main this concerns the delineation of a boundary between 
the Baganda of all economic classes, and non-Baganda* Thus we should see 
how the same patterns of kinship and marriage which directly produced few 
and relatively insignificant inequalities of status, power and wealth among 
Baganda were suitable for the symbolic organization cf the latter for political 
competition with all those who did not share than.
At the time of Independence, there were 48 recognized clans (bika) in 
Buganda (Southwold, 1965,p.95). This number had grown from the original six 
of the legends ofihe first kabalca, Kintu, as the kabakas granted the rights 
to form new clans to favourites, The clans were agnatic, and each took its 
name from a different 'totem' which, through the members* ritual avoidance 
of eating it, symbolized lie clan's distinctiveness as a group. The clan was 
the largest agnatic descent unitj Baganda nationality was established through 
the production of proof of clan-membership. A person appointed to a chief- 
ship had to recite the details of his clan-membership at the installation
ceremony, and was dismissed if the clan bataka denied knowledge of him* In 
the later colonial period, clan membership was particularly emphasized as 
distinguishing Baganda from African immigrants, of whom the fomer said:
"They are strangers* They have no dans." ( Richards, 1966,p.68)
There was an official clan head, known as mukulu or .i.ia.i.ia. Heads of 
descent groups at all levels were known collectively as bataka* As in the 
case of the choice of a kabaka, several principles were involved in the 
succession to a mutaka office, of which the most fcanal were those of nsikirano 
and the kabaka's approval. The lower bataka assisted the clan mutaka in a 
oaancil which chose from among the legitimate candidates for the office.
This pattern was repeated at the lower levels of segmentation, with the 
lunyiriri (minimal lineage) mutaka being assisted by leading members of the 
group. The bataka themselves were always chosen from the senior 'lineage 
of the roof, kasolya* at each level (Fallers, 1964, p*7l), but clearly this 
was only one factor in an actual choice since several persons would have 
such qualifications. Moreover, in the period considered here, unilineal 
descent groups had little political power (Southwold, 196l,pp.ll-14). They 
were dispersed, and involved minimal corporate obligations even at local level, 
(see below).
Each clan had its own estates. These were relatively small, "usually a 
single kvalo" (Southwold, 1965,p*96), and granted inalienably by the kabaka.
Hone were allodial; they were granted under 'butaka tenure1, Kabakas created 
new clans or clan segments by making such grants to favourites and allowing 
them and their descendants to bury their ancestors there.
One clan differed from the above descriptions: the "peasant princes' 
clan" of lineages formed by descendants of kabakas who were yet too remote 
to ensure their inclusion among the 'princes of the drum' ^io were eligible 
for succession to the kabakaship (Fallers, 1964,pp.68-9). This 'clan' 
was a status category rather than a group, having no totem and not acting 
corporately for political purposes since in that field its members were attached 
to competing matrilateral clans. M.C.Fallers (i960,p.54) suggests that in 
the precolonial period it was very dangerous to be a royal prince (balangira) 
because some kabakas executed those they suspected cf potential rivalry; so 
many princes 'hi^ * in their matrilateral clans. In the colonial period it 
has been safe, and a "princes clan" has been organized on similar lines to 
the clans proper. The failure of the balangira to organize in their own 
political interest was reflected in their formal exclusion from office, which 
applied even in the colonial period above muluka level. In 1926 a Governor
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tried and failed, to ha've a mulanaira appointed to a ggombolola chief ship
(chapter six). The 'balan&ira ahakooi * were often indistinguishable in
£
wealth from bakoni. though claiming higher prestige. Gians were not formally 
ranked, though membership of a clan specially favoured by a particular kabaka 
might bring added prestige.
The clan was an exogamous unit - a man could not marry into his own 
or his mother's clan - except in a few special cases which Southwold states 
(l965,p.H6n.8) concern large size or 'diverse descent of different sections'.
In these cases clans permitted marriage between members of different major 
lineages. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the effects 
of such divergencies on the symbolic o rganization of informal political 
groups. These might have been particularly important in the case of large 
clans, or indeed any others, which were politically powerful and might have 
sought membership restriction. The system would ideally operate to prevent 
the formation of dominant blocs. However, at the individual level the 
boundaries between kinship groups were not in practice strongly enforced - 
Mair (l934»P»79) mentions that marriage between kin in the prohibited cat­
egories occurred sometimes when other persons did not know the relationship, 
and even if it was discovered there was usually no further action than an 
enforced separation. But this data is from the colonial period. The 
"princes' clan" was again different in not having a rule of exogamy; again 
its failure to organize may be seen in the absence of a positive rule of 
endogamy.
I will discuss in chapter 6 the wider political functions of the clans, 
both (l) in their formal symbolic linkage to the kabakaship through ritual 
duties and services, marriages, the possibility of providing a kabaka and queen 
mother, etc., and (2) informally in organizing political groupings to cont- 
pete for the kabakaship and the kabaka*s favour. I d© not intend to review the 
evidence on, or examine, the question of how the kabakas centralised control 
of Buganda by extending 'patrimonial* authority at the expense cf local descent 
group authorities, for this process was completed before the end cf the nine­
teenth century, and was not in itself relevant to the colonial period (cf.
Gox, 1950; Southwold, 1961). Again, I will discuss there my disagreement with 
Fallers (l964,p.l5l) on this point. In the colonial p@eiod,at least, the clans 
concerned themselves formally only with domestic matters; informally their 
activites were wider-ranging but did not involve opposition to the institution 
of kingship (chapter 6)
Probably because of afcs informal functions the clan had a surprising degree 
of corp orate responsibility during the precolonial period in the case of mis-
Ill
demeanours by its members* The kabakas might order the execution of such 
persons, and of their fellow clan-menbers* Such political exigencies were 
krgely responsible £>r the considerable movement between clans. This move- 
ment was facilitated by certain customs. Firstly, there could be blood 
brotherhood between members of different clans. Seoondly, a man belonged 
to the clan of his genitor - not his patertif this was claimed to be a 
different person - which meant that it was relatively easy to change clanship 
if this was politically expedient. A good example occurs in the personal 
biography of Mika Sematimba, who was the Makamba of Busiro from 1892-1952: 
the Pangolin clan disputed his membership of the Lungfish clan, and within 
the latter two lineages claimed him - both these disputes continuing through­
out his lifetime, and the second was resolved only nine years after* his death. 
(Richards, 1966,p.47n.2) Thirdly, only the bataka had any extensive know­
ledge of genealogies. Most Baganda forgot ancestors further back than their 
grandfathers (SouthwoId, 1965,p.96).
Clan and lineage members recognised few mutual obligations, despite the 
retention of an ideology of collateral equality wittLn the agnatic descent 
group, as seen in the nsikirano principles and the extension of kinship terns 
to all members of the same generation ^ (Fallers, 1964,p.72): (l) the ob­
taining of vengeance in the precolonial period (Mair, 1934,p* 185) - though 
only with die kabaka's permission (Mair, 1962, p.59); (2) hospitality and a 
limited amount of economic aid. These obligations were of even less import­
ance in the colonial period than previously, though the dispersal of even the 
lunviriri already made their fulfillment haphazard. The importance of clan­
ship tended, even more, to be symbolic rather than instrumental, although 
it might be used informally in the Urination of political groupings, as in 
precolonial times, i>r in emphasizing Baganda identity in the colonial period in 
the 'neotraditionalist1 political organizations (chapters).
There were several different levels of clan-segments or lineages (Falles, 
1964>p*7l) In descending order of segmentation these were: ssiga. mutuba 
and lunyiriri. Mo segment s of the lunyiriri were formally recognised. Each 
segment had its mutaka and lukiiko. Although it was socially approved to 
live on a butaka of one's clan or clan-segment, and their dispersal around the 
kingdom made this relatively easy, and a man had a special right to be given a 
plot on his clan butaka if there m s  room, most Baganda did not use the 
opportunity. It was more profitable to seek good patrons of whatever clan 
they might be. The bataka acted as ordinary patrons to their clients, most 
of whom were not of their clan (chapter 4; Fallers, 1964,p.85)
In the precolonial period the clans and lineages had special responsibility 
for dealing with ntbters of succession and inheritable (of moveable property,
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including wives)* A man designated his successor (musika)» In the 1950s 
a musika took about Aff/o of the property of the dead man (Southwold, 1956,p.94-) 
He was then usually the eldest son, whether this decision was made by will 
or by the clan council. Sometimes he was the eldest son of the 'ring wife'.
In the case of mailo land, however small, the musika had to be approved by 
the kabaka. When a man die <&his musika took his name and position in the 
inatrix of kinship terms, as well as the largest share cfthe property.
After a decree of Mutesa I in the mid-nineteenth century the preference given 
to brothers and brothers' sons was abandoned and given to own sons (ibid).
Under Christian and Muslim influence this soon became preference for the 
eldest son. In the colonial period, the clans and lineages continued to 
exercise their special responsibilities in matters of succession and 
inheritance, now also including the inheritance of land, in theory. How­
ever, they have little real power, being limited by wills and the super­
vision of a special office under the katikklro: the clan's "function is
mainly administrative" (ibid,p.95) • In deciding the many cases where wills 
were not left,the clan councils Usually followed a kabaka*s order of 1926 
made to regularise the position and which, W&lenot becoming law, "may be 
said tobave the force of custom"(ibid ,p,89). Inthe distribution of mailo 
estates after 1900, the lineage bataka generally lost control of their estates, 
which were given to persons of different clans. The campaign of these lesser 
bataka to get their share of the milo spoils provided a symbol for popular 
opposition to the chiefs to rally around, as in the 1921 Bataka Federation ( 
chapter 6).
The relative unimportance of kinship groups other than the clan in Baganda 
political and economic relations & indicated by the reluctance with which 
kinship terms are now used to refer to kinsmen, rather than their personal 
names. Southwold found that:
"except between parents and children, kinship terms are
rarely used in addressing a kinsman... there is, in fact
a certain tendency to regard kin re la tins as an embarrassment."
(1965,p.101).
Residence at marriage always tended to be neolocal, with as much emphasis on 
relations with remoter as close kinsmen. This may be seen represent &L 
ideologically in the principles of kusllcirana ('to exchange successors' - 
Southwold, 1966,p.lOO). In part this followed from the search for the most 
advantageous clientship - with such a high degree of geographical mobility a 
man could still use kinship, however, ranote, to guide he behaviour towards 
other clients of new patron. But it also indicates particularly in the 
colonial priod, the absence of multiplex and constant dependence on kinsmen. 
Kinship of any sort was valued principally as a means of cementing relation-
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ships; whie Baganda says "Frie»«lship is stronger than kinship" (Southwold
1965), the discovery of the latter canf°imalize the foimer relationship.
Richards (l966) writes 'f'the "losely-organised bilateral nature of* kinship
groups" in both the precolonial (p.22) and colonial (p.86) periods, and
it seems that what Southall writes of town life in Buganda also applies to
rural villages: he also finds
"what might be called in a sense bilateral kinship behaviour; the 
strength cf the fundamental ties is still generally assumed, but 
rather on a reciprocal basis which precludes long-term parasitism.
Other kinsfolk, both consanguineal and affinal, present options 
which may or may not be taken up for friendship or assistance on 
a situational basis... such friendship roles are more achieved 
than ascribed" (Southall, 1961, (ed),p.220).
The d egree of kinship was relat ively unimportant, and a man could find kins­
men anywhere in Buganda. Baganda kinship behaviour might be seen as 
in some ways analogous to ‘tribalism’ in the Gopperbelt towns of the 1940s 
and 1950s, involving "categorical" relationships (litchell, 1966) which 
enabled peqsons migrating into new areas to 'structure’ their social inter­
action with others they did not know. The achievement of friendship roles 
can be seen in the formation of what Richards (1966) calls "kinship clusters" 
in the precolonial village, around a successful kinsman. In the colonial 
period, ’kinship clusters' have been formed rather of close kin, following 
expectations conforming with the new rules of inheritance and succession.
But vrhfl-eHiis may have helped a landowner dominate a village, the most 
prominent village and muluka political division arose between the Baganda 
and African immigrants. These latter were largely excluded from formal 
political processes except where they predominated numerically (Richards 
1954, pp. 179-93; 1964,p.315).
Formally, descent groups do not ascribe status in Buganda. The part 
played by descent in the distribution of prestige is limited to the domestic 
unit. For bale op i this is composed of the persons occupying a household 
(maka) under a household head (see Southwold 1965).. The maka is an inde­
pendent economic and residential unit. Larger residential groupings have 
little definition or significance: a 'village’ does not comprise a corporate
group in a discrete cluster, and may simply be the tern to refer to a mailo 
estate, of whatever size. Normally the domestic unit comprised the 
elementary family at some stage of its cycle. Married children almosb always 
had separate households. In the colonial period only about one man in twenty 
had more than one wife and headed a compound family. Sometimes a man whose 
wife had left him lived with a sister or unmarried daughter. Many persons
lived alone, bringing down itaaverage household size to only three 
persons.
The nature of the domestic unit was particularly important because, given 
the kabaka*s control of appointment and the dispersal of descent groups, 
attachment to a prominent patron's household was the route to political office. 
It was not possible to acquire political authority, or even much power, as a 
'good' lineage member; i.e. authority did nob rise in 'pyramidal' form 
(cf. Southall 1966b,p.126) Kinship ties were utilized to have children sent 
to the household of a chief, with the hope of their securing special favour 
and advancement. But even among a chief's own sons the process of pro­
gressive exclusion would begin: few would attain the same degree of power 
as their father, though it was unlikely that none would (Fallers, 1970,p. 170). 
Their advantage was the statistical and not normative one of a better chance to 
show talent to, or act as pawns in the alliances and favours of, the patrons 
who lad access to power delegated from its single source in the kabaka.
Thus in one example
"Some time after his son Mudiru had been placed to serve in 
the palace, Lukaayi Kaccoco took another of his children,
Kibuka Miti, and gave him to ICaddu, the Musalosalo ( a mutongole 
chief), who introduced him to the kabaka" (Lwanga, 1954,n . 5 
quoted ibid)
Competition between brothers for their chiefly (or iideed bakopi) father's 
favour stressed the domestic unit which- each represented, at the expense of 
the lineage group - for, unlike such coupetition in many 'segmentary lineage 
systems' the power for which brothers competed was not authorised to their 
father by the lineage organization or ideology and so they did not need to 
cooperate in maintaining fte latter as the prize for which they conpeted (cf 
Bailey, 1969)» instead of lineages tightly organized in corporate possession 
of political office or offices, we find 'dynasties' (ibid,p.l71* Mair 1962 
p.176) of kinsmen in office but lacking hereditary rights to them. Such 
dynasties were not composed of particular categories of kin, and might include 
remote kin while excluding certain close kinsmen. Membership of certain 
descent groups gave a better chance of joining sudi a dynasty, but no more 
than that. It may be, though I lack the evidence to substantiate the sug­
gestion, that the widespread fostering in Buganda ( Richards, 1966,p.19), as 
in Lwanga's exanple above, and the correlation of rank with fertility (Fallers, 
1964,p. 162) - the higher the more - were related to dynasty-building by 
political officials. The informal linkage of elite (Lontestic units thragh 
the language of clanship (see above), without the mediation of lineage corp­
orate political groups, need not then surprise us.
In the colonial ptdod the pattern of prestige distribution centering- on 
the domestic unit has facilitated tie distinctiveness of the dominant ecohomic
class on new criteria. In West Africa, the new elites have constantly faced v.i
the problem of limiting their obligations, symbolic as well as material,
beyond the (often new) domestic unit. (Lloyd, 1966) For Baganda, the fact
that a man's prestige did not spread significantly beyond the domestic
unit facilitated the reorientation of kinship links towards the creation of
solidarity in the economic class and status group, i.e. kinship followed
status links, and not vice versa; it was, moreover, only one element in
status differentiation. (Apter,p.20l)
At village level, there has often been a dominant group composed of the
kin of the original mailo holder (Richards, 1954, p*174 and 1966, passim),
in a similar haphazard 'dynastic1 fashion to that described above, and here
kinship may positively organize economic and political dominance:
"it is rare not to find some of the children of the original owner 
in a dominating position in the original village community, and in 
many cases all the owners of more than ten acres in the village 
are members of the minimal lineage" (Richards, 1954,p *174)
But other members of the village are not necessarily (or even often) members 
of like groups. Again, it is clear that kinship follows and institution­
alizes power and status.
The principle significance of the Baganda systems of kinship and marriage 
in this respect in the colonial period was the distinction of Baganda from 
non-Baganda. Two major trends of the later colonial period were the growing 
economic competition from African immigrant labourers and Asian traders, and 
the effort to mobilize Baganda nationalism against Protectorate Government 
control (chapter 7). The kinship system, with its appropriate ritual be­
haviour, provided one means for the symbolic organization of the Baganda as 
a status group dominating the other groups which it excluded. Members of 
the other groups, particularly those of the lowest status like the Banyarwanda, 
often tried to acquire higher status as Baganda by such means as claiming 
clan membership or attempting to establish 'butaka tenure' by burying 
ancestors on any land held. The Baganda were well aware of such devices, 
and ridiculed those caught attempting than. (Richards 1954)
As unilineal descent groupings in Buganda discharged a minimal "range 
of political and administrative functions" (cf.Smith, 1956,p.55) there was 
relatively little concern to protect their symbolic boundaries by forms of 
marriage (cf. Parkin, 1969,p.97ff). This is indicated by the fact that a 
child's genitor.and not his pater, was recognized as his father in cases 
where these were different persons - in contrast to Rwanda (Gravel, 1968,p.13l), 
Richards describes marriage in Buganda as "unstable", and in the village she 
studies, the figures;
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"for broken marriages in 1952 were 18tfo for women and for 
men, and these figures are certainly an underestimate (1966 
p.2l);
Southwold notes that
"most people have had several spouses, and have little confid­
ence that the current union will endure" (l965,p*105).
Bridewealth was relatively low, and not a deterrent to divorce (Richards, 1964 
p.256')* Baganda women were relatively free to form non-marital unions with 
persons of their choice (Parkin, p. 94)-
Despite these factors, the long period of immigration, and the marked 
predominance of males among the immigrants, there was notably little inter­
marriage between Baganda and African immigrants to Buganda. The sample 
villages in the 1948 survey of three counties - Busiro, Kyagwe and Buddu - 
showed that the following proportions of non-Baganda African men were married 
to Baganda women: in Busiro, 8,6%; in Kyagwe, 8^ ; in Buddu, 0>, The
following proportions of Baganda men had taken non-Baganda wives: in Busiro, 
none; in Kyagwe, 4$; in Buddu, 5*1%* (Richards, 1954»pp.270,276,281). At 
this time, more than a third cf the population of Buganda was made up by 
African immigrants. Thus there was a significant degree of infoxmal avoidance 
of intermarriage with foreigners by Baganda of both sexes.
There were clearly good substantive reasons for the avoidance of such 
marriages on both sides, particularly in the case of those immigrants who 
came to work at the lowest possible cost of living in order to return home 
as soon as possible, often to marry* Meharis points particularly to the 
great expense of a Baganda marriage ’of the ring1, which Baganda were app­
arently seldom prepared to lay out on foreign wives, and which immigrant 
men could rarely meet. furthermore, Baganda courts did not enforce the 
father’s right to the children in the case of immigrant men leaving Buganda 
without their wives (ibid). However, much importance must be attached to 
conceptions of the relative status of different tribes (see below). Parkin 
reports that in Kampala Baganda much more frequently married members of tribes 
which they thought most like themselves, i.e. to wbom they gave highest 
status, than those to whcm they gave low status (1969,p.97). The point is 
that, whatever the reasons, such patterns of marriage tended to reinforce 
the symbolic boundaries between Baganda and other Africans.
FART TWO: XDEOLOUX AMD RITUAL IN BUGANDA
My purpose in this section is an examination of the part played by ritual 
and ideology in maintaining existing forms of stratification, or creating 
new ones. As in the proceeding section, I examine the ideas and behaviour 
which institutionalize boundaries between groups and categories of persons, 
with particular attention to whether such boundaries follow the lines I 
have analysed between economic and political strata or cut across them.
Thus we can analyze the part played by these symbolic phenomena in increas­
ing or inhibiting awareness of corporate interests among the members of such 
strata. However, I do not examine other aspects of the involvement of ritual 
and ideology in politics (see chapters 6 and 7).
STATUS IDEOLOGY
The ritual bounderies between status groups in Buganda were insignif­
icant by comparison with those in Rwanda, and the rate of mobility between 
them relatively high. Individual social mobility, the acquisition of honour 
(kitiibwa) was itself a value (Richards, 1964,p.275), as it could not be for 
Hutu and Twa in Rwanda. These characteristics of Baganda stratification 
ensured that boundaries between the strata were blurred and there was a large 
area in which persons assumed different statuses according to the others with 
whom they were interacting at any time. This reflects the dyadic nature 
of political relations, which were the almost exclusive locus of kitiibwa 
in the precolonial period. It may be that the degree of status grouping in 
precolonial Buganda has been underplayed; if we remember that political 
status was what counted then the status hierarchy was very clear and its 
ritual boundaries insurmountable except by the kabaka's decree. There were 
clear differences in behaviour between tribute and labour paying bakoni and 
the patrons who supervised these activities. But it remains true that such 
differences derived from the politico-military sphere, where individuals were 
subject to the kabaka's favour and mobility in either direction could be 
rapid.
In the precolonial period, the category embracing most of the population 
was that of 'bakoni'-Persons of no importance* (Fallers, 1964,p,68). It 
is clear that this only acquires meaning by contrast with those categories 
of persons who were distinguished in some way. The most important of these, 
the true opposite of a mukopi, was a mwami, a roan who rules. Fallers (ibid) 
also mentions the mulangira. prince, as the opposite of a mukopi: however,
the existence of many 'balangira abakopi * literally 'undistinguished1 princes, 
requires some qualification to this statement. In the colonial period, 
when the boundaries between the strata had been hardened by structural 
differentiation and the creation of economic classes, bakopi was often used 
to refer to 'peasants'* There even appeared a category of 'peasant chiefs', 
of whom the katikkiro Wamala was the most famous. But these were unknown
in the precolonial period, and I suggest no conjunction of the terns 1 mukopij 
and 'mwami1 was conceivable. The status of mwami was not normatively 
ascribed, thou^i the son of a mwami had a statistically greater chance c£ 
achieving it than had the son of a mukopi.(chanter 4 & 6),
Before the encounter with Arab and European powers, differences of 
sophistication, ability to act the courtier or 'man of the capital' were not 
sharp or Ineradicable (ibdd,p.70). They were determined principally by 
political fortune, with very little ritual limitation of the recruitment pool 
for political office. The gradual definition of a status group of up-and- 
coming young chiefs and pages in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
starting with the acceptance of the new religions of Islam and Christianity 
and later including diacritical secular symbolism, precipitated far-reaching 
changes in the political system. It made organization for collective mob­
ility possible in the place of relatively rapid but insecure individual mobility. 
When this came it affected first the political system, and then further sub­
systems (chapter 4)*
During the colonial period there was a move away from the direct expres­
sion of inequality of terms such as 'mwami* and 'mtikopi'. which expressed 
consistent multiplex; role-relationships under the clear terms for ruler and 
ruled, The~’ term 'mwami* became used as a polite form in addressing anybody, 
and 'mukopi' had a general derogatory usage (thus it was used to describe 
B, Kiwanulta, leader of the Democratic Party, whaa he seemed to be setting him­
self above the kabaka by becoming Chief Minister of Uganda in 1961, though 
he was neither a peasant nor unimportant). Prestige (kitiibwa) became 
an attribute of many different roles, as role differentiation increased. 
Furthermore, it came to attach primarily to occupational roles. Structural 
differentiation without new institutionalized rankings meant that to a greater 
extent status evaluation lay in the eye of the beholder. Ideologically, 
individual social mobility into even the highest ranks remained possible 
within one or two generations. But as Fallers points out (ibid,p.125), 
the fact that most Baganda continued to think of status in dyadic terms does 
not mean that status groups did not exist, or were unimportant. Firstly, 
in Buganda the persons monopolizing the occupations with the highest prestige 
were very largely the descendants of the mailo-owning and power holding 
'gentry' status group of the early twentieth century (see chapter 6). Secondly, 
the prestige accorded generally to persons monopolising certain valued 
skills may ensure their self-awareness as a group with common interests in 
other fields than the occupational field in which the prestige was originally 
accorded. The ritual behaviour through which this group maintains distinct- 
iveness is perceived by others as an attribute of its members' occupations, and
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not as an aspect of group organization. Thus they may have the benefit of 
diffuse high prestige without their being perceived as a self-perpetuating 
group with sectional interests. Likewise, the monopoly of power achieved 
for its members by such a form of group organization may be perceived as 
acceptable by those excluded, for the political officials are then those per­
sons already allocated high prestige because of their occupations. This 
is one aspect of regeneralization of roles at the top of the economic, 
status and legal-political orders Rioted by Frahkenberg, 1966).
The economic class of mailo owners established in 1900 was also a status 
group in two distinct ways. Firstly, the persons comprising it were those 
who had already acquired the highest prestige in the traditional manner, being 
the kabaka1 s legitimate political officials, while for the first time achiev­
ing a group-consciousness through religious symbolism aid struggle with an 
unsuitable kabaka. Secondly, they were regarded by the British, and regarded 
themselves, as the persons most fitted to rule by ’virtue of their demonstrated 
ability, their recognition of and adaptation to new sources of power, and 
their adoption of a distinctive British life-style (see Richards, 1963,p.272). 
ICagwa describes his own part in this process (in ,The Book of the Grasshopper 
Clan1, n.d., quoted p.183 Fallers, 1964, & n .40 208-9), and this des­
cription might be matched by other influential chiefs. He was one of the 
first to adopt "new customs and work habits.. .they laughed at me at first..but 
later others followed1 (p.183)- In 1890 he bought a watch, which in itself 
implied a different style of life, and went on to acquire other status symbols: 
a horse (l892), a brick house with two storeys, in which he ate at a table 
and drank tea instead of banana beer (l894)> a kerosene lamp (1896) and a bicycle 
(1898). Literacy, or service from literate persons, also distinguished the 
elite and, like the other aspects of the new life-style, bound them in closely 
with the missionaries who provided the education. This educational aspect, 
or socialization process, was institutionalized in an elite educational 
system (chapter 4) * This served both to exclude effectively all but the chil­
dren of the elite from acquiring the means to political office or other de­
sirable roles, and to socialize the children in a distinctive life-style which 
would sustain their group-consciousness while legitimizing their political 
and economic dominance in the eyes of the British and other Baganda. I have 
already shown (ibid) the significance of this educational system, and in part­
icular the leading Roman Catholic and Anglican schools, in recruitment to the 
political elite. At the same time it focused the opportunities and aspirations 
for individual mobility, on the acquisition of these forms of symbolism. These 
forms continued to be valued long after land ownership and the possession of 
political office ceased to be crucial in membership of the top economic class
and status group* When land owner ship became more of an ’ascribed* role 
because of the creation of private property in land, and a conflict of 
interests emerged between landlords and tenants, the ideology of rapid 
individual mobility and ’achievement1 of roles was retained in the sphere of 
prestige acquisition. The later spread of landowning status seemed to sup­
port this ideology, while it did not itself alter the hierarchy of economic 
classes. There was also, as Fallers says,a diffusion of
%ey elements of the gentry culture* Monotheistic religion, 
literacy and a somewhat Westernized style of household life - 
features which in 1900 made up the subculture of an elite - 
have today become part of the common culture of at least a 
majority of Baganda" (ibid,p.186)•
What he fails to analyze is the extent to which possession of these symbols
and the aspiration for more, legitimized the political dominance of those
persons who possessed than to the highest degree* The only exception from
this process was ’monotheistic religion', the, spread of which altered its
function from defining the elite status group to assisting in the mobilization
of support for factions within that group.
Baganda status conceptions linked clear hierarchical distinctions be­
tween individuals, or between individuals and a collection of subordinates, 
with a strong emphasis on social mobility. The roles of patron and client 
were well-defined in ritual behaviour, to the extent that there was a teim 
for the ’art of being ruled1 (ktfeibwa) as well as for the ’art of ruling'
(kufuga) (ibid,p.273) * This ideal framework of what was expected of a patron 
or client was also able to express all the gradations of rank which might be 
required in any situation. Firstly, the qualities attributed to a patron 
were all achievable - political ability to protect clients and forward their 
careers, military ability, hospitality, the dignity and self-assurance approp­
riate to a man on whom others depend. Showing these qualities without losing 
face both indicated present rank and might be a factor in mobility. Thus a. 
man who could get away with acting as another’s superior thereby made him­
self superior. Secondly, a patron was in a position to rank his clients by 
the degree of favour he showed to each. So within a clearcut dyadic frame­
work, gradations of status could be expressed in a clear and flexible system.
It persisted in the colonial period at the same time as there appeared new 
ritual behaviour through which members of the dominant economic class con­
stituted themselves as a status group. They could utilize either or both 
kinds of ritual according to the situation. It is possible that use of trad­
itional ritual emphasized the super-ordination of its user, while the new 
'western1 symbolism put forward, in a new context, the ideology of social mobility, 
thus enabling it to retain its integrative functions in Buganda. An example
may be given from Parkin (1969,p.35), who reports that in the Council 
Elections for Kampala East Ward, September 1962,one of the successful can­
didates of the royalist party
"was a sub-county chief and was said to he of the royal clan... 
officials explained that he had been selected in order to attract 
the votes of Ganda. .He contrasted strikingly with the other 
candidates in standing aloof from the proceedings. He did 
attend meetings and.rallies, dressed in his kanzu and 
jacket, the traditional Ganda dress for men, but a younger 
Ganda, dressed in a lounge suit and speaking impeccable 
English and Swahili as well as Luganda, addressed the meeting 
on his behalf. Ganda residents attending explained that 
they expected a Ganda chief to behave in this manner. There 
is little doubt that most non-Catholic Ganda voted for him."
This shows how both status systems might be invoked symbolically.
The status group consciousness of Baganda as a whole was much sustained 
by the ideology and ritual of tribal difference, particularly of super­
iority over African immigrant wodcers in Buganda (see Richards, 1954)* Such 
ideology had many aspects. In particular, there was the history of Baganda 
military success and complex forms of government, which they considered made 
them superior to immigrants who lacked such history - peoples with Kingdom 
organization like themselves ranked higher than those without^ and there were 
stereotypes of immigrants relating to their lower standard of living. They 
were seen, according to Richards, as uneducated, poor and dirty (cf.Douglas, 
1967). While Baganda usually wore shoes and a kanzu over shirt and trousers, 
the immigrant stereotype went barefoot and wore only shorts and rags. Like­
wise immigrants1 housing was more frequently made of grass, while the Baganda 
normally had houses of mud and wattle. According to Richards it was clear 
in a village where the immigrants lived - their grass huts would be clustered 
around the more prosperous houses of their Baganda employers. African 
immigrants of high socio-economic status were few, and those who could afford 
not to try to assimilate with the Baganda, despite intending to settle 
permanently,were limited to Kampala, (Parkin, 1969,p.x). Those who did try 
to assimilate, by such means as adopting common Baganda names, faced resent­
ment and contempt if discovered (Richards, 1954,pp.167-176). Perhaps most 
important of all, Baganda "despised" -unskilled wage labour, and the "new 
industries of Uganda,.are almost entirely dependent on immigrant labour" 
(Richards, 1963»p«276); this comment applies even more forcefully to agri­
cultural wage labour (chapter 4). In 1950, only 2.3$ of Baganda were in 
scheduled occupations as wage-earners, making up only 30$ of all Africans in 
such occupations in Buganda), and many of these must have occupied the 
higher status jobs as semiskilled, skilled and professional workers (ibid, 
chapter 4)* So unskilled wage labour, which for Baganda had a particularly
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low or 'negative' prestige value, was left to the immigrants; Baganda who 
could not obtain more prestigious wage-earning jobs preferred to remain on their 
own plots,
While Baganda often expressed their sense of superior status in terms of 
the values associated with structural differentiation, such as complexity cf 
political organization or life-styles associated with more prestigious occu­
pations - there was a frequently expressed demand that immigrants be admitted 
only as 'porters', unskilled labourers - their internal cohesion as a status 
group could not be, and was not, expressed in the same terms, She symbolism 
of tribal custom served this purpose, Thus there were two quite distinct 
status hierarchies which overlapped only at the top* First, there was a 
hierarchy based on tribal membership; and second, there was a hierarchy based 
on occupational roles and life-styles. The top occupations, under British 
overrule and with the significant exception of some Asian traders, were held 
by Baganda of the elite class. The latter benefited by the situational use 
of the distinct status systems by other Baganda (see above). In contrast to 
immigrant Africans of other tribes, ordinary Baganda saw themselves as a single 
group; and they transferred to this selfconsciousness considerations from 
the other status hierarchy. So they saw Baganda as uniformly wealthy in 
contrast to the poverty of the Immigrants. At the same time it was clear that 
within the Baganda group some persons were wealthier than others, and these 
were allocated higher status by virtue of this within the group. Bkit wealth 
without Baganda birth did not bring higher status. In other words, while the 
Baganda continued to emphasize achievement in the allocation of status to 
individuals, collective mobility was conceptually impossible within the tribe 
because group status was allocated on tribal lines. Religious groups were 
only a partial exception to this pattern (see below). This had the political 
significance that the only status group within the Baganda tribal group was 
formed by members of the dominant class; they were able to identify themselves 
and act either as an elite group or as tribesmen, according to the situation, 
while ordinary Baganda identified themselves only as tribesmen and saw coll­
ective mobility only in those terms. This 'elite class' was able to maintain 
corporate activity for its special political interests, without identifying 
itself as a threat to popular aspirations. The control of political office 
by its members was in fact legitimized by their defence of Baganda interests 
against foreigners (chapter 7).
Conflict with the British and the Indians was not expressed in terms of 
status but of political ideology. Most Baganda had no contact with either 
except in the single-stranded role-relationships of governor/governed or
exploiter/exploited. The British were colonists, and insofar as the Indians 
perceived themselves and were perceived as a group they were identified 
with the rich elite on whom they relied to secure their political and economic 
interests (Morris, 1968,pp* 146-159). As Morris says (ibid.p.119)i "most
of the Indians in Uganda formed one economic class of traders and middlemen" - 
though I suggest this is how they were seen, rat hex" than that it was true 
that thiy formed an economic class. Here it is important to note that the 
'racial' terms in which the govern or/governed and exploiter/exploited roles 
were classified by the British Administration - Europeans, Asians, and Africans 
- did not lead to Baganda self-identification with other Africans. Instead, 
the sense of Baganda nationality was reinforced, particularly as the British 
seemed to be trying to force them into the same position as other Africans 
under the Protectorate (Morris, 1970,pp.325-6) or an independent Ugandan 
government* Furthermore, it was mainly Baganda at whose expense the Indian 
traders and cotton ginners seemed to be benefiting.
KBLIG-ICUS IDEOLOGY
The most striking feature of precolonial- religious ideology and practice 
was its overt control by political authorities. Thus Low (1958) suggests that 
one reason for the welcome Mutesa I Save to the missionaries was that he 
thereby emphasised his control over thosspersons with religious powers. 
Moreover, the lack of dependence of the kabaka on religious officials for the 
legitimation of his authority made adoption of the new religions comparatively 
easy. Religious roles were less a means to political power, or simply 
undifferentiated from political roles, than they were subject to political 
roles.
There were two main categories of spirits: (l) the mizirnu. ancestral 
spirits, of whom the most important were the former kabakas - the first kabaka, 
Kintu, was held to have founded the nation - who themselves were not clearly 
distinguished from the second category (Taylor, 1958,p.214); (2) the balubaale. 
national or localized spirits associated with various fundamental concerns 
such as occupation, war, fertility and affliction. An individual's relation­
ship with the migimu. who were believed to intervene in their descendants' 
lives, was not mediated by officials of his descent group but by spirit mediums
The balubaale also possessed mediums. The mediums were 'called1 by partic­
ular spirits, in the first instance by spontaneous possession and thereafter on 
the principle that success proves itself. Thafcspirit mediumship should be 
the central religious activity illustrates that achieved roles dominated this
, while regular propitiation might be carried out by the individual.
field as in others (Fallers, 1964,p.104); the kabaka appointed all religious
officials at national shrines thoughout the kingdom. Descent group organ­
ization was little supported by religious ritual; at most, certain clans 
may have provided temple officials for particular balubaale with whom they 
were associated, ' So belief in ancestral and localized spirits did not 
provide for contrary loyalties to those of national unity. The most import­
ant mediums practised at the most powerful shrines - the masiro of the dead 
kabakas and the biggwa of the nationally important balubaale - and these 
were controlled by the kabaka (ibid). The religious power tapped by the 
mediums was carefully differentiated from control of the shrines, which were 
administered by the kabaka*s officials (kabona)and so rendered politically 
harmless* Besides the spirits, religious power was also ascribed to fetishes 
(.i.iembe), acting through familiars, and again the kabaka possessed the most 
important of these (Taylor, p. 197). Religious ritual was of little significance 
in the direct legitimation of the kabaka*s rule, which relied far more on the 
ritual of successful warfare and of the political hierarchy. National rituals 
such as the succession ceremony of a kabaka, or his reception of a returning 
army, had little religious content. In sum, insofar as religious ideology 
and ritual had political indications, the distribution of religious power 
supported the political structure of the kingdom. The more important spirit 
mediums were attached to national shrines, themselves administered by ritual 
officials without religious powers. Traditional religious ideology and 
ritual did not provide the means of informal status group or political group 
organization.
fart of the much intensified symbolic stress on Baganda national identity 
during the Kabaka Crisis of 1955*55 was a revival of traditional religious 
forms. On occasion this had millenarian overtones: a spirit medium of the
was* god, Kibuka, prophesied the return of the kabaka and joined this with a 
recurrent theme of East and Central African millenarianism, that white men's 
bullets could not harm his followers. He drew great crowds when he spoke at 
Mutundwe, near Kampala, and a policeman was killed. (Fallers, 1964). But the 
revival did not spread beyond the control of the Buganda Government. It 
was politically expedient for the kabaka to encourage the renewed worship of 
balubaale and the cult of his royal ancestors' tombs, which he rebuilt and 
began to visit regularly. He also adopted traditional prayer (okusamira) 
in his palace (ibid).
Islam was the first of the new religions to spread at the capital and the 
great chiefs' courts, after its adoption by Sauna In 1854. Roman Catholic and 
Anglican forms of Christianity followed during Mutesa I's reign. The adoption 
of the new religions was politically significant from the outset. It pro-
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vided a means of informal organization of much larger political factions than
did the existing symbolic patterns of kinship and clientage, and an alternative
means to rapid promotion for the junior chiefs. All writers seem agreed on
the sociological composition of the converts:
"chiefs and young men who, as pages at the court, were in training 
for high position..central ruling and administrative cadres" (Uelboum, 
1965>p.5|see also Low, 1958,p.6)
Taylor describes their leaders more precisely as
"sub-chiefs or palace batongole,which is to say they were cand­
idates for senior chieftainships. * (and) potentially, military 
commanders" (1958,p.57).
Under Mwanga II, this potential was realized (see Southwold, 196l). He created 
three new batongole departments of soldiers (only young men with guns could 
join) under the leaders of the three new religious factions: the ICisalolo dep­
artment under the Catholic, Inyonyintono; the Eggwanika under the Anglican,
Kagwa; and Kiwuliriza under a Muslim. Their estates were taken from those 
of senior bakungu. batongole and bataka, which clearly maiked their political 
success. They formed a royal bodyguard:
"The regiments were very large..Most of the senior officers, at 
least..were Christians or Muslims" (Southwold, 1961,p.16)
In 1888 they carried out a coup d'etat against Mwanga II. Many writers 
have stressed the significance of the three religions in organizing political 
factions among the elite, and thereby missed the more important point that the 
adoption of new religion in itself marked off a qualitatively different elite, 
one which was conscious of its group status. Welboum points this out, despite 
his confusing use of the term 'balcungu' to refer loosely to any kind of admin­
istrative chief or etfen aspirant to such office (1965, note 5> pp.71-72):
"It was left to the bakungu to grasp the full political potential 
of the new religion, .they had never yet been able to exercise fully 
the power of which they were capable. As a class they had no 
religious symbol which was peculiarly their own.,In these t4ims, 
they could all - without any very coherent cooperation - have been 
aware of the possibilities of the new religion", (p. 5 & note 5)
Thus, at the points of radical political change in the late nineteenth century -
the overthrow of a kabaka by his own officials, and the 1900 Agreement - the
members of the three religious groups acted together and shared out the spoils
(chapter 6). It was a Christian alliance which dominated the coalition, and it
is true in this sense that there was a 'Christian ruling class', as Low (1958,
p.12’) calls it. But this should not obscure the more fundamental effect of the
new religions, on social mobility and political change, in providing new syabolism
through which a privileged political elite could make itself distinct and organize
informally by realigning its members' informal political ties from clan lines.
Once this elite had established itself politically and economically, the
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different forms of the new religions "became more important again, as a means 
of organizing its members1 competition for the highest offices, and they began 
to be extensively adopted in the population at large. By this time new 
symbols maintained the ruling elite in cooperation as well as conflict, and 
it could afford the luxury of internal differences organized by religious 
symbolism.
I do not intend to minimise the significance of political divisions 
between the religious parties in the colonial period. This was so clear that, 
for instance, in the 1962 election campaign the initials of the Democratic 
Party and the Uganda People's Congress were reinterpreted widely in Uganda, 
as, respectively, i 'Religion of the Pope' (Dini ya Papa) and the 'United 
Protestants of Canterbury' (Welbourn, 1965,p.l). However, these divisions 
were not fundamental; the K.Y. swept the board against the D.P. in Buganda, 
despite there being a larger proport ion of Roman Catholics in the population, 
i'he continuing political implications of religion in Buganda can be traced, 
like that of the but aka issue, to competition in the elite (chapter 6). The 
Protestant faction gained ascendancy in 1900, and there emerged a 'Protestant 
establishment1 (ibid,p.12) which kept the lion's share of political office.
In the chiefs' local census of 1955, 55^ of the population declared themselves 
Catholics (possibly an underestimate - see Vfelboume), 2£pk Protestants, and 
1$> Muslims. In the same year the ministries were allocated z&sri&zxi--'-'1 ~ 
in the proportions 1:4*1 respectively and the county chief ships in the prop­
ortions 8:10:2 (ibid,p,17). Perhaps for this reasons, Catholics were prop- 
inent in the leadership of the Bataka movements, and Catholic membership grew 
slightly faster than Anglican membership during the colonial period (Gee, 1958, 
p. 148). Insofar as we are concerned with the relationship between social 
stratification and political change, we find that the leaders of the different 
religious groups, as of the political parties, were recruited from the same 
economic class and their political' aims concerned change of personnel rather than 
structural change (see Low, 1962, pp.11-17). The conflict of'religious groups, 
like the Bataka movements, offered a means of expression of popular discontent 
and, at the same time, its disciplining by factions in the political elite who 
used religious ideology as a support in their competition for office. It may 
also have been significant that popular perception of a privileged ruling 
group, when it appeared, often took the form of seeing 'Protestant' or 'Catholic 
domination', and thus led always back to the support of leaders who were of the 
same economic and status group as thostbeing opposed.
The sociological patterns of the symbolism of inequality in Buganda, ana­
lyzed in this chapter, will be shorn in the following two chapters to have been 
of great significance in the events and nature of political change in the king­
dom.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE POLITICAL ORGMIZATIOH OP BIEQUALITY H  BUCAHDA
The purpose of tim chapter is to analyze the • political system from the 
standpoint of the two major structural processes whose interaction was res­
ponsible for its form at any time as it changed rapidly in conjunction with 
changes in its environment of colonial overrule. The two processes will be 
shown to be; firstly, the struggle for power between different elements of the 
political elite (cf. Lloyd, 1965.p.64), and particularly between the kabaka 
and different groups of his officials; secondly, the maintenance of political 
dominance by an economic class throughout the colonial period. The former 
process was continuous with certain pre-colonial conflicts, though not ident­
ical, and it will be necessary to trace its full development. The two pro­
cesses affected each other significantly by each providing the other with a 
political form and dynamic, and thus each being affected by changes in the 
other from independent factors. As an illustration, if I may anticipate my 
argument, the weakness of the kabaka and his struggle against domination by 
his officials in the early colonial period seemed to align him with popular 
struggles against the land lord-chief s. When the popular struggle in the 
economic order of relations shifted from opposition to landlords to opposition 
to foreign economic competitors (see chapter 4) the kabaka, who symbolized 
this struggle, regained the power to dominate bis officials. He had no 
interest in destroying the offices themselves or in changing the mode of re­
cruitment to as genuinely to radicalize the 'populism* (cf. Apter, 1961;
Low 1964) of the political syston which he headed. Thus persons from the same 
economic class continued to make policy, under the political domination of 
the kabaka who was no longer in dispute with them. The position of their 
class was secure while they participated in and fostered the political expres­
sion of hostile economic relations between Baganda farmers and traders, on 
the one side, and the British, the immigrants, and other Ugandans on the other. 
They were accepted by the bakooi as the ’kingb men' at a time when the kabaka 
was the dominant symbol under which they organized politically against the 
colonial power and other aliens. Thus the two major structural processes 
which I isolate can be shown to have affected the political perceptions and 
behaviour of actors in the following ways: (*l) opposition to the dominance of 
an economic class of landlords was able to organize behind the opposition in 
the other proces, ile. elite conflict, and thus to adopt neotraditional forms; 
(2) the dominant economic class was able to justify its position in the same 
neotraditional terms when the latter^s symbolic functions had changed, after 
the politico-economic changes cf the 1920s and the later struggle against the 
Protectorate Government. At a further level of abstraction we can see how
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political and economic structures determine cultural form, -while the latter 
acts back: through the perceptions of actors to determine political and economic 
structures*
By the time the first European travellers, Speke aid then Stanley, visited 
Buganda in the second half of the nineteenth century, the kabaka ruled an 
expanding kingdom of about a million inhabitants. Host of the expansion was 
then talcing place in the north and west against the kingdom of Bunyoro. In
the south andeast multi-chiefdom tribes known respectively as Bahaya and Basoga 
paid regular tribute to the kabaka. They are estimated to have included 
probably another million persons (Fullers, 1964.p.l04; Roberts, 1962).
Like the jftwami of Rwanda the kabaka exercised "arbitrary” powers i.e. 
he held powers of life and death, and could not be held formally accountable to 
anybody. While the enjoyment of these powers clearly depended on his not 
alienating his political supporters, the kabaka’s possession of them made this 
political task much easier. Only rarely after a succession had been decided 
could the unsuccessful claimants retain their political influence, aid. then 
only so long as it seemed they might rebel successfully. In the nineteenth 
century the kabakas seem to have prevented this happening by murdering pot­
ential rivals (Southwold, 1966,1968),
The succession was determined by several factors (ibid.), of which in­
heritance was only one. Only 'princes of the drum' (balangira bg'engoma) 
were eligible - the sons and grandsons of kabakas. One of them would be 
chosen by the leading commoner chiefs (see below) after consultations held 
individually by the katikkiro, who announced the decision. There was no 
royal clan, and the balanglra attached themselves to the agnatic clans of 
their mothers. In the competition for the kabakaship, candidates were backed 
by their matrilateral allies, and it was the more powerful clans which prov­
ided kabakas: Southwold (1966,p.85, note 8) estimates that only sfeeai-fi© of
the approximately 50 clans ever provided a kabaka, and that those which pro­
vided more than one were many fewer than that. However, no clan was able to 
monopolize the kabakaship, aid relatively wide sharing of the office probably 
reflects the importance of the nsikirano principles as a banner behind which 
opponents of any attempt at such a usurpation could rally. According to 
Msimbi (1956, quoted by Southwold, 1966,pp.86-7) even the extremely powerful 
kabaka Mutesa I failed in an attempt to join a totemic clan (the Lion clan) 
because of opposition from his senior chiefs. And it seems that in the col­
onial period, Daudi Cwa was prevented from passing on his mother's totem to 
his children (ibid). Competition for office therefore had as a major focus
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the provision of wives to the kahaka in the hope that the next queen mother 
(nnamasole) would he from the clan, and thus in a good position to secure its 
members political favours* Certain offices, forming a kind of bodyguard for 
the kabaka,were reserved for his matrilateral allies, They also received 
special favours in appointment to office, though they never achieved a domi­
nant position numerically. The same process ensured that a kabaka had 
affinal alliances with the most important kinship groups in the kingdom, More­
over, his wives provided links with different areas of the kingdoms each chief 
was responsible to a particular royal wife for his area's taxation (kallers, 
1964,p.106). An Interest in the succession through possible affinal alliance 
with a future kabaka, as well as the alliance with the contemporary incumbent, 
probably helped to unite all the calns in preserving the institution of king­
ship. (see Southwold, 1966).
in the nineteenth century there seems to a consistent move by kabakas to 
lessen their dependence on kingship groupings, and to build up their own 
independent political and military support, in a personally-loyal staff (see 
below). In the process by which this staff eventually seized power, and this 
was then institutionalized by British overrule, kinship was less important than 
the symbolism of religion and status differentiation. hew criteria in appoint­
ment to office appeared, and even the kabakaship was decided by the might of 
the British Administration rather than any dominant kinship grouping. Never- 
the less, the position of the queen mother remained as a symbol of the legit­
imacy of the political system, and the attempt to change the role to allow a 
widowed queen mother to marry a commoner in 1941 provided an issue around which 
opposition to katikkiro Nsibirwa rallied successfully. Here we see a clear 
example of the type of change of symbolic function undergone by traditional 
symbolic forms in the colonial period.
|dke other patrons, but on a much greater scale, the precolonial kabaka 
gathered his clients around him wherever he moved his capital (kibuga). All 
his higher chiefs had to attend on him there, not only the permanent advisers 
like the kat ikkiro and the kimbugwe. who did not have specific territorial 
jurisdiction other than their own estates. The military and political nature 
of the higher chiefs' roles is clear from this. Attendance at the capital 
was necessary both to avoid suspicion of organizing local forces for rebellion, 
and in order to compete for the kabaka's favour, particularly as regards the 
leadership of profitable kaiding expeditions (ibid). The mundane business 
of administration was carried out by deputies (abasigire). who did not have 
the legitimacy of appointment by the kabaka which could make them a political 
or military danger. The appointment of deputies was found at all levels of 
authority, as the actual persons appointed by the kabaka to an area found it
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necessary to maintain close links with their patrons "by attending on them.
This again illustrates that control of an estate was useful in exclusively 
politico-military terms, providing clients and warriors; it could not be 
exploited economically.
The kabaka's favour was all-important in the competition for political
office and prestige. As in Rwanda, the effect of having such an effective
arbitrator (i.e. able to impose settlements: Bailey, 1969,pp.32,64-5), was
to prevent open warfare between rivals except as succession disputes. Open
competition centred on judicial processes, with rivals formally accusing each
other of disloyalty before the relevant patron chief. At least in cases
before the kabaka, a victorious plaintiff might be given the right to "seize
the alleged miscreant's office and property - to 'eat him up' (kumulya)1
(iPallers, 1964»p.l09). Furthermore, as Bailey points out
"an arbitrated decision is not merely a means of keeping 
order; it is also a means of broadcasting messages that 
the leader's credit is good". (l969,p.64).
So, as in Rwanda,the actual power of the kingship at any time depended con­
siderably on the use made of the office in particular historical circumstances 
by the incumbent, in structural conflict with his staff (cf.Lloyd, 1968; South­
wold, 1961; and below).
Certain features of the nineteenth century Buganda political system stand 
out. Firstly, its military nature; secondly, the absence of groups or categ­
ories of persons with unequal relations derived from the economic processes of 
production. Differences in access to wealth were a function of the military- 
political organization. A synchronic analysis, like that of Mair (l96l) might 
show up a basic distinction between persons who had the right to allocate land, 
and persons who sought land. However, the former did not comprise a group who 
owned the land, and land was not capital which could be made to increase itself.
It indicated military-political status, for the more land a man controlled the 
more clients he could settle on it. The clients came not for the land but for 
the value of being attached to a military-political official. As I explained 
in chapter 4, war and not the land was the source of differential wealth. South­
wold reports Baganda as saying "In the old days the work of the men was war" (1965, 
p.109). Furthermore, control of the land was allocated according to military 
and political criteria, and could not be simply inherited, i.e. political office 
was not 'owned' either.
In a formal system of this type, the capacity to mobilise informal links 
with high patrons was a person's principal asset. (Mair, 1962,p.I48). Strat­
ification centred on privileged access to the means to achieve political office.
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Kinship, particularly for a son,with a political official was a useful inter­
personal relationship for mobilization, but descent alone did not ascribe 
political power and status. This is most strikingly demonstrated by the 
process of succession to the kabakaship* All descendants of kabakas might 
claim status as princes (balangira); but by a process of progressive exclusion, 
only sons and grandsons of a kabaka were eligible for the succession (see 
above; Southwold 1961,pp.5-6). The other princes were indistinguishable from 
ordinary Baganda in power and style of life, except that they were excluded from 
all senior political office and could, not be 'guests' or clients of any 
political official (Southwold, 1966,p.86). They were known as 'princes who 
have dropped away' or 'undistinguished princes'. Moreover, as we have seen, 
formal inequality was virtually limited to dyadic relations (chapter 5)> and 
institutionalized named ranking occurred only among clients of a single patron 
(kallers, 1964,pp.73,96).
The administrative system under the kabaka may be briefly described (see 
Bichards* 1963,p*269). Firstly, there were ten provinces (ssaza) in the late
nineteenth century. The ssaza chiefs were appointed by the kabaka,- though 
one factor in the appointment of three of them was eligibility under broad 
inheritance qualifications (Cox,1950). They were responsible for assisting 
the kabaka's tribute collectors and organizing tribute in the form of labour 
services (particularly as warriors and in maintaining military resources such 
as roads). Like all other political officials they settled disputes among 
their clients. As in Rwanda this was a major channel for political struggle, 
and it is noteworthy that appeal against a decision took the form of chall­
enging the political chief who made it,in a case before his superior (falters, 
1964,p. 109). The ssaza chiefs were assisted in these tasks by hierarchies of 
lesser chiefs down to kyalo level, for whom they were directly or indirectly 
patrons and secured their appointment from the kabaka. All these chiefs had 
their own estates with their particular bakopi clients, and the more inrporfc- 
ant had several such estates.
Secondly, in each province there were many estates under other jurisdictions,
and this could lead as Fallers says to
"a veritable jungle of overlapping and int exdigit at ing 
authorities, the cumulative result of centuries of ad hoc 
adjustments" (ibid,p.96)
Such estates may be summarised as: (l) those held by the kabaka in each province
(2) those held by members of the royal dynasty; (3) those held by direct clients
of the kabaka - who were usually military captains or those giving specialist
household services; (4) those held by clans and lineages (the butaka), where
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ancestors were buiied (bailers, 1964). These categories are the most useful 
analytically here. However, Baganda categorized political officials as bakungu. 
batongole and bataka. These were not necessarily exclusive categories. I 
shall examine these categories briefly after considering the main functions of 
all political officials.
The political official was almost invariably a military leader. All 
adult males were liable to be called out for service in the army under their 
patrons. And unlike the Hutu, and all but an elite corps of Tutsi, in 
Rwanda, all Baganda served as warriors - armed with spears. Even specialist 
functionaries, such as the Lungfish clan who provided naval transport, were 
not differentiated from the rest by economic class or status group. The fact 
that all Baganda were warriors was an important factor in determining the 
nature of social stratification in the kingdom. For little distinction can 
be made between kingdom and army as organizations; the terms best represent 
different activities of the same organization in Buganda. The kingdom was 
effectively an encamped army, and there were no status groups forbidden to 
bear aims in it. In Rwanda only the Tutsi could be considered as an encamped 
army, as only they might bear arms (though not all did an any one time), and 
as they were organized through cattle transfers to preserve a monopoly of mil­
itary and political power.
Warfare was thus a major activity of all male Baganda. In Mutesa I's 
reign there were probably more than two important campaigns each year (Fallers 
1964,p.83). Men performed military service as part of their roles as clients, 
making up their patron's troops; but military activity was controlled by the 
state. Thus men unable to serve as warriors had to pay an extra tax, according 
to Kagwa (l952,p.l63) Wealth, power and higher status could not be achieved 
by economic production and exchange. Raiding non-Baganda, and receiving a 
share of the tribute paid by them, were t&e means to those ends. But only 
the kabaka could 'give a war' (kugaba olutalo). and he allocated rights to 
profitable positions and opportunities in this valuable process. Fallers 
points out the consciousness with which Baganda regarded war as profitable.
Thus 'kugaba'. as in the phrase above, means 'to distribute largesse' - which 
indicates the connection of war and political power, which also depended on 
this capacity. And':-the chief who was chosen as general was known as the 
mngabe or 'recipient' of the war (Fallers, 1964,p.Ill), charged with taking 
the enemy's wealth. When the wealth in cattle and slaves was brought back, 
special parts were presented to the kabaka and to royal officials and kin at 
the court. The rest was redistributed through the patron-client system, as 
with taxation, and ungenerous patrons were liable to lose their clients. This
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was not the only ritual way in which, war and political power wexe linked. 
Political officials being military leaders, they were required to display 
prowess and bravery. Failure to do so led to dismissal, and war heroes often 
received political reward. Warfare and political intrigue provided the best 
opportunities for upward mobility for Baganda.
The system of taxation in Buganda reveals the crucial importance of the 
capacity to redistribute goods as a patron to clients, and the kabaka1s succ­
ess in limiting patronage to officials appointed or approved by him. Polit­
ical officials were not delegated the right to collect taxation, as they were 
in Rwanda. Instead the kabaka sent out special envoys (babaka) to receive 
tax payments. According to Kagwa, the amounts due from each household, and 
due for redistribution to different officials were foimally established, and 
collected regularly (1952,pp.163-7)• Taxation was paid in livestock, on a
sliding scale, and other consumption and craft produce, though not apparently 
in basic foodstuffs. Besides the regular shares of the tax allotted to poiy-~ 
ital officials, accounting for the greater proportion, the kabaka used much 
of his own share for rewarding favourites unexpectedly. The point here is 
that the kabaka was not the indirect recipient of the tribute directly received 
by his local officials, leaving them free to make what they could, economically 
and politically, from this power. Instead, all paid tribute to the kabaka 
directly, and depended on his favour as their patron to receive their super­
vised shares. This was ritually as well as technically important since the 
role of patronage in Buganda depended on the capacity to bestow rewards, which 
liras thus under the kabaka*s control.
These functions of ruling were shared by all three Baganda categories of 
political officials, and their differences may now be examined. The bataka 
were the heads of clans and lineages (see chapter 5). As such they had a 
special responsibility for certain estates where members were buried, the 
but aka lands. Their recruitment was limited by descent criteria, but they had 
to be approved by the kabaka. As territorial officials, they acted as patrons 
to persons of any clan who wished to be their clients and live on the estates 
with they ruled. Most of a mutaka*s clients were not members of his own clan 
(see chapter 5)*
It appears that at one time the bataka had had hereditary rights to 
certain of the kingdom's offices, and been exempt from the kabaka's control in 
their own selection. But during the nineteenth century the kabakas central­
ized authority in the kingdom at the expense of the bataka (Cox,1950). They 
removed areas from the jurisdiction of the bataka and put them under their 
own direct appointees (balamgu and batongole): and they insisted on recog­
nition of their authority as ssaabataka. chief of all the bataka, controlling 
the latters* appointment.
Southwold has built a useful model, for understanding the development 
of different orders of chiefs, on Weher’s model of the growth of 'patrimon- 
ialism1 in the struggle of medieval European kings against the centrifugal 
tendencies of feudalism (1961,passim). Thus we see the kabakas, particularly 
in the nineteenth century, centralizing the distribution of power in Buganda 
by creating an alternative 'staff, more directly under their control, to 
the hereditary bataka and thereby reducing the latter's power. The danger 
was that the new staff might decisively overcome the old one and place the 
king in a position of dependence again. In this case the king must appoint 
an alternative and still more dependent staff. While the term 'batongole' 
was used 'of assistants to any chief, this further stage may to some extent 
explain the difference between bakungu and royal batongole (cf. Southwold 
1966) officials, as the kabakas struggled to gain control of appointment of 
all levels of their staff and prevent the great bakungu chiefs becoming 
independent patrons. The kabakas successfully used bakungu officials to 
reduce the power of the bataka, but then had to deal with the pretensions of 
over-powerful bakungu like the katikfciro to whom Mutesa I is said to have 
owed his selection as kabaka. Mutesa and his successor Mwanga tried to 
build up a further staff of royal batongole into a personally-loyal military 
force - the ki.iasi department and its successors. Royal batongole were 
appointed by the kabaka, like the bakungu.but tended to be more directly res­
ponsible to him and independent of the bakungu chiefs, acting as his local agents.
It was my argument in chapter 5 that in such a mobile system of recruitment 
to and dismissal from power and high status a staff tends to seek means of 
limiting the recruitment pool and stabilizing its position. When this cannot 
be organized in a formal political group, organization may take symbolic fonus.
I analyzed the adoption of monotheistic religion by certain powerful Baganda 
in this way. It is striking that the three departments of military batongole 
organized by Mwanga as his most dependent staff (see chapter 5) were each 
headed by a leader of a different monotheistic religious group. I suggest 
Mwanga was attempting to offset the development of an independent (albeit 
symbolic) source of patronage among his staff.
I have examined the precolonial political system at some length in order 
to demonstrate the structural conflict between the role of the kabaka and other 
elements of the political elite, and among the latter themselves. These conflicts 
persisted in the colonial period, which may be regarded as beginning with the 
victory of one segment of the political elite over the kabaka; the victory 
which was not final. But while the forn of these conflicts appears 'traditional* 
the functions were considerably changed. For the political elite was soon
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constituted as an economic class which rapidly developed antagonistic economic 
relations with its political subjects* The latter could not legally organize 
politically in their own defence and probable lacked the necessary e:xperience, 
and so they organized behind the Opposition* faction of the political elite, 
as in the Bataka movement of the 1920s* This was not a political conflict 
of the precolonial period emerging in the colonial period. (see Wallers,
1964,p.91; Richards, 1964,p*320). It was only when land became valuable and 
antagonistic relations appeared between the new economic classes of landlord 
and tenant that any popular political attachment to the but ale a lands or opp­
osition to the hierarchy of appointive chiefs became noticeable In Buganda.
hat aka did not receive popular support when their powers were being reduced 
by the kabakas in the nineteenth century; they received it when their efforts 
to receive part of the shareout of land, from which many of them had been 
excluded in 190 0 , or take power from the ministers, provided a focus and ideolog­
ical support for tenants to organize against the landlords.
The civil wars of 1888-97, in which the British enforced a settlement (Low 
and Pratt, I960,p. 12), were followed by changes in the political system rat­
ified in the Agreement of 1900, between the British and the victorious Protest- 
ant-dominated political elite (although the Catholics and, to a lesser extent, 
the Muslims were also included). Buganda became one of the provinces of the 
Protectorate of Uganda, under British overrule. Its size was much increased, 
mainly at the expense of its traditional enemy, Bunyoro, and the number of 
ssaza increased to twenty. The kabaka*s authority was to be recognised "on 
all questions but the assessment and collection of taxes'* (clause 9, quoted 
p.70,ibid) so long as he and his subjects conformed loyally to "the laws and 
regulations instituted for their government by Her Majesty's Government" (clause 
6,P*353, ibid.). The duties of the chiefs were defined, and a fixed salary 
established. The kabaka was to receive a private purse. Clause 10 established 
the ministries of the Katikkiro, Chief Justice and Treasurer, and defined their 
duties. Clause 11, made the kabaka *s council, the Lukiiko, into a permanent 
body with regular membership (see below). The Agreements also made the changes 
in land tenure which I discussed in chapter 4.
In the period between the Agreement of 1900 and the British Government's 
withdrawal of recognition in 1953, under clause 6, the kabaka's authority rem­
ained formally supreme in Buganda under British "overrule" (ibid). This was 
summed up by the ICintu Committee Report of 1955 in reference to the essential 
"Core" of Baganda traditions, which they felt was essential in any change in their 
institutions:
"from no other source does any of his subjects derive power 
except from the Kabaka who exercises through his Ministers 
and Lukiiko his direct rule over his people*'(quoted Apter,po53)*
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While this principle was respected throughout the period in theory, in practice 
the kabaka lost much of his control of appointment, both to .his chiefs and to 
the Protectorate Government. Daudi Cwa, who replaced Mwanga in 1897» was a 
minor; his regents and ministers acted in his name (cf. Southwold, 1968,p.149).
By the time that he played a more decisive part, in consultation withhLs 
ministers, the Protectorate Government was extending its control at their expense. 
This control did not extend to direct imposition - in 1926 a Provincial Comm­
issioner failed to impose a mulangira as ssaza chief against customary practice - 
but the Protectorate Government's influence was usually accepted from the 1920s 
onwards, and incompetent chiefs were directly vetoed. (Low & Pratt,p.223)
The Protectorate Government also controlled policy, so that the kabaka had 
to follow its 'advice* whether he approved or not. The lukiiko was not 
simply the kabaka*s instrument, even rejecting his proposals on occasion (ibid. 
p.246). Until 1953 there was constant dispute over policy, with shifting 
alignments, between the three ministers (and between each other) , the kabaka, 
the Protectorate Government and the lukiiko.
The kabaka was able to retain much informal power, however, as the focus 
of loyalty to the kingdom; he often appeared to represent Buganda national 
interests when the Lukiiko of unpopular chiefs and the ministers were prepared 
to compromise with the British. This is best seen in the lands issue of 1933- 
5 when the kabaka took up a militant and popular position against the Protect­
orate Government's lease of some mailo land to Indians, which the Lukiiko had 
accepted. He wrote a pamphlet against it and tried to veto the necessary leg­
islation. By such activity the kabaka retained informal support, whidi was 
important in different circumstances than this particular issue, although his 
formal power had declined - he was 'persuaded' to pass the legislation eventually. 
At the same time, Daudi Gwa kept out of the administrative processes of govern­
ment , leaving them to the katikkiro, and this may have helped avoid his loss 
of legitimacy (ibid,p.300). The chiefs were extremely unpopular in this 
period (see below). The Dundas reforms of 1944, removing British officials
to a more advisory capacity and leaving direct rule to the kabaka1 s government, 
the
proved/latter too unpopular to be capable of carrying it out and were reversed 
after the 1945 riots. Despite changes of personnel, the unpopularity of the 
chiefs increased. In 1948 the ministers and sixteen chiefs petitioned the 
Protectorate Government for the abolition of the Bataka Party, which was organ­
ising the discontent, and in the 1949 riots popular choice of chiefs was a major 
demand. -
At this time the kabaka Frederick Mutesa, who had succeeded as a minor in
1939 and attained his majority in 1945# lacked the popularity of his father.
He had been appointed against the popular candidate, Prince Mwanda, and "was 
regarded as a dutiful young pro-British Protectorate government-mission appoin­
tee". (Apter,p.2l3) After the 1945 riots, in which the kabaka had supported an 
unpopular Treasurer, he was himself so unpopular that the British Administration 
thought it wise to send him away to study at Cambridge again. The new Bataka 
Party saw him as under British control, and attacked him personally after his 
return from England in 1948 (ibid.p.244)« He was popularly regarded as 
failing to sustain Buganda national interests. In the Bataka Party neotraditional 
political forms were being used against the kabaka and the chiefs, though the 
institutions themselves were not under attack. However, considerable limit­
ations of their power were envisaged by the Bataka Party, as in the demand for 
popular control of appointments.
To summarize his position in the colonial period, the kabaka had until 1955 
to act through a staff which had made itself independent in many ways in the 
1890s and depended on British backing for its power. His position in the pol­
itical system was largely the symbolic one of legitimating the rule of this 
staff and their real 'lord* (cf. Southwold, 196l) the British Administration.
The popular opposition to the ruling staff organized itself through one of two 
potent symbolic patterns, based on either the bataka. hupreyibnsly^dominant and 
defeated 'staff1, or on the kabaka. (see Low, 1964, for a different use of the 
idea of patterns of political office). It did this according to the appropriate­
ness of each 'blueprint' to the situation, (cf. Cohen, 1969a,p.180). The Bataka 
Federation and the later Bataka Party, though different from each other, both 
organized popular grievances against the ruling staff when it was perceived as 
a group having privileged political and economic interests. These struggles 
dominated the colonial period until the early 1950s. Meanwhile the kabakaship 
remained as a symbol of all good government of united Baganda, though the in­
cumbents suffered personally from their association with their unpopular staff. 
Thus there were at least two forms of neotraditionalism available in Buganda - 
and a third if we include the form used by the colonial administration, the 
bakungu-batongo 1 e form. Although these forms overlapped, with the bataka move­
ment appealing to the kabaka for example, their use had quite different impli­
cations. The bataka pattern was relevant only to internal struggle. The 
kabaka pattern was suitable for organizing all Baganda as a political group.
Other 'traditional' institutions acquired new functions. After 1900 the 
kabaka's court* in which the political unity of the kingdom had been focused, 
split up, with some elements retaining symbolic importance only and others 
being adapted for new political functions.
The Great Lukiiko was one of the latter. Before the 1900 Agreement the 
Lukiiko comprised simply the chiefs whom the kabaka summoned to a council in
which he heard their reports and issued his instructions. But by clause 11
of the Agreement it was established as a court of appeal! from the ssaza-chiefs1
court s. Furthermore,
"The functions of the council will be to discuss all matters 
concerning the native administration of.. (Buganda).. and to 
forward to the Kabaka resolutions which may be voted by a 
majority regarding measures to be adopted by the said administration.
The kabaka shall consult with H.M.'s representative in.. (Buganda) .. 
before giving effect to any such resolutions..and shall in this 
matter, explicitly follow the advice of H.M.'s representative"
(quoted Low & Pratt, I960,p.355).
Its membership was established as the 3 ministers, the 20 ssaza chiefs, and
three notables from each ssaza. together with 6 'other' persons, all appointed
by the kabaka. The katikkiro was its President, the Chief Justice its Vice-
President, and the Treasurer its leader (ibid).
Low and Pratt consider that the Lukiiko, thus constituted, prepresented 
only its own class. Their analysis of its activities in a typical month in 
the 1920s (pp.244-5) reveals four categories: (l) action against interference 
by the Protectorate Government; (2) action on internal Bugandan administration 
not conflicting with its own interests; (3) action on matters internal to the 
Buganda Government itself; (4) action on matters advantageous to themselves.
It defended its privileges against both the Protectorate Government - when it 
seemed to be taking a popular, if conservative, line - and against popular 
reform measures, like the Busulu and Envujo Law. The situation was no diff­
erent in 1949 when Apter estimates: "Of 32 items dealt with in its two sessions 
in 1949# none were important", (p.261) This was despite the introduction 
of directly-elected members in 1945 (31 out of 89 members, raised to 36 in 
1947), who with the introduction of 14 ggombolola chiefs and 14 miluka chiefs 
made up the number left vacant by the abolition of the 60 places for ‘notables'.
•The two most important of the precolonial kabakas’ bakungu chiefs under­
went different types of change. They were: firstly, the katikkiro. who acted 
as the kabaka's chief executive for the whole kingdom, and whose duty it was 
to negotiate with the chiefs the successor to a dead kabaka; (Southwold, 1966, 
pp.92-93)j secondly the kimbugwe. who had similar responsibilities for the whole 
kingdom, and was formally a ritual official charged with the care of the kabaka's 
umbilicus. The latter office retained only symbolic significance after the 
civil wars. The katikkiro, like all bakungu chiefs, appears to have been 
increasing his power in the nineteenth century at the expense of the kabaka, 
though not to such an extent as to challenge any incumbent during his lifetime, 
until the civil wars. A katikkiro seems to have played a large part in the 
choice of Mutesa I as kabaka, against a more widely-favoured candidate. But 
once Mutesa became kabaka, he disposed of this particular official who threatened
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to become too powerful (ibid,pp.95-96) There had always been, a danger since
Ssemakookiro reformed the system, of succession by having possible rivals exe­
cuted (Southwold, 1968,pp.148-9), and later kabakas nominated heirs- apparent 
from among their sons, that when successors were young and inexperienced - 
particularly if they were minors -. they would depend very heavily on the lead­
ing commoner chiefs, especially the katikkiro (ibid). Rebellion was more 
likely to come from this source than from royal kin, by the end of the nine­
teenth century, When the commoner chiefs rebelled against the incompetence 
of Mwanga, the katikkiro became the most powerful:office in Buganda. Even 
after Kagwa's resignation in 1926, katikkiros were the effective heads and 
leading policy makers in the Buganda Government, while the kabakas stood aside 
from executive tasks.
The katikkiro and the two new ministers - the Chief Justice and the 
Treasurer - had a more narrowly defined public responsibility as the Buganda 
Government tha£ had had the precolonial bakungu and batongole chiefs who were 
responsible to the kabaka alone. In the colonial period the Buganda Govern­
ment was still the kabaka*s. Thus political offices were shared out among them­
selves by the bakungu chiefs to secure the interests of the different relig­
ious parties - the katikkiro and Treasurer were always Anglicans, and the Chief 
Justice a Roman Catholic;) of the twenty county chief ships eight were considered 
as Catholic appointments, two as Muslim, and ten as Anglican (Richards, I960.p.64) 
- and the kabaka was constrained by this arrangement. On the other hajid, 
these developments shielded the kabakaship from popular rejection as an office 
through which the colonialists ruled, as was often said of the ministers and 
chiefs. The 'populist* struggle for control of these tffices, as in the neotrad­
itionalist agitation over the Hnamasole Affair (Apter, 1961,pp.21^-14) which 
brought Wamala to the kat ikkiro ship in 194l> was recognised as conflict with the 
Protectorate government and not with the kabaka, unless the latter directly 
intervened on the other side, as Mutesa did in the ICulubya affair in 1944~5- 
Ministers were no longer simply the kabaka*s clients.
The political officials installed under British overrule in 1900 were the 
same persons who had held office under the last autonomous kabaka, Mwanga.
At the time of the change to overrule important changes were already taking place 
in the political system. As never before, the kabaka*s officials constituted 
a political and status group (see chapter 5)* In the 1900 Agreement they were 
also constituted as an economic class, though the social and political consequ­
ences of this did not appear until later when land became valuable as a means 
of production or as capital. In this section I shall analyse the continuiing 
domination of the political system by this economic class through its successful 
adaptation to changes in the economy, in status evaluation, and in political 
institutions.
Initially, the 3,945 chiefs who received mailo allotments were in a much 
stronger position politically than chiefs under the precolonial kabakas. The 
creation of private rights in land, and the continued association of economic 
patronage with political patronage, meant that for the first time power could be 
derived from sources not ultimately controlled by the kabaka. Wealth could 
be accumulated, and in the form of land ownership automatically gave political 
power. Persons outside the first group of chiefs might eventually acquire some 
power by this means. But for a time, the initial recipients of mailo benefited 
from a new security and moreover did not suffer from the competition of rivals, 
since they monopolised the means to power. They formed a dominant political 
group*
Mailers argues that this group, which he calls 'the gentry1 (l964»p»176) 
and sees as "an elite class (p.186) "(see chapter 4), constituted an oligarchy 
for the first twenty-five years of the colonial period and then disappeared 
fairly rapidly when the British Administration found it obstructive, as they 
assumed more direct responsibility in Uganda, in what Apter calls "the bureau­
cratic-colonial system" (1961.p. 160*). Mailers' argument represents-scamething 
of a consensus amongst the major studiesoof this period, although different 
terms are used in the more detailed political-historical studies of low and 
Pratt (i960), Low (l964)j and Apter (l96l), and it may be thus taken as 
representative:
"the new elite had more than a quarter-century in which to 
consolidate their position without the intervention of the 
Kabaka in Buganda Government affairs. Most important, the 
royal power was not during this period exercised in appoint­
ments to office. The cohesiveness of what had now become 
something very like a gentry reached its peak around 1920-5 
and thereafter probably began to recede. One immediate 
reason for this was that Kabaka Daudi Gwa had meanwhile come 
of age and begun to a-ssert his traditional authority...
More broadly, British officials began during this period to 
intervene more and more in Buganda government affairs in the 
interest of what they considered good government.. .Some of 
the interventions of the administration, furthermore, served 
to undermine the foundations of the whole elite class, for 
by this time British colonial administrators had come to be 
more interested in promoting the welfare of ordinary folk 
than in maintaining the power and dignity of their rulers,
The Busulu and Envujo Law of 1928, for example.. .Generally 
speaking, Uganda Government policy has moved in a similar 
'democratizing' direction ever since.i.The gentry, in short, 
came into existence in the wrong century. Before it could 
consolidate its position, it encountered the opposition of 
'welfare state' conceptions of public policy of a sort which 
were threatening the dominance of gentry classes everywhere 
in the modern world" (p.187).
This argument identifies the elite class as 'gentry', exercising power 
through the monopoly of land when land ownership carried political rights.
Its demise apparently followed the recognition and enforcement of political
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rights from other sources, such as the kabaka's favour or administrative ability 
acquired through 'western' education. However, we should not assume, as 
Wallers does with his statement about 'democratization1, that the domination of 
an elite class ended at the same time as the "gentry lost their monopoly of 
power, This would he to confuse cultural and. structural factors. From the 
perspective of analysis of the Bugandan political system over time,the clear- 
cut domination of the 'gentry' status group does not appear to be discontinuous 
with the forms of stratification which preceded or came after it. Far from 
'existing in the wrong century' it may be regarded as having provided the 
political conditions within which the 'elite class' could consolidate its pos­
ition as a privileged economic class, and thereby guarantee its advantage when 
the criteria for recruitment to political administration altered. This rather 
reified expression of the analysis may be justified if I point out that the most 
important political condition provided by the 'gentry' status group ( and the 
'convert' one from which it sprang) was that it provided subjective conscious­
ness and a mode of organization and agency to the dominant economic class (which 
is itself only an analytical construct). By the time the 'gentry' criterion 
became less important in recruitment to major offices the elite class was still 
objectively advantaged, both in holding office and in access to the new means 
of recruitment (see chapter 4; Richards, 1963,p.272); and it was made distinc­
tive and disciplined by new status criteria. By the time that bakopi tried to 
buy higher status by acquiring land, it was of only local significance, no longer 
providing admission to the highest status group. By then the elite class mono­
polised the greatest wealth, power and status by other means. I suggest that 
the prominence of a 'gentry* class in the first quarter of the twentieth cen­
tury as a dominant political group in Buganda may be traced primarily to the 
increasingly antagonistic economic relations between its members and their 
tenants, manifesting themselves in their political relations. "While political 
conflict took this form, and status groups remained so undifferentiated, the 
dominance of an elite class was clear to all. This clarity, as a factor in 
political behaviour, disappeared with two developments in about the same period. 
Firstly, land reforms reduced the immediately-obvious conflict of interests 
between landlords and tenants (cf. Stinchcombe, 1967,pp. 185-7)• Secondly, 
the gentry seemed to lose their monopoly of power - though in my analysis this 
meant only a differentiation of economic roles within the elite class and the 
use of new symbolic patterns in its organization (see chapter 4).
In my chapter on 'ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND POWER STRUCTURE' (4) I reinter­
preted the available evidence (Fallers, 1964), unsatisfactory as it admittedly
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is, as showing that the highest positions in the political administration were 
redruited very largely from members of one economic class, which comprised 
owners of the means of production - landowners with an income from rents, and 
agricultural, industrial and commercial capitalists (the class included persons 
in other occupational roles, as I explained). Faller's own interests lay 
rather in estimating the decree of individual social mobility - it is prob­
ably the increase he finds on this parameter which he refers to when he writes 
of 'democratization'. Although I am going to develop iy argument of the above 
chapter by using part of Fallers' evidence rather as he has interpreted it,
I wish to stress that the point X make is different from his. He is concerned 
(p.202) with estimating the extent to which the 'gentry' class of original mailo 
holders gave rise to a hereditary elite. While I do not think this question 
is the only one relevant to analysis of the part that economic stratification 
played in political stratification in the later colonial period - since only 
those who made profitable use of their land successfully made the transition to 
the period when land alone did not guarantee political power - it allows us to 
see contemporary genealogical links among persons in the highest political 
positions (see ! - 1 0? Fig. 18,p.203 & n.64) * Thus
"chiefs, civil servants, ministers, landowners and leading politicians 
are much more closely related to the 1900 elite than are..(other cat­
egories of his 'modern elite')".
More inportant, this means that they are related to each other by mobilizable 
ties of status and kinship, so they tend "to form a relatively cohesive and 
hereditary inner elite"(p.202) Policy was thus decided by a particular int­
erest group, recruited from a single economic class and status group, i.e. an 
'elite class'.
In the 1950s, the.political system embodying this foim of stratification 
was supported by most Baganda, from all economic classes, status categories 
and political strata. For Fallers this is not a situation necessarily re­
quiring explanation: he holds the straightforward functionalist view (cf.
Davis & Moore, 1945) that a stratification system is "society's way" of 
organizing rational (cf. Weber) pursuit of "agreed ends" by rewarding the 
successful with dominance (ibid,p.204). However, if we do not wish to make 
this assumption of 'agreed ends', we are faced with explaining how an elite 
class managed to organize support among the non-elite despite perceived struggles 
over, and unperceived conflicts in, their members' goals. This cannot 
simply be put down to psychological dependence by Baganda on their 'traditional' 
institutions, as Fallers tries to do. He dismisses the problem of why many 
traditional foms survived as sinply a matter of the irrational legitimation 
of increased 'rationality' in the society - which means 'modernization', i.e.
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role differentiation and increased occupational mobility. In this view,
legitimation was necessary because, as a stratified system shows (see above),
not all men were equally capable of 'rationality'. 'The main problem of social
order ms the maintenance of both the consensus and 'rationality' as historical
circumstances changed - to which the answer was political organization on
neotraditional lines:
"New men, new religion, the endless new ideas and techniques 
embodied in Western education - all these could be absorbed 
and yet the Baganda could believe they were living in the same 
society, under leaders of a familiar kind. Indeed, the 
traditional kingdom gained added legitimacy from the sense that 
it had triumphed over new problems, had successfully put the 
new men and new techniques to work in the service of tradition­
al goals"(ibid.,p205)
This ignores the fact that the 'traditional kingdom' had changed in more
fundamental ways than incorporating some new ideas; and it is not shown in
what ways 'traditional goals' differed from the universal pursuit of wealth,
power, status and ideological satisfaction. This detour has been necessary
in oider to explain why it is a central sociological problem that dominance
by an elite class should be accepted by the non-elite, whether through
expediency, failures of perception, or whatever reason. Failure to examine
this question will lead to distortions in the analysis of stratification in
Buganda; for the preservation of that which is supposedly agreed on (i.e.
the forgt of the political system) will be seen as an end in itself, as in
Fallers' analysis. In such analysis, explanations become circular and
ahistorical. It should now be possible to understand that, historically,
the neotraditionalism of the 1950s was not simply the continuance of the
traditional system throughout 'modernization'.
The clearest demonstration of this can be seen in the long-standing 
popular opposition to the political officials in the whole colonial period 
until the kabaka's return from exile in 1955* The hostility was so great that 
Low characterises the major political struggle in Buganda of 1897-1955 as one 
between 'Chiefs' and 'People', in what he calls the "Bataka pattern" (1964)
It should be emphasized, however, that the actual Bataka movements of the 
colonial period were not principally concerned with pursuing conflicts of the 
precolonial period, though the mode of expression of popular opposition was 
'traditional* (though not a traditional means of expressing such grievances). 
The Bataka movements did not oppose increased power for the kabaka, as 
precolonial bataka are said to have done: one of their main demands was for
a return of all mailo land to the kabaka for more equitable distribution. 
(Apter,pp.I46-8; Welbourn, 1958,p.20) The kabakas, who had also lost power
to the Chiefs in the 1900 Agreement, were seen by the People as saviours who 
would lead them in the struggle against 'unjust' Chiefs. In addition to the 
hostility resulting from changing economic relations, and the gradual weakening 
of the patron-client tie, much hostility to the Chiefs resulted from the new 
powers and functions given them as political administrators under British over­
rule.
After the 1900 Agreement a new system of political administration was set 
up along more bureaucratic lines, with the creation of a uniform hierarchy in 
the place of the different orders of chiefs. In theory, the Kabaka still 
controlled appointments, under approval of the British Governor, though his 
ability to exercise control was impaired by personal factors, such as Daudi 
Cwa’s long minority. His katikkiro had gained considerable autonomy during the 
civil wars, and. this position was institutionalized as a prime ministership.
Two other ministers were created: the omuwanika (Treasurer) and omulamuzi(Chief 
Justice). Under the katikkiro were 20 county (ssaza) chiefs ruling the ten 
traditional units and ten new counties taken from the surrounding areas, mainly 
Bunyoro. Responsible to each county chief were 9-10 sub-county (ggombolola) 
chiefs, some of which ruled areas corresponding to traditional units (^ Richards 
I960,p.55). Both county and sub-county chiefs had 'statutory' courts. After
the kabaka's return in 1955, the number of sub-county chiefs was reduced to 128.
At the same period there were about 900 chiefs at the next level, the muluka, 
which was the lowest officially-recognised and salaried level. The muluka 
unit, sometimes called 'parish' (ibid,p.58), comprised usually 8-10 byalo and 
300-500 taxpayers (Southwold, 1965,p.92) It seldom corresponded to a trad­
itional untfc! (Southwold, 1964). Like the other chiefs, the muluka chief had 
a council (lukiiko), though it was infoimal until 1951 and never a 'statutory' 
court. The muluka chief was assisted by a deputy (musigire).whom he appointed 
and paid himself, and about 8 to 15 unpaid batongole. who were the landowners 
of his area or their nominees. Batongole received no formal recognition as such 
from the British Administration. County, sub-county and muluka chiefs were 
responsible mainly for tax collection, law enforcement, and supervision of public 
amenities and labour.
Southwold (1964) has shown that the role expectations of bureaucratic 
superiors and of the bakopi clashed most seriously in the role of the muluka 
chief (1964). There were specific structural reasons why conflict between 
political strata should emerge most clearly at this level. Thus (l-) the higher 
chiefs had the power and wealth which ensured them the fear and respect (kitiibwa) 
necessary to ruling, while muluka chiefs often did not - often accepting office 
in the hope of thus acquiring it. They were seldom even the largest landowners
of their area. (2) They could not be transferred from one area to another like 
the higher chiefs, and so bureaucratic impartiality was made more difficult.
(3) The job tended to make muluka chiefs remote from their subjects, yet they 
did not have the executive power to compensate for the resulting lack of 
cooperation, particularly from the batongole - often the musigire. who was 
less remote, was better able to secure compliance. (4) They were the executives 
directly responsible for effecting unpopular administration - tax collection, 
enforcement of unpopular laws, collecting information, and enforcing agricul­
tural and sanitary regulations includihg communal labour. (5) They were sub­
ject to open reprisals, of which the most popular was houseburning and refusal 
to recognise their authority, for tax-paying or communal labour, in a way that 
higher chiefs were not except in very special circumstances. All this does 
not mean that the higher chiefs escaped hostility, as many examples illustrate: 
the formation of the Bataka Federation in 1921: the land issue of 1935-5: the 
formation of the B&taka Party in 1945; the opposition to the Buganda Land 
Acquisition Act and the murder of the katikkiro who promoted it; and above 
all, the riots of 1949 in which the rioters petitioned for popular choice of 
chiefs, more representation on the Lukiiko, and the abolition of the existing 
government. But the remoteness of the higher chiefs and their recruitment 
from a particular economic class did not result in class-conscious opposition 
to them except in the first parfc of the colonial period, before the 1927 land 
reform. Hostility to unpopular administration was directed at the muluka 
chief,? who seldom had economic power over more than a few of his subjects.
The higher chiefships were still seen as representing Baganda rule against 
British rule, and considerable kitiibwa still attached to their incumbents.
It seemed right that they should be wealthy and powerful men. Hostility to 
them was personal, when it was clear that they had failed to oppose new and 
unpopular British measures. I have argued that the peculiar nature of economic 
relations after the Busulu and Enyujo law of 1927 made such politfcal and status 
relations possible. It was possible for Baganda to retain an ambivalent
attitude to stratification in their political system, so that the latter was 
available for use in organising them as a political group in defence of their 
common interests. This, in turn, helped to determine their perception of 
'common interests' (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, Introduction). By contrast 
in Rwanda, where the political chiefs were clearly part of a political interest 
group, it was clear to Hutu peasants that their position of economic and political 
disadvantage was a consequence of the system of political stratification, and 
not only of colonial overrule.
The desirable higher chiefships had a relatively high salary, with frequent 
mobility to better paid posts, and they were pensionable. They received many 
'perks' - official house, land and rents, and a car loan, for example. They were
not recruited by direct succession, but close kin of chiefs bad 
an advantageovis position:
"55$ of county and 37$ of subcounty chiefs were themselves 
the sons of chiefs; 20$ of county and subcounty chiefs were 
brothers of other chiefs; and 35$ of county and 14$ of 
subcounty chiefs were brothers-in-law of chiefs"(Richards,
1960,pp.65-66).
Allowing for overlapping, there is a significant degree of 
inheritance of political power here - and clearly,, chiefs who did 
not fall into those categories were not necessarily of a different 
economic class. Equally high proportions of muluka chiefs were 
in these categories,, but tended to be young men training for 
rapid promotion or less successful brothers of higher chiefs, 
(ibid.). Thus much the largest proportion were in the category 
of 'brother of a chief(37$) - nearly double the proportion of 
county chiefs in this category, and 3 times that for subcounty 
chiefs. Muluka chiefships had little power and were not sought 
by the wealthy. As Southwold says:
"partly because so many muluka chiefs are now bakopi, there 
is no longer any great kitiibwa to be gained by an educated 
ox* upper-class man in serving as a muluka chief; this is 
part of the reason why it is now so difficult to persuade 
such men to take on the job". (1964,p•220).
"Whatever the reason, I suggest this reluctance functioned
latently to prevent an overriding conceptual association of
economic dominance with the most unpopular aspects of the
political system. The unpopularity of the higher chiefs was
relatively indirect, and their obvious economic power individually
acceptable in terms of kitiibwa.
The institution of direct election of 2 members to the 
muluka council and to the ggombolola council by all taxpayers 
over 20 years of age, with indirect election of a representative 
to the ssaza council, the Lukiiko and the Legislative Council, by 
the reforms of 1945, 1947 and 1950, did not alter the distribution 
of power. Southwold (1964,p.23Sff.) found that there was little 
interest in the councils, with under 5$ of voters turning out in 
1950 and 1955* Probably this was because the councils were not 
decision-making bodies, and seen as of only limited use in 
expressing grievances (ibid.). In these circumstances? it is 
not surprising that councillors are
"very similar* in type to the lower chiefs, and not person­
ally representative of the average peasant"(ibid,p.239),
A new feature of the colonial period was the organization of 
of political groups in a differentiated legal order. Clan group­
ings had provided a degree of informal political organization 
(Southwold,1966,p,85), and continued in this function - not only 
in the obvious case of the Bataka in 1921, but also
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in the'modern nationalist' movements like the Sons of Kintu (see Apter,pp.214-5)• 
The new political groups tried to mobilise support by such means as were 
available, including clan organization, but were 'traditional' only in that 
sense, '^ he common feature of all of them was the conjunction of disputes 
in the political elite with appea.-ls, by the"elites manques" (Low, 1964), to 
popular grievances to drum up support. Thus one of the leaders of the Bataka 
movement in 1921-2, mobilizing popular opposition to the beneficiaries of the 
1900 Agreement and their 'Official nationalism' (Apter) which i-.c.ia; ;.l \-h on 
included cooperation with the British, was the Mugema. He had been the leading 
ssaza chief, as well as clan mutalca of the Grey Monkey clan. He had done well 
materially from the Agreement (Richards, 1966,p.60), but in 1911 Had lost!his 
role of county chief and retained only clan and ritual roles (ibid,p.3ln,6).
The katikkiro, Sir Apolo Kagwa, immediately tried to mobilize his supporters by 
a similar symbolic appea.<l, in the "Association of the Bataka which protects 
the Agreement of 1900 regarding the land of the Bataka (Richards 1964>p.320). 
in the demands of the Bataka Federation can be read the popular association 
of their land grievances with rule by the chiefs, and the desire for a new 
political system under the kabaka (presented as the 'traditionally-correct1 
form).
With the decline in hodility to the land.lord class, and growing competition 
with Asian traders and non-Baganda African immigrant peasants (chapter 4)?
popular grievances focused on what was perceived as the threat to Buganda? 
all aliens, who were seen as the weak protected by the strong,i.e. the British 
Administration. The anti-ministry chiefs who formed the Sons of Kintu in 1938 
gained mass support at muluka level by joining their campaign with opposition 
to Indian traders and ginners (Apter,p.206,246-7)* The Sons of Kintu were also 
closely aligned with radical urban groups who had economic grievances, through 
the Uganda Motor Drivers' Association. The Bataka Party, founded in 1945,was 
different in not actually recruibing its leaders from anti-ministry chiefs so 
much as from the new "elected element anxious to have power in the Lukiiko after 
the 1945 reforms. They sought to end chiefly control of the Lukiiko" (Apter 
p.242). They were largely small businessmen and farmers (ibid). This leader­
ship was more radical than previous opposition factions, partly because its 
members were sociologically marginal to the elite class, and it bid for the 
same support, in popular grievances,that had sustained opposition elements in the 
elite class. They made strong efforts to link up with potential supportive 
groups at the local level - Bataka Party units, voluntary and recreational 
societies, and the farmers' groups organized by I.K.Musazi (ibid,p.243)* The 
two main planks of the party program (the five demands of 1949) were (ibid,p.259) 
(l) opposition to all the chiefs, since these were seen as loyal to the ministry
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and the Protectorate Government after Wamala's ’populist* faction had con­
fronted the latter and been defeated by it; (2) opposition to all who stole the 
wealth of Buganda - whether their land (i.e. the Protectorate Government, the 
immigrants) or their profits (i.e. the Protectorate Government which fixed the 
prices of cotton and coffee, Asian traders and ginners).
Like the Sons of Kint.u, the Bataka Party's neotraditionalism was oriented 
to contemporary conditions, as shown by the demands for elected chiefs under 
the kabaka, and for economic freedom with their cash .crops. The party was closely 
aligned with the cooperative movement, the Uganda .African Farmers' Union, and with 
traders through informal contacts (Apter,p.252) The Bataka Party was banned after 
the 1949 riots. The U.A.R.U., also banned, reorganized as the Federation^ 
of Partnerships of Uganda African Farmers (F.P.U.A.F.), This organization 
provided the main means of mobilizing rural discontent behind a new opposition 
element in the political elite, composed mainly of modernist, educated 
nationalists who were themselves members of the dominant economic class but who 
opposed the old chiefly elite (see Low, 1964)- They founded the Uganda National 
Congress in 1952. The U.N.C. fitted into the same pattern as the neotrad­
itionalist parties in Buganda, despite its formal differences. Its leaders 
still belonged to the elite class of Buganda. The Central Committee of the 
National Executive in 1958 which made policy decisions, was composed l(f/b of 
old pupils of King's College, Budo and: "A high proportion of the members either 
had land or were related by marriage or descent to important families in Buganda" 
(Apter,p.317-8). Only three of the approximately twenty members were not 
Baganda. According to Apter, the main specific grievance of the leadership 
was discrimination against Africans in the Civil Service - hardly a mass 
issue in its&f (ibid). The U.N.C. at all levels was predominantly Protestant 
in membership. The rural branches of the party were supported mainly by persons 
who were both farmers and traders, and whose concern was with excluding Asian 
and African immigrant competitors from Buganda (ibid,pp.323-4) • As before, the 
elite struggles were being used to express popular grievances, and this division 
in the party necessitated obscurity of policy on the major issues of the kabaka's 
position, federalism, and self-government for Buganda. The U.N.C. did not offer 
or provide fundamental changes in the political system. According to Apter 
(p.275)* "The U.N.C. was in many respects the same organization as the Federation 
of Partnerships" - the F.P.U.A.F. (above).
The formation of the UNO in 1952 was, however, potentially significant for 
political structure in Buganda. Though the party was heavily dominated by Baganda 
of the elite class, and many of its personnel and organizational forms at all 
levels overlapped with those of the banned Bataka Party, its strategy of mobil­
izing support outside Buganda in the rest of Uganda was, apart from the minor 
link up of the Bataka with protest in Busoga, a new one. The UNO's elite
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class leaders may not have aimed at anything much more than improving their 
bargaining position -with the Buganda Government and the British (Apter,p.328).
But with the introduction of this new resouce into the arena of struggle among 
factions of the Baganda elite class, I suggest that the IMG leaders had broken the 
’pragmatic rules' of struggle in that arena, to use Bailey's terminology (1969 
•p. 15). Moreover, by doing so they were threatening the monopoly of competition 
for important political offices held by the elite class. For if they succeeded 
they would end the 'encapsulated* situation of Buganda in the Protectorate, 
within/such monopoly was possible (cf.ibid,p.145;.
In 1955 there was a confrontation between the kabaka and the Governor of the 
Protectorate which led to the withdrawal of recognition of the former under 
the 1900 Agreement, and his deportation to England. The appearance of IMG
was gn important factor in the decision-making of the kabaka and his govern­
ment in the events leading up to this crisis (Morris, 1970,p.326), though 
clearly far from being the only one (see Apter,pp.276-86). I suggest this was 
because the IMG was a potential and indirect threat to their power,, because 
its leaders had 'broken the rules' of elite competition in Buganda at a time 
when there was fear that the kingdom's dominant position in the Protectorate 
was diminishing. Morris considers that
"By 1953* * It was clear to the Kabaka and his Government that
a positive stand against the growing forces of encroachment
upon Buganda’s national identity and internal sovereignty had 
to be made. The resurrection of the old East African federation 
scare provided an excellent pretext"(ibid,p.326-7)•
Whatever the complex causes of the Kabaka Crisis, one of its latent functions 
was to reassert the boundaries between Bugandan and Ugandan political systems, 
while temporarily bringing Uganda-wide support behind the Baganda in the struggle 
to secure the return of their martyred kabaka, preempting the IMG strategy. The 
IMG, after its initial reaction attempting to make capital from the kabaka's exile 
without undue concern about his return (Apter,p.289), made use of the crisis to 
extend its popular support. It became one of the leading organizations camr- 
paigning for the kabaka's return, and raising money for that purpose. In the 
process it raised its dues-paying membership to about 50,000 (ibid,p.332). But 
it also meant abandoning its Uganda-wide strategy, and its acquicsuce in the elev­
ation of the kabaka as the dominant symbol of nationalism in Buganda (see chapter 
7). This removed its raison d'etre temporarily, and after the kabaka's return the 
level of membership dropped to under 10,000 (ibid) Above all, it marked the IMC's 
leaders' return to the rules of elite competition in Buganda, and precipitated 
splits in the party.
In this chapter I have built up a model of political structure in Buganda 
over a period of time from the accession of Mwanga II in I884 until the deport­
ation of Mutesa II in 1953> which shows that the greatest potential for conflict
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of 'objective interests' among Baganda to emerge in political action lay in two 
fields: (l) conflict between the elite class and the unorganized Baganda who 
shared common class situations; (2) conflict between members of the elite class 
- between the offices they occupied, andjncompetition for those offices. The 
elite class could continue to dominate the political system only so long as it 
could prevent class-based parties organizing against itself. Its ability to do 
this depended considerably on the informal discipline that could be exercised 
over its members to prevent their competition destroying their cohesion. I 
demonstrated that this analysis could be successfully tested in the history of 
the colonial period. ^In the next chapter I show how the nature of political 
change in the decade before Independence was determined by the posing of these 
problems in a particularly acute form, and the finding of solutions by members 
of the elite class*
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PART III 
CHAPTER SEVEN
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND PARTY FORMATION
In this chapter I attempt to explain the contrasting success and 
failure, respectively, of the neotraditional cultural strategies adopted 
by the elite classes in Buganda and Rwanda, in their efforts to prevent 
political parties forming along the main lines of social stratification in 
the period before Independence. The problems which are faced by political 
groups in maintaining their organization in a changing environment have been 
comprehensively outlined by Cohen (1969a, pp.201-ll). These are the problems 
of (l) distinctiveness (2) communication; (3) decision-making; (4 ) 
authority; (5) ideology; (6) discipline. This typology is an analytical 
tool of which the value can only be established by the light it throws on 
empirical processes; I shall not be concerned to demonstrate that it is
logically exhaustive. An important variable in the solution of these
problems is whether the means adopted are formal or informal (see Intro­
duction), that is to say, in this context, whether or not such means
"form part of the official framework of economic and
political power within the state" (ibid. p.200).
If the means are informal it is likely that symbolism, ritual and ideologies 
will be utilised to a much greater extent than if they are formal (ibid.).
I write here of the strategies of 'elite classes1 (see Introduction).
I emphasize again that when I use this concept it is with the specific
meaning of an economic class, that is, a category of persons, which has
achieved corporate group organization as the most prestigious status group 
in a society.
The function of distinctiveness refers to a group's need to define 
its membership and identity, so as clearly to exclude non-members from 
corporate rights and to facilitate the mobilization of members in the 
fulfillment of corporate obligations. We should note further that within 
a group which defines itself as exclusive-by certain criteria there may be 
a more exclusive group defining itself by additional and different criteria.
The function of communication refers to a group's inability to 
exchange information and co-ordinate their activity without regular and 
institutionalized channels of communication between members.
The function of decision-making refers to the need for channels of 
communication to centre on a co-ordinating person or 'administrative staff* 
(c.f. Weber, 1964? P«146) which can abstract generalizations relevant to 
the group's activity from the particular messages received, and make
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decisions about the group*s activity in the light of this information. 
Although called an 'administrative staff* they might be involved in policy 
decisions. M.G. Smith's (1956, i960) distinction between 'politics' and 
'administration' cannot always be sustained (cf. Bailey (1965) and Swartz 
(1968)). Effecting "the order governing the corporate group" (Weber, 1964) 
p.146) may involve policy decisions.
The function of authority refers to the need for those "whose action 
is concerned with carrying into effect the order governing the corporate 
group" (ibid.), i.e. those who make and carry out decisions, to have the 
legitimate power to do so, and to have their decisions enforced. As 
Weber points out, it is the ability to enforce decisions which distinguishes 
the corporate group from other "closed commun^al or associative relation­
ship^)" (ibid.). The legitimate power of the decision-makers may 
derive from symbolic as well as material sources.
The function of ideology refers to the process through which powers 
exercised by decision-makers may be legitimated. The symbols through 
which such power is habitually expressed, at the "operational" level 
(Turner, 1962, p.125), are "polysemous" or "multivocal"and may be 
considered at two other levels of meaning: the "exegetical" and the "pos­
itional" levels (ibid.). As Turner points out, the positioning of symbols 
within a symbolic whole, under a "dominant symbol", reinforces the subjective 
validity of their "exegetical" meanings, and thereby provides explanation — 
and thus "legitimation" (Berger and ILuckman, 1967, p.110) - for their 
habitualized "operational" meanings. Without some degree of legitimate 
power a group has no continuity.
The function of discipline refers to the "habituation characteristic 
of uncritical and unresisting mass obedience" (Weber, 1964, p.153).
Such habitual obedience follows commands which are accompanied by the 
appropriate ritual behaviour, or such behaviour may itself invoke general 
commands even when there is no specific order - this is the difference 
between an order from a military officer to a soldier, accompanied by 
the appropriate uniforms, saluting, tone of voice etc., and the ritual 
behaviour of a member of an endogamous group which works against his wishing 
to marry someone from another group. Discipline can only be maintained 
by (l) constant reaffirmation of the validity of the 'exegetical* meanings 
of symbols involved in ritual behaviour, at special reaffirmation cere­
monies in which they are 'positioned* within the ideological system; 
the ceremonies are usually associated with emotionally-charged events, the 
intensity of which may vary from the beginning of a new day (e.g. children 
singing hymns and being addressed by the headmaster in an English school)
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to that of a life-crisis (e.g. Bdembu Mukanda ritual); (2) the constant 
reaffirmation of the Operational1 meanings of particular symbols; this 
takes place in its clearest form at reaffirmation ceremonies, hut also 
occurs every time uncritical obedience takes place.
In this chapter I compare the formal and informal methods adopted 
by the elite classes in Buganda and Rwanda to deal with these outlined 
problems in organizing political groups, within a context in which new 
sources of power were potentially available to the populations outside the 
elite classes.
It is necessary here to discuss in what sense the ’elite class* may 
be said to have acted corporately in dealing with the problems of 
organization. Weber*s definition of corporate action enables us to 
specify agents:
Tf‘Corporate action* is either the action of the administrative 
staff, which by virtue of its governing or representative authority 
is oriented to carrying out the terms of its order, or it is 
the action of the members as directed by the administrative 
staff" (1964, p.146).
In Buganda and Rwanda, the persons who acted formally as the administrative
staffs of the kingdoms also acted informally as the administrative staffs
of the elite classes. This situation developed historically, as I have
shown, in the colonial period, fostered by the British and Belgian policies
of administmt ion by ‘indirect rule*. It was precisely because the
administrative staff of the elite class was also that of the kingdom that
we may describe the elite class as occupying an ’objectively* advantaged
political position. So long as these administrative staffs were supported
by the colonial powers,, they needed no more legitimation than that provided
by their continuity of symbolic form with the precolonial political
authority. However, the approach of Independence and the enforcement of
constitutional changes by the colonial powers brought the probability
that the elite classes would no longer be able to preserve their monopoly
of the administrative staff offices of the kingdoms. Hew resources,
such as direct election of officials, could mean that some of the non-elite
would find’social and economic mobility in organizing the political mobility
of their strata, and thus not be amenable to absorption in, and discipline
by, the elite class - even where this could be envisaged. Thus it was
essential that the administrative staffs of the elite classes in Buganda
and Rwanda intensify the moral bases of their rule in the kingdoms,
and establish a claim to represent the kingdoms as corporate entities.
That is, they had to preempt the transfer of authority to election by the
masses, and locate it in the kingdom as a mystical whole. If they could
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retain authority into Independence, they would then have the 
full state apparatus of power at their disposal.
SECTION ONE
BUGANDA: THE NEM-STYIE POLITICAL PARTIES
The political parties which were formed in response to the Uganda 
National Congress (UNC) or by breakaway from it fall into the same pattern 
of struggle among factions of the elite that I have already identified 
(chapter 6). The UNC group representing continuity with the Federation 
of Partnerships (FPUAF) and led by I.K.Musazi, the secretary-general, had 
been joined in 1955 ky a faction of more radical western-educated politicians 
who hoped to utilize the UNC *s comparatively widespread rural branch organ­
ization. When their takeover failed, and it seemed that the UNC organiz­
ation could not be made efficient enough for their purposes (cf. Apter, 
p.338)» many of this faction broke away in July 1957 io form the United 
Congress Party. But they failed to carry the UNC branches with them, 
and remained an isolated elite faction: all the Protestants, who dominated
it numerically, were from King*s College, Budo and six had also been to 
Makerere or higher education elsewhere (ibid. p.336). The UCP tried to 
function as an elite faction without popular support; firstly by having its 
two legislative councillors (who had crossed the floor from other parties) 
resign in 1957 (ibid. p.430, n.6 4) as a protest against the non­
introduction cf direct elections for that body; secondly, by then supporting 
the Buganda Government in its efforts to keep Buganda out of direct 
elections. But they failed to attract either popular support or the 
kabakaJs favour, being regarded as untrustworthy and opportunistic (ibid, 
p.343). Furthermore, they lacked the “social position and economic power” 
(ibid.), which was only promised in their educational standing and which was 
indispensable for elite competition. The UCP gradually split up, with 
some members leaving politics and others joining other parties - most appeared 
in the Uganda National Movement (UNM) (see below).
Another elite faction was composed mainly of a core of western- 
educated Protestants indirectly elected to the Lukiiko in 1953, who 
had effectively negotiated the kabaka*s return under the leadership of 
E.M.K. Mulira. In the process they had acquired a following of about 
20 Lukiilto members to their core of 12 (ibid, p.338). They founded the 
Progressive Party in January, 1955* nature as an elite faction can
be seen in the composition of its leadership , which again came mainly from 
King *s College, Budo and which made up ”a largely Protestant group of 
schoolmasters, prosperous farmers and African entrepreneurs, who had not 
found a niche for themselves within the Buganda Government hierarchy".
(Low, 1962, pp.21-22). The PP never achieved much popular support, offered 
no mass issue of its own, and probably reached a maximum total membership 
of 1,400, Mulira himself called it a "party of leaders" (Apter, p.339)
Its mild opposition to the chiefs did not bring it popular support because 
,*good chiefs1 - the .’King's Friends * - in the populist, and in some respects 
conservative,tradition of Wamala seemed to have been introduced after the 
kabaka’s return (Low, 1962, p.39)5 there was no urge to replace them with 
more efficient bureaucrats (see below). However, the PP did provoke 
harassment from the Buganda Government, which successfuly disrupted its 
Lukiiko base by judicial tactics against its tmembers. Like the UCP, 
the PR’s lack of a popular following made it impotent, and Mulirars eventual 
entry into the UNM was a recognition of this (see below).
Some cf the radical anti-Musazi faction of the UNC, led by another 
Muganda, J. Kiwanuka, had remained within the party when the majority 
left to form the UCP. The UNC slowly extended its support among poli­
ticians outside Buganda after 1955 - though this meant the forming of a 
coalition of local parties rather than any unitary party in which Baganda 
interests might be overruled—and Kiwanuka's faction sought once again 
to make it a nationalist party of the modernist, Pan-Africanist type, and 
to make its organization more effective. In January 1959 Ike UNC split 
over these questions, symbolized by the issue of whether or not to have a 
Foreign Mission in Cairo, disseminating nationalist propaganda and making 
contacts with other such parties in Africa. The anti-Musazi faction 
retained most of the party organization, but split again in August 1959 
with the expulsion of the secretary-general, A. Mayanja. Both the UNO’s 
Baganda founders had thus been expelled from the party, and the only 
continuing sectionms now led by a Lango, A.M. Obote. The Buganda 
Government had by this time declared itself against political parties, and 
already made the UNC inappropriate for elite competition in Buganda.
The second occasion of the UNO’s ’breaking the rules* of Baganda elite 
.competition had put it outside the competition altogether. Many 
Baganda leaders - like Musazi or the more radical Mayanja, who had been 
in Kiwanuka*s faction of UNC - were nt prepared for this, Mayanja became 
Minister for ^ Education in the Buganda Government. Kiwanuka also split 
from UNC later and, like Mayanja, became prominent in the KY party (see 
below and Nailers, 1964, pp.383,385).
In 1956 the Democratic Party was formed around the Homan Catholic 
faction in the Buganda Government, largely at the instigation of the 
Catholic hierarchy. Its first president, M. Mugwanya, had been chief 
Justice - the Catholic share of ministerial office - but was out of
office after failing in 1955* by one vote in 83 (Apter, p.375)» to become 
the first Catholic katikkiro. The leadership of the party was overwhelmingly 
Catholic (ibid, p.341)? Its organization was assisted by Catholic priests 
and the Catholic Action movement (Leys, p.5, 1967); and its mass support was 
based on opposition to Protestant ’establishments* everywhere, but especially 
in Buganda (ibid,). The BP, like the UNC, broke the ’rules* of Baganda elite 
class competition by adopting a Uganda-wide strategy. Unlike the UNC, it 
did so uncompromisingly, declaring itself against independence for Buganda 
and moving increasingly towards preference for a unitary form of government 
fir independent Uganda. It was able to do this while the UNC could not because 
it was a ’religious1, and not ’nationalist’, based party and was therefore 
not so involved in ambiguities and fears about the nature of Independence 
which would divide it between Buganda and the rest of the country.
Moreover, as Catholics its leaders could not hope to capture the Buganda 
Government by winning the kabaka’s approval, or joining any coalition 
of elite factions. The BP was the only major Buganda-based sparty whose 
leaders kept out of the UNM, and it strongly opposed KT (see below). Both 
these latter parties supported a ’Protestant establishment*. As a 
Catholic party with a religious, and so potentially a political, majority 
in Buganda it could hope to divide or even capture the latter, end division 
between the Bugandan and Ugandan political systems, and set Ugandan politics 
on new religious-divided lines with itself as probably the majority party 
(Richards, I964, p.380). However, such a strategy still depended heavily 
on success in Buganda, for in the rest of Uganda Catholics were slightly 
in the minority, so it could not depend on dominating Buganda from outside 
(Leys, 1967, p.5). From 1958 its president was a leading Muganda lawyer,
B. Kiwanuka. In the long term the BP failed, because the religious division 
among the Baganda elite was not so strongly matched in the rest of the 
population - at least not strongly enough to overcome loyalty to the kabaka 
when this was well-organised.
Apart from those in the BP, whose aim was somewhat different, the elite 
factions had failed by 1959 'fco organize mass support in new-style parties 
as a mobilizable resource in their competition for power in Buganda.
They could not appeal over the heads of the kabaka, chiefs and Lukiiko, 
principally because their mode of political organization, and its modernist 
symbolism, revealed them for what they were - a western-educated elite who 
were unlikely to be very different from the old chiefly elite (Low, 1964), 
which had supposedly been deposed when the kabaka returned from exile and 
replaced with the ’King’s Friends’. The Buganda Government was able to
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monopolize leadership on genuinely popular issues (see below) and to destroy 
the parties by refusing to allow Baganda to lake any part in direct elections. 
It was able to continue to claim to ;*speak for* the Baganda.
However, soon after the 195^ elections in the rest of Uganda it became 
clear that this latter mode of relationship would be inadequate to control 
and discipline the expression of popular grievances. From within the new 
Legislative Council a new party called the Uganda Peopled Union was 
formed with a platform primarily "in opposition to Buganda and to its 
neotraditionalism in particular" (Low, 1962, p.30; see also Apter, p.347)«
Its leaders were non-Baganda and they hoped to represent the rest cf the 
country. The Baganda response to the TJPU was not, however, cultivated and 
expressed by the Buganda Government but by a new party organization - 
the out-of-bffice elite factions at last had a popular grievance which 
was too radical for the Buganda Government to give its official approval. 
Moreover, a political party was needed which could mobilize popular support 
at a greater intensity than that implied in being ^spoken for1, in order to 
participate in Ugandafs politics enough to prevent plans for Independence 
going ahead on UPU*s terms (since Buganda was not participating in the 
Legislative Council), but without committing the Buganda Government to any 
institutionalization on unfavourable terms of such participation.
The elite factions thus had the field clear, and the ^parties of leaders* 
many from the UCP, Musazi of UNC, and Mulira of PP - joined together with 
"a number of new, and less ,*advanced*leaders of the Buganda populace" (Low, 
1962, p.32) in the Uganda National Movement. As a channel for popular 
grnsrances, the UNM "quickly became the most powerful political party which 
Buganda or Uganda had ever seen" (ibid.). Low states that the UNM was banned 
too quickly for any estimation of whether "the unsuccessful party leaders 
had really captured the support of the populace, or vice versa" (ibid. n.l), 
though he implies the latter was the case. Anyway, the party leaders 
had decided to accept the expression of popular political and economic 
grievances, hoping thereby to win support away from 0bote*s UNC, by 
directing them wholly against non-Africans. As I discuss elsewhere, the 
attack onron-africans fostered a Buganda, not a Ugandan, sense of nationality, 
though in nationalist terms it was a legitimate program. In February 1959, 
just after the UNM was founded, it called for a boycott of non-African goods 
and transport. This tactic, and the party itself, received support almost 
exclusively inside Buganda (Richards, p.372). The boycott was effective 
there, and developed with the use of intimidation and attacks on the persons 
and property of Asian traders in particular. The Buganda Government
intervened slowly, and seemingly reluctantly, to stop the disorder (ibid.).
The movement was banned and its leaders, including Musazi’and Mulira, deported 
by the Protectorate Governent* In May, 1959* However, the boycott continued, 
diminishing after an appeal by the kabaka in July but only ending in the 
following year (see below). Following these events in Buganda, the two 
major non-Baganda parties, the UPU and UNC, merged in March i960 in the 
Uganda People *s Congress.
For our purposes, the significance of these events is as follows:
(1) The attempt by elite factions to mobilize mass support in order to 
force their way into the kabaka’s government had finally failed, though
in the process some individuals had shown they could be used — for example, 
Mayanja and Mulira.
(2) The pattern of Buganda politics in which popular grie/ances sought 
expression through elite factions had not changed; however, the context of 
this process hdd changed. It was now Uganda-wide, and the Buganda Govern­
ment represented the out-of-power faction within this context.
(3) The UNM had shown that mass support could be mobilized in the new 
context to great effect, and that neotraditional symbolism could be used 
in its organization.
(4 ) The UNM also showed that such an organization required much 
greater discipline if it was to be useful to the kabaka’s government, and
not to become too radical in its demands, and activities. For these
purposes it would have to be more directly controlled by the kabaka’s 
government.
(5) All the elite factions, except the BP, irrespective of ideology, 
had recognised the need to work under the dominant symbol of the kabaka.
The only cross-cutting loyalties were the religious ties of Catholics to the
BP, and these were to prove less intense than those to the kabaka.
(6) The elite class had not been challenged either within the kingdom 
or by outside political parties. The Baganda peasants, industrial workers 
and petty traders perceived themselves as a group in economic competition 
and political conflict with different groups of non-Baganda, who seemed to 
be working in coalition to subjugate them (chapters 4 & 5; and- below).
In this situation, the elite class were seen as their .’natural leaders.*.
The process of party formation is analogous to that described by Weber for
industrM societies:
"Since it is quite a general phenomenon we. must mention 
here that the class antagonisms that are conditioned 
through the market situation are usually most bitter between 
those who actually and directly participate as opponents in 
price wars,.It is not the rentier, the shareholder, and the
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■banker who suffer the ill-will of the worker, hut almost 
exclusively the manufacturer and the business executives 
who are the direct opponents of workers in price wars.
This is so in spite of the fact that it is precisely the 
cash boxes of the rentier, the shareholder and the banker 
into which the more or less ’unearned' gains flow...This 
simple state of affairs has very frequently been decisive 
fb? the role the class situation has played in the formation 
of political parties.” (1970, p.l86)
Until the success of the UNM, the (’King’s Friends 1 had continued to 
’’monopolize legitimacy” (Apter) in Buganda. After coming to power in 1955 
they had gradually secured complete control of the Lukiiko and successfully 
resisted the efforts of other elite factions to draw away their popular 
support in Buganda or acquire it elsewhere. Among other tactics ensuring 
that new-style parties acquired little popular following, the .’King’s 
Friends* insisted to the Governor of Uganda that he deal only with officials 
of the kingdom; and they secured a statement from the revived council of 
clan heads condemning any Muganda who belonged to a political party as 
thereby compromising his loyalty to the kabaka. Above all, they managed to
prevent direct elections to the Lukiiko or to the Legislative Council until 
March 1961. Thus the parties remained ,’parties of leaders’, and it was of 
little use to them to secure two or three seats each in the indirect 
Lukiiko elections of 1959 - EP» with its exceptional organizational 
facilities got 19 seats. Although their presence in the Lukiiko led 
Apter to state that "Whereas party politics had not been characteristic of 
the previous Lukiiko, it was now an established fact” (1961, p.387), within 
weeks the Buganda-based parties had merged in an effort to come to terms 
with the fact that party divisions would have to follow the lines of cleavage 
between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. The Uganda National Movement was 
formed in response to the anti—Baganda UPU.
Until the perception of the UPU as a threat to the integrity of the 
Buganda nation, the ’King's Friends* had thus monopolised the support 
of most of the Baganda populace, and of the leaders of local political 
opinion. The latter focused concern on two main issues: (l) economic 
grievances, popularly associated with African immigration and Asian 
traders and middlemen, - Asian traders were well established in rural areas 
of Buganda, and dominated their commerce; (2) loyalty to the kabaka - as 
definitive of Baganda identity, and as embodying the national corporate 
authority of the Buganda Government and chiefs after 1955*
Unfortunately, the second level of leadership, the category which Low 
refers to as "the less educated and less ’advanced’ men, who were giving
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the populace leadership" (1962, p.39)*a-2i(l which was crucial to any 
understanding of party formation in Buganda, has been little studied. Low 
mentions only a few names, saying that though "popular forces", in some way 
suspicious of elite politicians and the *King*s Friends*, clearly were well- 
organized enough to keep the UNM boycott going independently, "All too 
little is known, to outsiders, about how the boycott was sustained"
(ibid, p.4 0). Apter provides some useful data on the UNC rural branches, 
which provided a formal political medium for some of the second-level 
leaders after the banning of the Bataka Party (pp.323-4; & Chapter 6 ).
But many of these leaders* political activities were necessarily informal, 
and after 1955 they had accepted political direction from the kabaka*s 
,*friends*. Their activities, then, were continuous with those of the 
small businessmen and farmers who sought to end chiefly domination of the 
Buganda Government in the. 1940s? through the Bataka Party and what I have 
called *potential supportive groups* in the local areas - voluntary and 
recreational groups, farmers-* groups and, after 1949? underground Bataka 
units.
Apter*s analysis of Baganda UNC rural branch membership reveals the 
same characteristics in the leadership, and in the absence of more direct 
evidence it is this analysis which I am forced to rely on, in an attempt 
to avoid the greater danger of distortion by omission, in explaining the 
organization of the UNM and KY parties. It is misleading to explain 
Baganda nationalism in the usual terms of collective psychology - the 
Baganda ^thought* or ,*felt.* threatened by African and other aliens - and 
it is necessary to specify the institutions through which such ideas were 
formed and communicated, and responses organized. It is clear from the 
following statement by Apter that the role played by second—level leaders 
was not merely passive communication between national leaders and the 
populace
"the branch chairmen were not only organizationally important 
in the (Buganda) Uganda National Congress. They also helped to 
shape its character. With such a high proportion of them in 
trade, they were in constant competition with Asians. This 
gave middle-rank party leaders a more pronounced anti—Asian 
bias than either the rank-and-file of the senior leadership..
Several in interview singled out Asians as objects of special 
animosity. For them nationalism was to result in the 
elimination of the Asians as formidable competitors" (p.324).
What then were the characteristics of second-level leaders, as
revealed by Apter*s study of Baganda UNC branches? The branches themselves
were organized at ggombolola rather than muluka level, and the leaders
to whom I refer were more than simply muluka *big men* (to use a useful term
from the social anthropology of Melanesia). Their occupations meant that
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■they were belter placed than most muluka fbig men1 for political contacts with 
the centre; "Almost all important branch members were farmer-traders, that 
is, pepole with both occupations" (Apter, P,319) This meant frequent 
journeys to Kampala on business, and relative ease of contact with 
national-level leaders at, for instance, the UNC Central Committee in 
Katwe. They also had close contact with more local areas, leading 
members of branches being usually also sub-branch leaders, and they had
widespread contact in organizations which were not formally political (see 
above); although dues-paying UNC members were few, much general sympathy 
was organized through such informal groups. The branch itself was usually 
patronised by a prominent farmer and mutongole. whose house was used as 
the head-quarters. The Bataka Party had organized in the same way.
But the real leaders were those farmer-traders whom Apter describes as 
cQinivers":
"Behind the patron* there was usually a more Conniving1 
political person, most often a small shopkeeper with a duka 
adjacent to several Indian dukas. On the whole, the i*conni- 
ver1 was financially less successful than the Indian, devot­
ing less time to his shop. While on good terms with the 
Indian, he dislikecLhim heartily. The *conniver* typically 
had a small plot of land in addition to his shop.." (ibid, p.320)
on which he produced subsistence, and some cash, crops. The *conniver* 
was crucial to party organisation because, as I explained above, he made 
effective contact between the local areas and the centre which the formal 
party apparatus invariably failed to do.- At the same time, he derived 
much local prestige from his 'personal accounts of contacts with 
national political leaders.
A most important characteristic distinguishing second-level leaders, 
or rather the category from which they arose, from other Baganda might be 
summarised by saying that sociologically, noting the different rates and 
levels of economic development between Buganda and the U.K., they could 
be loosely categorized as the Baganda version of "blocked spiralists" 
(Prankenberg, 1966, p.26o). The brokerage role of *conniversf was often 
an attempt by "substantial citizens" (Apter, p.320, n.33), who had failed 
in other attempts at social mobility and had reached their "highest and 
furthest point" (Prankenberg, ibid.), to prevent downward mobility. The 
examples given by Apter support this (p.320 n,33): the Conniving*, 
failing traders; relapsed or expelled Catholics who were relatively 
wealthy but had lost their high status in Catholic associations; 
unsuccessful progressive! farmers who were losing money on their land; 
demoted ggombolola chiefs and (mohe often in the Bataka movements) muluka
chiefs; retired railway employees and clerks; other literate 
persons with land and "careers of* minor prominence’1# Moreover,; 
Apter noted downward mobility as relatively high among branch, 
chairmen# He stresses their particular status consciousness,! and 
their acute awareness of the limitations on social mobility, as 
distinguishing them from the rest of the populace# In particular, 
they were often educated to junior secondary level but found that 
the jobs they sought were occupied by persons with senior 
secondary education.
The ’substantial citizens’ shared certain political charac­
teristics with the ’blocked spiralists* of the U.K. which were 
highly significant for a consideration of the interaction of 
social stratification and political- change - although,, as I have 
stressed, the context of their geographical and social ’blockage1 
was quite different. (1) They shared the ‘local1 as opposed to 
’cosmopolitan* status orientation of the 'blocked spiralists’, 
(Prankenberg,p,262),, i.e., they accepted total ascribed status in 
the local community as Baganda, having failed to achieve occupa­
tional status which would be recognised anywhere, (2) They filled 
local leadership roles, (3) They also "act together because they 
feel they are a group but do not act to change their basic position 
in society"(ibid,;p. 261 ) . That is, in Weber's terms,, they develop 
’communal' but not 'societal1 action.(1970,p.183) This is impor­
tant because it means that local, political leaders in Buganda 
were peculiarly likely to interpret grievances in ethnic/status 
and not economic class terms,, even when the direct interest of 
trading competition with Asians was absent. And those who) emerged 
as second-level leaders through successful fulfillment o,f the 
'conniving' brokerage role did not thereby emerge from this con­
text and change their political values, for the role required 
them to articulate the views of local leaders.
Although this data on the characteristics! of local-level 
leaders,, and those who became second-level leaders,, is not taken 
from direct study of the UNM or ICY parties, it does give necesssary 
detail on those persons who are usually referred to in some way 
which does not reveal the full significance of their structural 
position or specify their active role in generalizing popular 
grievances and interpreting them in a particular way. They are 
usually referred to as 'bataka leaders', 'conservative populists', 
'less advanced and educated men' and 'leaders of the populace'.
Two further justifications for my use of indirect material on 
these second-level leaders might be given: (1) they played a
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role in UNM, when•they clearly demonstrated characteristics which might 
have been predicted on the basis of Apter’s UNC rural branch date; (2)
Low states (1962, p-40) that the only elite politician who had long­
standing links with the *popular forces * in the UNM, which acted almost 
independently of the elite factions and the Buganda Government, was 
Musazi - the chief organizer of UNCfs rural branches in Buganda*
My analysis of Apter’s data will enable us to understand the 
potentialities and limitations of the local and second-level leaders 
as they appeared in the UNM trade boycott of 1959* As they had, 
partially, in the 1949 riots, they showed a capacity to maintain their 
aims distinct from those of the elite class leaders with whom they linked 
up. While the elite factions, including the ’King’s Friends’, regarded 
the boycott of non-African trade and transport as means to win..away the 
popular support outside Buganda of the anti—Buganda leaders in the legis­
lative Council (ibid.)and to mobilize Baganda in a demonstration of 
strength against them, the second-level leaders, who were linking up the 
local grievances of the bakopi and generalizing them in a way '*'.which 
suited themselves, saw it as a means to end the Asian traders1 economic 
domination of the rural areas.
Soon after the boycott and intimidation began, the UNM and its 
brief successors were banned and the official leaders were deported or 
withdrew. The kabaka then withdrew his government’s tacit approval.
But the movement continued illegally, and without apparent leaders, 
for many months and succeeded in driving Asian traders out of the rural 
areas. However, the second-level leaders who sustained the boycott 
movement did not institutionalize their independence cf the kabaka and the 
elite class leaders, even though they had achieved it in practice and were 
supported by what low describes las popular suspicions of the latter, including 
the kabaka’s government, as "embryonic elite groups" (ibid.). By 1961 the 
elite class had regained control in a new political party (or ’movement*, 
since they denied it was a ’party’), under the reasserted dominant symbol 
of the kabaka, called theKabaka Yekka ( ’Kabaka Alone*). I suggest that 
this ‘failure* of the second-level leaders can in considerable part be accounted 
for by the characteristics which I have outlined. Firstly, their ability 
to link up was based on a communal level of consciousness and was not 
directed to changing their basic position in society. They demonstrate clearly 
what Saul (1969) calls the "Janus-faced" nature of .’Populism* - both 
’modernizing’, in terms of pursuing new and often individualistic modern 
goals, and ’reactionary*, in terms of the communal ideology developed as 
a defence against failure as capitalist economic relations spread in peasant
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society (see also Kilson, 1966, p.6l). As we have seen, second-level 
and local leaders were often those who had pursued modern goals hardest, 
as traders, and failed in competition with Asians. It was they who were acutely 
aware of loss of status, and particularly sought to recover it on a 
communal "basis. Secondly, the essence of their local status orientation 
was membership of the Baganda tribe (chapter 5) which was defined by the 
institutionalized forms of loyalty to the kabaka. The kabaka was 
the dominant symbol of their communal ideology.
The second—level and local leaders were thus ready to accept the 
kabakaTs government as their political commanders again, once their 
economic grievances had been settled by their own action, and once the 
KY party began to mobilize them to defend communal status as Baganda.
In i960, some of the second-level leaders did attempt to form such groups 
themselves; for example, the Sikatange Party ( ’What I have, I hold’); 
the Mwoyo ggwa Ggwanga ( ’Spirit of the People’);and the Amabega ggwa 
Wamulondo ( ’Behind the Throne1). The founder of the latter was Augustine 
Kamya, who was one of the few second-level leaders who can be named, 
because of his prominence in the UMM trade boycott (Low, 1962, p.39;
Richards, 1964*. p.383). But these parties were absorbed in the KY when 
the elite class reasserted control in the kabaka’s name, as were supporters 
of the Bataka movement and its auxiliary groups (ibid. & see below).
Kamya’s personal history may be taken as a test-case for my analysis of the 
failure of second-level leaders. He left KY when he discovered that despite 
its rhetoric it was being used to secure the position of the Buganda 
Government by (l) alliance with the UPC, which dominated the rest of Uganda, 
and (2) by acceptance of other communal groups - the KY did not try to deny 
that it received financial support from Indians and that immigrants from Ru- 
anda-Urumdi had joined (Richards, 1964* p.382). But he could not 
transcend his own and his supporters’ communal consciousness, and he 
continued to look to the .’natural leaders.1 with intensified rhetoric of the 
same kind. His new party, ’The People for the Lukiiko and the Throne1 
(Mabega wa Lukiiko ne Rhamulondo) was annihilated in the 1962 elections, 
not being authorised by the kabaka.
The strategy of the kabaka’s government from 1955* based on the 
Buganda experience of his exile, had been to reject all party organization, 
for reasons which I have analysed. Another part of the strategy had been 
the rejection of participation in direct elections to the Legislative 
Council. This was itself part of its rejection of any superior authority 
to the kabaka, which I discuss below. Both elements of this strategy had 
been highly succesful until 1961, and the party organizations which had been
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developed at various times when an alternative strategy was considered - the 
mobilization of clan heads for possible party activity, and the All-Buganda 
Party and the, United National Party which were both at times said to have the 
kabaka’s backing - were not utilized. Bui by 1961, the strategy was failing, 
as can be seen from the desparate and ‘unrealistic1 (see below) unilateral 
declaration of Independence by the Lukiiko (Jan.l, 1961), after the failure 
to prevent the Wild Committee setting up direct elections in Buganda as 
elsewhere for the 1961 Legislative Council. . The limitations of even the 
strategy’s successful execution were revealed in the elections of March,
1961. The Buganda Government hoped now for some kind of federal relation­
ship, in which it would represent Buganda in the Uganda government; and 
so the Lukiiko passed a resolution that registration Id vote in the election 
was "treason" against the kabaka (Richards, 1964j p.363). This was highly 
successful, with only 2jj$ of those eligible even registering to vote.
But this simply made way for the only elite faction which had consistently 
pursued a Uganda-wide strategy, the BP, to capture 19 of the 20 seats in 
Buganda by default. And since in the rest of the country the BP had only 
24 seats against UPC,’s 35 (Low 19^2, p.4 6), it was those 19 seats which 
gave it power to form the first Uganda government.
The BP was doubly threatening to the kabaka’s government. It was 
increasingly in favour of a unitary government structure in Uganda; and 
its power base in the central government gave it the opportunity and 
resources to consolidate its support, operate more effectively in Buganda and 
undermine the power of the kabaka. The Buganda Government responded by 
supporting the growth of an anti-BP movement in Buganda. Moreover, having 
demonstrated its power in the kingdom, it made an alliance with the UPC at 
the Constitutional Conference in September-October 1961. With UPC support 
it secured at the Conference Buganda*s right to determine whether or not it 
should have direct elections to the National Assembly in April, 1962, which 
would be the last before Independence, like the rest of the country. The
decision was to be made by a new loukiiko, t^o be directly elected in 
February 1962. The UPC agreed not to contest this election, and so to 
leave a straight contest of KY and BP.
The anti—BP movement, in which out—of—office elite class leaders like 
Mulira had again linked up with second-level leaders, as in the UNM, became 
known as ,‘Kabaka Yekka* (Richards, p.382) and had its leadership largely 
taken over by the kabaka*s government (see below). With a further 
intensification of the moral basis of the Buganda Government’s rule (see 
below), politics was simplified to a single issue - loyalty to the kabaka, 
represented by a vote for the KY. The potential Catholic vote against the
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"the Protestant establishment was divided, or at least neutralised (22% 
of eligible voters did not even register for these crucial elections, while 
•the first direct elections elsewhere in Uganda (in 195$) had brought out over 
80% polls in 8 of the 10 constituencies)*and the KY took 65 of the 68 seats. 
The new members represented the ’’moneyed and landowning class” (ibid, p.384). 
The Lukiiko then decided for indirect representation for its 21 seats in 
the National Assembly. After the April elections in the rest of Uganda, 
in which UPC got 37 seats to DP’s 24, the KY kept its side of the bargain 
and formed a government with the UPC which took Uganda to Independence 
in October, 1962. By the final Independence Conference in June 1962,
Buganda secured confirmation of its status as "a single federal kingdom 
in a composite state” agreed at the previous conference (l96l)r (see 
Richards, 1964 pp.376-7)* Buganda’s representatives in the National 
Assembly would continue to be chosen by the Lukiiko. The formal political 
institutions through which all factions of the elite class had .’agreed1 to 
operate, induding the kabakaship and a Lukiiko which still allowed seats for 
the asaza chiefs, were made legally secure. They could be altered only by 
a two-thirds majority of the Lukiiko. The elite class retained its power 
into the period of Independence. Those elite factions which had sought 
their own short-term interests in securing power for themselves in a unitary 
Uganda, at the expense of the corporateness of the Baganda elite class, had 
been disciplined or defeated. The Buganda Government had been forced to 
concede certain powers to the central government, notably as concerned 
administration of the Crown Lands, income tax collection and external 
loana raising, and arm and police control. But except for the financial 
concessions considerable room for political manoevre was left. The 
Buganda Government seemed to be in a strong position in ihis respect; it 
had demonstrated its popular support, agreed with the UPC on respective 
’spheres of influence*, secured a third of the central government 
ministries and, some time after Independence, the. Presidency of Uganda for 
the kabaka. Problems for the future, however, lay in that the success of 
the elite class in retaining its corporateness on an ethnic basis precluded 
its participation in any move towards the formation of a Ugandan elite 
status group or class, and made it a target for non-Baganda elites.
SECTION TWO
RWANDA; THE NEW-STYLE POLITICAL PARTIES
The Hutu revolution of 1959—61 has never been adequately explained 
in its specific detail because it has always been treated as a question 
of individual psychological orientations and ideological change. Exp­
lanation need then only refer to possible broad 'causes1 of psychological 
changes among Hutu, away from the ^.premise of inequality* (cf. Maquet, 
1961,1964) and dependence on Tutsi governors - and no investigation need 
be made of different levels of consciousness, internal structural 
differentiation and the actual process of organization of the caste as 
a political group. Even Lemarchand, who sees the importance of these 
questions at later stages of the revolution, accepts earlier writer1 
explanations of its beginnings as the spontaneous result of individual 
decisions in a situation of widespread anomie among Hutu, produced by the 
colonial administrations' removal of institutions which traditionally 
maintained 'balance' and 'harmony' between the castes (pp.ll8 .140ff).
He considers this anomie was triggered by intolerable tensions following 
the monarchist coup d'etat of July 1959 and the formation of an aggressive 
Tutsi party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) pressing for immediate 
Independence while its members monopolised political office. He merely 
qualifies earlier accounts by pointing out that anomie and "profound 
psychological disturbance" was concentrated in a particular category of 
Hutu who, in the process of structural differentiation, had oome to stand 
outside the caste system.(ibid.p.144)
I have already indicated that equilibrium assumptions are unwarranted 
empirically and misleading analytically. Besides the choice of explan­
ations for which the only 'proof' is the occurance of the events they pur­
port to explain, the basic error of these writers is to assume that 'Hutu' 
and 'Tutsi' designated units of the same type. On the contrary, it has 
been my argument through-out that while the Tutsi were organized as a 
political group, the Hutu were only a social category defined as a status 
'group' by their masters. Tutsi domination was the product of their 
superior organization, which was kingdom wide while the widest Hutu group, 
was the lineage operating at no higher political level than the hill.
Hutu could not develop consciousness of their common interests so long as 
their social interaction was principally competitive and their ability to 
cohere was organized by a Tutsi patron. Hutu did not participate in any 
political arena at a higher level than the hill even in the 1950s, as the 
1956 elections show (chapter 3). Even if Hutu at hill level rose against 
their patron, Tutsi could mass their kingdom-wide organization with 
specialized military units (either the intore or colonial police) to
repress them. It was by nowmeans inevitable that Hutu should achieve a 
group consciousness, for this would require the development of communication 
and other organizational functions at above hill level. And although a 
potential organizing body appeared in the Hutu intelligentsia (ibid), which 
had support after 1956 from the Catholic European hierarchy and the Belgian 
Administration, this had apparently failed by 1959 to raise support at hill 
level because Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs could prevent the entry of 
organizers, the discussion in any formal body of kingdom level polical 
issues, and the formulation of problems in caste terms, (Lemarchand, 1970 
p.152). OTAR launched a campaign after its foundation in August, 1959) 
which appealed in the name of Rwandan nationalism to members of all 
castes. This shows that its Tutsi leaders were confident that, as pre­
viously, Hutu participation in the political system could be directed at 
pleasure because of its lack of autonomous organization.
In the event it was wrong, not because the Hutu peasantry supported 
a remote and inadequately protective Hutu intelligentsia directly but 
because there existed a new category of Hutu who were (l') aware of the 
activities of the Hutu intelligentsia; (2) expecting the latter to gain a 
considerable amount of political patronage through reforms which the 
Belgians would force the Tutsi monarchy to accept; (3) hoping to utilize 
the caste symbolism embraced by the main Hutu party of the intelligentsia 
to replace the local Tutsi patrons with themselves; (4) sociologically 
speaking, in a position which was independent enough of the local Tutsi 
patrons to enable them to act as 'big men' within the Hutu category, 
articulating to ordinary Hutu those ideas of the intelligentsia in which 
they themselves were interested; (5) thus able to personify, without a 
confrontation with the local Tutsi patron for which they were not ready, 
a specifically Hutu challenge to local Tutsi rule; and to acquire a foll­
owing which transcended lineage competition. I suggest that far from being 
spontaneous the rising of November 1959) which began the revolution, was 
the result of those Hutu 'big men' or potential 'second-level* leaders (in 
this context) mobilizing their 'cores' of followers for the seizure of 
local patronage at a time when it appeared that the Tutsi were beginning 
a systematic elimination of the Hutu intelligentsia, to be followed by 
Independence, a process which would deny upward mobility to local Hutu 
'big men' indefinitely - and might well lead to their own elimination. 
Schematically, it might be said that the latter acted as if there already 
were a Hutu government which would give them patronage; the Hutu intelli­
gentsia of the Parti du Mouvement de 1'Emancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU)
170
accepted the role; the Belgians endorsed it; and Tutsi organizational 
supremacy was irretrievably lost. Unfortunately, there is no direct 
evidence against which this analysis could be tested and although I shall 
justify it in terms of (l) the structural characteristics of Tutsi domination 
and of the new rural Hutu economic category, and (2) the better-docu­
mented process of political change which followed the November rising, the 
major justification must be that the current explanations in terms of 
mass psychological change or straightforward inevitable1 class war are 
quite inadequate (chapters 1 & 3)• An attempt is therefore necessary to 
make better sense of available data on these crucial events which may be 
regarded as providing an 'experimental situation’ in the nature of Tutsi 
rule in Rwanda. I suggest that, discarding preconceptions of Hutu psy­
chological dependence, the November risings should be seen as an intrisic 
part of the revolutionary process of the next two years and not as its 
analytically separate ’cause’. It is then possible to see one contin­
uous process of Hutu solutions to problems of political organization (which 
were at the root of Tutsi domination) both before and after November 1959- 
In this case it is legitimate to speculate that the sudden appearance of 
Hutu political patrons at the local level, after the risings, required 
informal preparation - not consciously for revolution but for individual 
social mobility through politics, which it seemed might soon be possible 
for Hutu.
I have already dealt extensively with the structural characteristics 
of Tutsi domination (chapter 3) and it is clear that no explanation of 
the revolution which does not explain how it might have been organized in 
the face of such difficulties could be considered even minimally adequate.
The characteristics of the new Hutu category are significant here.
Its members were upwardly mobile like the Hutu intelligentsia, though less 
successfully, and they too found themselves ’blocked' by caste consider­
ations. They possessed skills which tied them to occupations in the rural 
areas: primary school teachers, clerks in the Administration (plantons) 
petty traders, inn-keepers, truck-drivers, brick-layers. After the elect­
ions of June-July 1961, the occupations of the new Hutu political officials 
(burgomasters) in Kibuye territoire included
’’nine school teachers (moniteurs), one catechist, one judge, one 
clerk (secretaire de chefferie) and three carpenters. However 
fragmentary, the evidence available from other areas indicates 
a somewhat similar breakdown of occupational statuses, with a pre­
dominance of primary school teachers" (Lemarchand, 1970jP-187).
The Ipart played by the primary school teachers strengthens my argument that
a capacity for patronage had to be demonstrated by local Hutu leaders: as
Hobsbawra points out (l962,p.232) it is this occupation which frequently
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"represent(s) the ideal of an age when for the first time 
common men and women looked above their heads and saw that 
ignorance could be dissipated".
Lemarchand considers that persons in all these occupations, whom he calls 
a "kind of rural proletariat':" (p.7) "emergent middle-class" (pp.7t479)* 
became rural revolutionary leaders because they no longer "belonged to 
the caste system" (p.144) thus did not share the psychological dep­
endence of most Hutu. He has no doubt that they acquired followings 
among Hutu:
"they were ideally suited to act as intermediaries between 
the intelligentsia and the masses. In fact, in many instances 
they acted as surrogate patrons for those peasants who could no 
longer expect aid and protection from their traditional over­
lords" (p.141).
I suggest that they were able to attract a 'core’ of Hutu who shared their 
aspirations even before the November risings, because their occupations 
reduced their dependence on Tutsi patrons and gave them expectations of . 
further mobility, probably through the political system from which they 
were temporarily excluded. They would then be in a position to generate 
and lead a much larger rising against the Tutsi as a caste, which might 
appear ’spontaneous’. At later stages of the revolution, for which 
there is evidence that they organized in this way (ibid,p,l83ff)jthe 
peculiarities of their occupational characteristics are not necessary 
to explanation of their intermediary role and local patronage, for these 
went to any political official appointed by the central governement; the 
prominence of certain types of occupational statuses can only be explained 
by their significance in the pre-revolutionary situation. I suggest that 
in November 1959 'blJ.e possibility of not realizing the intermediary role 
to which they aspired led them to accelerate the process by seizing power 
locally. My analysis enables us to see the November risings as an ess­
ential part of contemporary political processes - the final stage in Hutu 
organization, linking national and local - level processes of change - 
rather an ’act of God1 explicable only in terms of general historical trends 
or mass psychology.
Moreover, in the northern regions there is evidence that the process
of local organization by Hutu patrons did precede the November risings,
and made them possible. The traditional Hutu patron chiefs, the abakonde,
still informally maintained their roles, and had occasionally used them
during the colonial period in localized risings against the Tutsi chiefs.
There was endemic hostility between the abakonde, supported by their
clients (bagererwa coutumiers) who had been dispossessed of political
power and land rights, and their dispossessors - the Tutsi chiefs and their 
clients (bagererwa politiques) Many of the abakonde belonged to the
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Hutu intelligentsia, sharing its aspirations from its first organizational 
efforts and later rising to high political and administrative positions.
But even after Independence the sources of their support were neotraditional 
men like C. Hahamenshi (Minister of Justice) B. Bicamumpaka (Minister of 
Agriculture, then the Interior) and J. Habyalimana (Minister of Armed 
Forces and Police) held large areas of land in the north as abakonde.
They had secure electoral support from their clients and could even use the 
'gifts' they received to become wealthy traders (ibid,p.232) . On a much 
reduced scale they had the same sources of support before November 1959 
(Pauwels, 1967). In the November risings it would have been comparatively 
easy for them to mobilize the Hutu peasantry through their leading clients, 
who were more local 'big men', by the neotraditional symbolic appeal of 
their roles, against the Tutsi chiefs and their (merely 'polftical') clients, 
whose installation in power was too recent and too much resented for them 
to have established legitimacy. Pauwels (1967) describes the Tutsi 
chiefs in Bushiru in the 1930s &nd 1940s as being figureheads while much 
administration was carried on informally by a mukonde. But the abakonde 
also led the Hutu revolution in the north in areas where Tutsi hegemony had 
been established before colonial rule. Some of them demonstrated con­
siderable independence from PARMEHUTU until the party proved its capacity 
for patronage in the commun^al elections of i960 (Lemarchand, 1970,p.182).
Standard accounts of the Hutu revolution stress the ideological and 
psychological effects on the Hutu peasantry of the appearance,from the mid- 
1950s, of a Hutu intelligentsia. I suggest that much more important was 
its creation of a political group at kingdom-level which, being clearly the 
proteges of the Belgian Administration and European Catholic clergy - and 
thereby the beneficiaries of projected electoral reforms - was attractive 
as a patron to second-level Hutu leaders. In particular, it claimed to 
speak for all Hutu, and this was accepted by the European authorities.
From about 1956, the Administration and Catholic Church began to move 
rapidly away from their commitment to 'immobilisme' and Tutsi domination.
In fact, Lemarchand presents a convincing case that throughout 1959“62 
it was only the active intervention of the Administration and Catholic 
European clergy, neutralising Tutsi political and military counteraction, 
that alLowed the Hutu revolution to take place. But as "resources in the 
environment of political action" (Nicholas, 1968,p.310) like the United 
Nations used by the Tutsi, they did not create the revolution or the social 
and historical processes of which it,was part, though they did allow them 
to develop (see also Southwold, 1966,p.l2l). The change of policy meant
173
that Hutu intellectuals acquired the means to meet as a group and form­
ulate self-consciously the awareness that the 1956 electoral reforms were 
likely only to consolidate Tutsi domination and legitimate it. Of these 
means, the most important were: (l) Catholic newspapers; (2) the Cooperat­
ive Travail, Fidelite, Progres (TRAFIPRO), a consumers’ and producers’ 
cooperative. In late 1956 the Hutu intelligentsia acquired almost ex­
clusive expression of their views in the main European weekly, ’Temps 
Nouveaux d’Afrique’, and the only vernacular newspaper, ’Kimanyateka’, 
where G. Kayibanda (the future President of the Republic) took over as 
editor from the leading Tutsi ideologist, Abbe Kagame. In December, 1956 
TRAFIPR'Q began its activities at Kabgaye near one of the main seminaries; 
it was initially financed entirely by the Catholic Church. As Lemarchand 
says (1970.p.148) ’’TRAFIPRO' served as the basic cell from which the Hutu 
movement developed", for it enabled the Hutu intelligentsia to solve their 
own organizational problems, providing an institutional framework for de 
decision-making and communication, in particular, and to link up with some 
of the Hutu local leaders in the rural areas. It was very closely conn­
ected with Kayibanda’s Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) and PARMEHUTU parties, 
and he was the first chairman of its board of directors.
The limited possibilites of propaganda in achieving reforms seem to 
have been reached quite rapidly. In March 1957 seven Hutu of the intel­
ligentsia produced the ’Manifeste des Bahutu’, although this received no., 
official response from the Belgian Administration to whom it was addressed, 
or from the Tutsi—controlled Supreme Council of Rwanda for over a year*, bu.t 
through the local press and informal discussion its contents became known 
all over Rwanda (ibid,p.152-3)> and a subject of major interest. The 
manifesto demanded an end to all forms of Tutsi political, economic and 
social domination, replacing them with liberal-democratic forms of govern­
ment; moreover, it claimed this should be done quickly, before the Supreme 
Council took unilateral action (R.P.pp.20-29)« In June 1957 Kayibanda 
formed the Mouvement Social Muhutu to promote the manifesto and mobilize 
his contacts in the rural areas. But because of the rigorous opposition 
of Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs MSM was unable to achieve rural organization 
except in areas around the main mission stations in Ruhengeri, Gitarma 
and Astrida, even when it attempted to make informal use of the irregular 
hill councils of Hutu lineage heads (Lemarchand, 1970,p.153). MSM was 
further weakened by a split between the ex-seminari^sts, and those who had 
had further education and tended to be more ’moderate(ibid.p.234) i*1 ther 
demands. J.Gitera formed his own party with the ’moderates’ in November 
1957j "the Association pour la Promotion de la Masse (APR0S0MA). This 
appealed for the support not only of Hutu but ’menu peuple’ of all castes. 
It never achieved much support outside Astrida. It had affinities with
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millenarian movements, using neotraditional and Christian symbolic 
forms and looking to the mwami, the "father of Rwanda1', "the first 
Christiam sovereign" and "A good Tutsi", to extirpate 'pagan* elements 
- particularly the royal symbolism centred on the drum Kalinga - and return 
the country to a Golden Age of caste quality (d'Hertefelt, 1960b,p.126),
It changed sides opportunistically during the civil war of 1959-61, and 
after the PARMEHUTU-led coup d'etat (see below) it was gradually supp­
ressed. But until the November risings, the MSM (re-organized in 1959 
as PARMEHUTU) had little more success than APROSOMA. Its activities 
were intensified after the Tutsi coup d’etat at Charles III Mutara's 
funeral in July 1959- This event had been rapidly followed by the form­
ation of a monarchist party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise, whose leader­
ship was "largely synonymous with " the Tutsi Supreme Council (which 
had only one Hutu member: chapter 3) (Lemarchand, 197C)TPla'te 6). This 
was followed within a month by the reorganization of MSM as PARMEHUTU.
After the coup d’etat, UNAR denounced the apparent coalition of the 
Administration, Church and PARMEHUTU and demanded immediate Independence.
This strategy rested on the assumption that Hutu organization and propa­
ganda had not been effective at hill level, and the danger to Tutsi rule 
lay only in the revolution from above imposed by the Belgians. It aimed 
to mobilize the population through the traditional structure of authority 
to reject remote, self-appointed PARMEHUTU leaders. As I have argued 
above, this could not succeed because there was a new flexibility in the 
local structure of authority. When UNAR militants began what looked like 
the systematic elimination of Hutu leaders there was an overwhelming res­
ponse by Hutu. On November 1, 1959» UNAR militants in Gitarama (central 
Rwanda) attacked one of the few Hutu subchiefs, a PARMEHUTU leader, and 
local Hutu immediately retaliated by killing an anti-PARMEHUTU Tutsi subchief 
and 3 Tutsi officials who were with him. Violence spread immediately in 
the adjoining northwestern provinces of Ruhengeri, Kisenyi and Kibuye - 
where armed bands of Hutu attacked a town on November 7» ^  spread north
and finally returned to the rest ., of central Rwanda. As evidence of 
’spontaneity’ it is said that Hutu attacked Tutsi indiscriminately - yet 
by January I960 it was necessary to replace,by Hutu,21 Tutsi chiefs and 
332 subchiefs who had been killed, forced to flee or could not continue in 
the face of local Hutu opposition (ibid,p.l72). Tutsi reprisals during 
the rising were clearly directed at Hutu leaders and carried out by com­
mando groups. It is significant that Tutsi used their traditional mach­
inery of repression, which had been informally resuscitated as part of the 
monarchy’s neotraditional campaign in the 1950s: (see below)
’’Heavy reliance was placed at the outset on traditional 
military organization: the traditional army chiefs, the
"border guards (ababevyi) the Twa-led commandos, all 
played their part in organizing the repression" (ibid,p.l65).
The Belgians officially restored order on November 1 4, By the end of
November there were 7,000 Tutsi refugees, with the number rising fast.
From this point on there was intermittent civil war. With the Hutu 
intelligentsia backed by the Administration many UNAR leaders, including 
the mwami, left Rwanda and began a campaign to get a reversal of the sit­
uation by the UN" trustees. Some of them organized guerilla commandos 
(in.yenzi) of refugees both within and from outside Rwanda; these had 
little effect other than providing a justification for the violence used 
by local Hutu leaders in consolidating their support. The Administration 
took the opportunity of the risings to replace half the Tutsi authorities 
with Hutu ’interim authorities’ (see above).
An Interim Decree of December 1959 provided for a new governmental' 
structure: (l) the subchiefdom was to be replaced by a "commune" with
directly elected "councillors" and an appointed "burgomaster": (2) the chief 
was to lose executive power, and merely facilitate communication betwejan 
the centre and the burgomasters; (3) the centre was to be an indirectly 
elected legislative Council with powers subject to Belgian veto. Elections 
for the communes took place in June and July i960. UNAR officially boy­
cotted the elections (communique'’ 20.5 .60,R.P.p.240) but some splinter groups 
contested seats. Tutsi attempted to intimidate Hutu voters, whose retal­
iation was again overwhelming, continuing long after the elections - which 
appeared to give them carte blanche. Gravel's account of the impact of 
these events in Remera, where there had been no violence at all prior to 
July i960, 'shows, how the newly-appointed burgomasters consolidated their 
power locally by terror (1968,pp.190-6).
The results of the elections gave PARMHUTU 2390 of the 3125 seats 
(76*5$); the next party, APROSOMA, had only 7*4$ of the seats and a share in 
6fo of the PARMEHUTU seats; UNAR gained 56 seats (l.7$) (R.P.p.272). 210
of the 229 new burgomasters were Hutu, and 160 of these were PARMEHUTU mem­
bers, soon joined by many of the others. The Administration raised the
numbers of the Special Provisional Council, which in February had replaced 
the Tutsi Supreme Council, from 8 to 48 - dominated by PARMEHUTU now - and 
allowed a provisional government to be formed by Kayibanda (R,P,,pp.207,315). 
The latter pressed for direct elections to be followed by Independence, since 
it was difficult for PARMEHUTU to discipline the second-level leaders whom
it was patronising - central leaders could not afford to lose secure votes,
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yet were afraid that the extensive use of terror might create disaff­
ection and split the party (Gravel »P*195)
OTAR secured ar.postponement of elections “by the OT until all parties 
could compete safely under amnesty, and the mwami return from exile(Reso­
lutions ,20.. 12.60.R,P.pp.359-363)* But on January 28, 1961 there was a 
coup d'etat hy the Hutu in the provisional government (OT Commission report 
A/47O6 ,R.P.p.388) . All Rwanda's ^burgomasters and councillors were brought
to Gitarama, where they were informed that the monarchy was abolished and 
a republic proclaimed. After this, 92% of them participated in voting for 
a President and National Assembly. PARMEHUTU secured the Presidency 
and 44 °f 48 seats; APROSOMA the rest (official communique 28.1.61,
R.P.p.385). Three days earlier the Belgians had granted internal self- 
government, and the OT Commission concluded that they had abetted the coup.
The OT eventually decided that elections should be held in August, and 
that there should also be a referendum on retention of the monarchy (Res­
olutions 2-10,22.4*61.R.P.pp.402-3)- Meanwhile PARMEHUTU put its internal 
autonomy into effect, replacing Belgian territorial administrators with its 
own 'prefects' and gaining greater capacity to discipline local leaders (see 
Gravel, 1968,p.l95). Erom its position of strength it won 35 of the 44 
seats in the elections, and the monarchy was rejected by 1 ,006,339 votes to 
253,963 (Lemarchand, 197^»PP*196-7)- UUAR had participated, under UN super­
vision, and secured 7 seats. By the New York Agreements (28.2.62.ibid,p.
197), UNAR was guaranteed 2 ministries and other high offices by the UN.
But these did not enable it to create an electoral base, and they provoked 
a split between its own 'Progressives' and the 'conservatives' (ibid,pp.203-4)* 
By 1965? OTAR had also tried an intensified guerilla campaign, which failed, 
and had fragmented. The independent republic of Rwanda was proclaimed by 
a PARMEHUTU government on July 1,1962.
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SECTION THREE
COMPARISON OP SOLUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
(a) The Problem of Distinctiveness
Defining Baganda group membership was not a process that required 
organization anew in the 1950s. H*-6 neotraditional political structure
still linked all Baganda to the kabaka, the living embodiment and point of 
reference for myths of origin and superiority defining the groupfs exclusive­
ness. Tribal custom continued in the colonial period to exclude non­
members, particularly through forms of descent - this, I suggest, is the 
explanation for the continued vitality of descent group organizations after 
they had lost formal and informal political power, which many writers have 
found inexplicable in functional terms. The development of economic classes 
did not bring a decline in the importance of tribal custom in the personal 
identities of Baganda, or the growth cf new symbolic forms, principally because 
relations between Baganda economic classes were not those of direct 
conflict (cf. Weber, 1970* p.l86, quoted above) after the 1920s, and it was 
in the interest of the Baganda peasantry, including farmer-workers and 
farmer-traders, to maintain tribal solidarity as a status group in order 
to compete effectively against non-Baganda labour and traders. However, 
stratification within the Baganda group had been reflected in the conflicting 
interpretations of the meaning of tribal custom (chapter 6),between the 
Buganda Government and the Bataka, and associated movements. Although it 
was the ,Pataka* supporters who are usually referred to as traditionalists:1 
or *neotraditionalists*, the advocates of both interpretations of tribal 
custom sought to give new meanings and functions io old symbolic forms. The 
problems of distinctiveness faced by the elite class were thus those of iden­
tity rather than membership. Firstly, the conflicting interpretations 
of tribal custom had to be transcended, so that they should not become 
the bases for economic class consciousness and new forms of custom cutting 
across tribal lines in Independent Uganda. Secondly, intensification 
of tribal distinctiveness was required so that Baganda should not develop 
cross-cutting ties to the new political parties, based on Uganda national­
ism, religion or, potentially, economic class, which would undermine the 
authority of the Buganda Government and thereby the corporate organization 
of the elite class. Intensification of the ritual defining the role 
^Muganda* would prevent Baganda forgetting their obligations to the 
tribal group,and mobilize them in defence of what were conceived to be their 
exclusive corporate rights — their economic, political and status superiority 
over other Ugandans. The process of intensification ideally requires the
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establishment of a single symbolic pattern which, can articulate all aspects 
of social life (M.G.Smith, 1956, p.55)*
As I show in section 1 and below, the Kabaka Crisis provided the oppor- 
tunity for the establishment of such a hegemonic symbolic pattern, dominated 
by the kabakaship, But even the indoctrination of this pattern, begun 
during the crisis itself, and continued after his return (see section 3 (b) ), 
was subject to fluctuating success. There were signs in the IINM trade 
boycott that not even the existence of an anti—Buganda movement would always 
sustain loyalty to the kabaka, if the long-standing purposes of the Bataka 
movements were not achieved. And so, after 1959j a* new level of intensity 
in the indoctrination of the kabaka-dominated symbolic system was projected, 
and all issues were again reduced to the matter of loyalty to the kabaka 
(see section 3 (f) ). This was successful in maintaining the distinctive­
ness of the Baganda necessary for their mobilization informally, and then formally 
in the KX, in such a way that the Buganda Government could not be consti­
tutionally weakened in -the transition to Independence because the kingdom 
was also a strong political party, with the political element.in its 
governmental relations with the central government wfell distinguished from 
the administrative element.
Organization through the symbolic pattern dominated by the kabakaship 
also obscured the existence of an elite class corporately organized by 
the same administrative staff, distinguishing itself as an elite status group 
by the new life-styles acquired in the process of structural differentiation, 
with its own myths of superiority, and forms of moral exclusiveness through 
the patterns of friendship, kinship and marriage (chapters 4-6)*
The Tutsi elite class in Rwanda failed to solve the problem of 
distinctiveness in two main ways. Firstly, it failed in its efforts to 
create a distinct group of Banyarwanda focused on the corporate possession 
of a common culture. Secondly, while it succeeded in obscuring its own 
existence within the Tutsi group, its privileges were nevertheless perceived 
by the Hutu masses as those of a corporate group, because of its distinctive— 
ness as *Tutsi*. As with the tribal categorization in Buganda the caste 
categorization did not accurately outline the corporate groups of greatest 
’’range" (cf. Smith, 1956) in the society but crucially affected political 
norms in a rapidly changing situation. In Rwanda, the hierarchical 
distinctiveness of ,* ethnic* status groups, i.e. the castes, made the 
existence of an elite class more prominent, even though the latter was not 
co-extensive with the former type of group. In Buganda, the hierarchical 
distinctiveness of *ethnic* status groups,where a large majority of the
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population belonged to the most prestigious ,*etbnic* group^obscured the 
existence of an elite class.
So long as the Belgian Administration.^ policy was to limit secondary 
education and recruitment for government offices to Tutsi, it was in the 
latter*s interest to distinguish themselves ever more clearly fromron- 
Tntsi, •» v . ■ *•; ' .■ ■» •  ^- u *,
During the colonial period, an elite class emerged among Tutsi, largely 
through these policies, distinguishing itself by educational and life-style 
criteria. Noble Tutsi status was an important element in the identities 
of these persons, but there were also other reasons why they did not abandon 
caste symbolism. Principally, their value to the Belgians was that they 
provided the administrative staff of the group (distinguished by Tutsi status) 
which was able to maintain order at the local level, preventing political 
organization among the peasants against colonial rule extremely efficiently 
and cheaply (see statement by first Resident, 1925 Report, quoted Lemarchand, 
1970 p.66). Por these purposes, the patron-client system had to be maintained, 
to^gether with Tutsi distinctiveness which was indispensable to it. We 
may note that the Belgians showed great enxiety at the prospect of the 
abolition of ubuhake, which they identified with the total patron-client 
relationship, and, delayed it until 1954*
When the Belgians* policy changed in the mid-1950s? Tutsi control at 
the local level became even more important for their own purposes. In 
1956 it was shown that so long as there was a Tutsi monopoly of political 
office they could prevent Hutu organizing adequately to end the monopoly by 
elections. But when the Belgians permitted Hutu parties to appear, and 
showed they intended to "politicize" the Hutu (statement by Special Civil 
Resident, 11.1.60, R,P.p.215), with the purpose of holding direct elections 
before Independence, the Tutsi elite class had to preempt these moves by 
establishing their own claim to popular authority. They tried to mobilize 
Hutu, under the control of Tutsi patrons, to reject the Belgian colonialists, 
direct elections and the Hutu intelligentsia. This involved the use of 
customary ties, ideologically resystematized by reference to an ideal past, 
under a relevant dominant symbol, the mwami (see section 3(e) ), in which 
there was caste • harmony. The declared aim of this Apolitical religion* 
(Davies, 1970 p.59) was a return to harmonious relations by reviving 
A traditional.* customs. The use of neotraditional ideology and ritual 
would ensure the failure of Hutu to organize as a group, however often 
^progressive * Tutsi leaders declared that the dislanguishing features of 
the castes did not mean they were unequal; the Supreme Council even found 
it expedient to declare that it was impossible to distinguish clearly
■between the castes and the use of caste names in official documents 
should "be stopped (12.6.58, R.P. p.37). However, the strength of caste 
distinctiveness was shown when conservative Tutsi reaffirmed their myths of 
,’racial* superiority (see section 3(e) ), denying common descent of Tutsi and 
Hutu.
Neotraditional customs were intended to act as forms of- moral exclusive­
ness, maintaining the distinctiveness of ordinary Banyarwanda from the 
persons branded as Enemies' or’traitorSi', i.e. the Belgian colonialists, 
particularly the European clergy, and the Hutu intelligentsia with its modern 
life-styles and ;’western.* liberal-democratic ideology. In 1958, the Supreme 
Council considered that all caste friction could be put down to the activities 
of
"un groupe restreint de types qui eux-m£mes agissent sous 
une influence etrangfere de quelques blancs ou noirs, aux 
idees comnranisantes et dont l*intention est de diviser le 
pays" (R.P. p.37):.}
ieading Tutsi referred to themselves as *abatabazi*, warrior-heroes who
traditionally saved Rwanda from foreign invasion, when they launched their
appeal "Enfants du Rwanda, soyez pr^ts au combat" (R.P. pp.75-78')*
The Hutu, then were expected to continue to channel their behaviour through
customary institutions, legitimated as ,*traditionaL*and articulating Rwandan
unity. Until the mid-1950s the .’exegetical* meaning of these forms always
referred to the cosmic rectitude of caste differences. But when it became
necessary to seek, in a limited way, the support of Hutu, not even Tutsi
relied wholly on the ’premise of inequality*. Instead they sought to
maintain customary modes of behaviour while simultaneously legitimizing their
their rule by a decreed change of exegetical meaning in their ideology -
so that Hutu would believe themselves free and equal, yet continue to act
through neotraditional forms of which the Operational * meaning would be
their distinctiveness and inferiority. However, in practice the use of
traditional symbolism merely emphasized internal divisions between the castes,
not the unity of all Banyarwanda. It is possible that the same symbolism
might have been used successfully to create a Rwandan nation if the Tutsi
elite class had made adequate concessions to upwardly-mobile Hutu who were
the political organizers of opposition. But their actual attempt to retain
symbolic form and function, changing only the exegetical meanings left the
lines of distinctiveness as they were at a time when a considerable shift
of power from one caste to another was taking place.
(b) The Problem of Communication.
I have shown that the reforms of the council system in Buganda, in 1945 
1947 and 1950, did not encourage popular participation in the formal political
system. It did provide, however, a more efficient means of communication 
between the Buganda Government and the mass of Baganda peasants. As we have 
seen, the formal hierarchy of communication broke down between the muluka 
chief, and the batongole and bakopi. Direct use of the muluka chief in 
the ’party* organization of the kingdom would be clearly ineffective in 
mobilizing mass support. But institutionalized channels of communication 
were indispensable, and the council system informally fulfilled this function 
at the same time as it was failing in its formal function of increasing pop­
ular participation in government.
Tlie muldka unit was not as "intimate1* (Southwold, 1964, p.214) 
a group as the precolonial kyalo, in that the relationship of ruler 
and ruled was not voluntarily entered into, the ruler was alienated from the 
people by new administrative tasks, and he did not redistribute goods among 
them. nevertheless it was the political unit in which the batongole and 
bakopi most clearly expressed their grievances, and it was the muluka chief 
whom they tried informally to control (Apter, pp.245-7). The muluka chief 
was ineffective as a means of communication of the grievances of the bakopi 
because he was subject to conflicting role-expectations. The batongole.
who were invariably the influential men of the muluka, were in a more 
advantageous position. The demands on them from above were not institution­
alized and they could continue to fulfill their roles according to popular 
expectations. However, for most of the colonial . period the Buganda 
Government was not interested in two-way communication with the bakopi, 
and did not take advantage of the potential brokerage of the batongole. 
Communication '.of -grievances by bakopi or batongole with the higher chiefs 
went only through the formal channels of judicial complaints against the muluka 
chief, phrased in terms of the government*s bureaucratic demands. Opposition 
movements, like the Sons of Kintu and the Bataka Party, made effective use 
of the prominent batongole of a muluka in their rural organization (ibid.).
In particular they were able to communicate in both directions. Information 
on popular grievances was collected from the local meetings, and generalised 
as common problems. Connections between these problems could be established, 
and communicated back to the local level through sympathetic batongole.
Thus resentment against chiefs and Asian merchants and cotton ginners could 
be directed to support for specific anti-goverment and anti-colonialist 
policies. The effectiveness of their communication enabled the Bataka 
movements to challenge the power of the higher chiefs and the ministers, who 
relied on authority from the kabaka and the British to secure unquestioning 
obedience (Apter, p.247). The council system was largely reformed to secure
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better communication of the official hierarchy with the local level, and 
to bring the expression of popular grievances under control through formal 
organization. None of the councils below the Great Kukiiko had executive 
or legislative powers (ibid, p.364).
As we have seen (chapter 6), the persons elected to the muluka and 
ggombolola councils were "not personally representative of the 
average peasant", (Southwold, 1964) and were usually batangole. Though, as 
Southwold points out, their presence in the muluka council did little to 
convey the views of the bakopi to the muluka chief, their presence at the 
ggombolola council, together with the co-opted fmen of experience*
(bamanyirivu), did enable the views of local 'big men* toapresented to the 
higher chiefs when these whenCthese were prepared to listen, as was the 
case after the 'King's TViends* came to power. The batongole communicated 
with the bakopi both informally and in the muluka council, and in discussion 
were able to generalize grievances for the whole muluka in a form that could 
be conveyed to the ggombolola chief - partially in the ggombolola council 
but more effectively, I suggest, in informal discussion at the time of 
council meetings - when batongole from different muluka would also meet 
each other. Information coming down the hierarchy would be communicated 
in the same process.
The crucial link in the communication chain which I have outlined was 
that between prominent batongole and the higher chiefs* Sometimes it 
might seem to either or both sides to break down when it did not lead to 
desired results. The UNM trade boycott was one such occasion, when some 
of the batongole and other 'substantial citizens* found a more effective 
channel of communication through persons whom I have called 'second-level 
leaders* to the elite factions who formed the UNM leadership. When the 
latter were removed, the'second-level * leaders were able to maintain 
adequate communication for effective local action against Asian traders.
But the second-level leaders failed to develop or institutionalize solutions 
to other organizational problems, notably in the fields of distinctive­
ness and ideology, so that they and their supporters were reintegrated with 
the kabaka's government when the latter, the 'natural leaders', reasserted 
authority through the KY. The anti-DP movement which preceded the KY 
proper seems to have utilized the same links through second-level leaders 
as had the Ulff, but once it received the kabaka's approval and became 
the KY movement, the rapid increase in support noted by Richards (l964» 
p.382) can probably be ascribed to more intensive use of the communication 
channels I have analyzed here. These channels reached everywhere in Buganda 
and were much better co-ordinated than those of second-level leaders. Their
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formal character as instruments of the kabaka*s government gave authority
to messages down the hierarchy, and made them less likely to suffer from
local factional rivalries in which second-level leaders would be involved.
This is not to say that second-level leaders were not used - that they were
is clear from the list of official foundling members of KY, and the partyfs
candidates for the I962 elections (see section 3(c) ) - but they worked
with the Buganda Government once it was clear it was receiving their messages
There is no doubt in the minds of observers that the chiefly hierarchy was
crucial in the electoral success of KY. Richards says that KY*s local
organization "was probably composed of the staff of district chiefsT
offices" (ibid, p.384). Bow agrees: (1962, pp.54*-*55)
,rKY was confronted with novel problems of electoral organization 
such as had never confronted the IBM. But into the breach 
stepped the now chastened chiefly hierarchy, who..enjoyed the 
great advantage of being organized already as a functioning 
political bureaucracy; they were soon in action - despite 
denials - as KY*s electoral machine".
I suggest this could not have happened unless the higher chiefs had found a 
more effective channel of communication with the populace than the generally 
unpopular muluka chief.
In strong contrast with the Baganda elite class, that in Rwanda 
continued to rely heavily on existing channels of communication in a 
situation, after 1956, when they would no longer suffice. In part this 
may be ascribed to the efficiency with which these channels had solved the 
organizational problems of the Tutsi caste over a long period. Hutu could 
not formulate or generalize problems beyond the hill level because their 
only External* channel was the Tutsi hill chief. On the hill, all meetings 
of Hutu lineage heads were presided over by the hill chief, being occasions 
of competition for his favour rather than discussion of common political 
problems. Thus it is not surprising that until mid—1959? the Tutsi strategy 
relied entirely on preventing the Hutu intelligentsia creating alternative 
channels to the local level. But while existing channels were effective 
in maintaining Tutsi organization, and Hutu passivity, they could not sustain 
the demands put on them, in the face cf Belgian pressure for political reforms 
of communicating the new ideology of Rwandan nationality. The contra­
dictions in communicating messages of caste harmony and equality through 
the Tutsi hill chief were too apparent. This was recognised when UfflR 
was formed in August, 1959 an(t the party tried a new form of communication, 
the mass meeting. The first of these was held at Kigali on 31 September, 
1959 and led to the disciplining under retrospective instructions from 
the Residency of the 3 chiefs who formed the central leadership of UHAR,
Isee section 3(d). However,; the mass meeting and UNAR itself1 did 
no more than supplement the more institutionalized forms; of 
communication through, the chiefly hierarchy, which provided the 
local, organization of the party.
(c) The Problem of Decision-Making.
The structure of the Buganda Government in the late colonial 
period provided a clear hierarchy of decision-makers. In the 
analysis of decision-making,, there are three basic questions:
"who formulate the general problems,, who deliberate about 
these problems,, and who make the decisions" . (Cohen,, p. 206) •
I am concerned here only with the highest levels of decision­
making, for in such hierarchical structures lower units usually 
make decisions only in the sense that they distort communications 
to suit their sectional interests;; i.e. I deal with the Lukiiko, 
minisitries and kingship,., and later with the leadership of ICY-.
On the kabaka's return,, the 1955 Agreement had formally 
changed the relationships of these bodies to the Protectorate 
Government. In return for certain constitutional concessions, 
notably participation in the Legislative Council by difect 
elections,, the Buganda Government received virtual internal self- 
government (Richards , 1 9^4, p .352) •> In practice,, it fought the 
concessions in court and by non-cooperation, particularly in 
regard to direct elections.Itfs position was made clear in the 
Lukiiko1s- plan for independence (ibid,p.386)„ which established 
that it regarded its relationship with the central government as 
political in M.G.Smith's sense, i.e. a power relation between 
bodies with equal authority (1956,p . ), rather than wholly 
governmental.
The Agreement also formally changed the internal relations 
of Lukiiko, ministers and kabaka (see Apter-,pp.35^-5) • The 
latter was no longer to be directly and personally responsible 
for the governing of Buganda, though the government was to act in 
his name. It was to be led by the lcatikkiro, who was now elected 
by, and responsible to, the Lukiiko. The latter was to comprise 
60 representative members, the 20 ssaza chiefs, a speaker, 6 
nominees of the kabaka, and the 6 ministers. Direct elections 
were not implemented until 19^2. The lcatikkiro chose the other 
5 ministers, who comprised the 2 existing ministries, plus new 
ones for Education, Health and Natural Resources. The chiefs and ,
administrative officials were to be chosen by an Appointments 
Board, comprising a chairman nominated by the kabaka, the 
lcatikkiro's permanent secretary, and 3 nominees of the
ministers from outside political life. Formally, the kabaka had lost many 
powers, particularly in appointments. However, while the Kintu Gommittee 
(Report, pp.31-32) was prepared before the kabaka*s return to call him a 
"constitutional monarch", with certain provisions about his advisory powers, 
the Kintu government imprisoned Mulira in 1956 for doing the same (Richards,
1964, p.389).
Informally, the kabaka*s'decison making power grew enormously (see 
section 3 (d) ). His appointment powers were unimpaired since he- controlled 
the Appointments Board in practice - the first permanent secretary was 
removed because he attempted to resist political pressures (Apter, p.355); 
the six; new chiefs appointed in 1962 were all KT supporters; more informally, 
the kabaka approved the list of KY candidates for the 1962 elections and the 
list of Bugandafs representatives to the Rational Assembly. (Richards,
1964, p.368), The kabaka remained at the^head of the patron-client 
system in government (ibid, p.363). The katikkiro, ministers and, by 
1957, the Lukiiko were composed of *King's Friends1. The Kintu governments 
of the whole post-Crisis period had no autonomous power base, and remained 
in power because it was known they were the kabakars choice, making 
decisions with him (ibid, p.360). The Lukiiko was the formal body in 
which formulation and deliberation on problems could be seen to take place, 
and it served mainly to co-ordinate communication and express the political 
decision-making of the kabaka and ministers informally, as they could not 
do themselves because such activities clashed with their formal governmental 
roles (see above.). Richards* analysis of Lukiiko resolutions since 
1955 shows that "its meetings were given very largely to discussions of 
political affairs" (p.365) and that it was heavily influenced by the 
kabaka through his ministers, nominees and chiefs (p.36l). Most of its 
members were prominent batongole and chiefs (Apter, p.368). Thus the 
Lukiiko expressed through its resolutions what might'be called the *party 
line* of the Buganda Government, enabling it to function as a political party 
without a head-on clash with the British such as had led to the kabaka*s 
deportation. While it always seemed more *ultra* than the kabaka and 
ministers - almost to be pushing them towards secession, for example, as in 
the unilateral declaration of independence and the refusal thereafter to 
submit resolutions to the Governor*s approval (Richards, 1964? p.360) - 
it was the latter who made final decisons. Thus in the case of the 
independence declaration no action was taken by the Lukiiko to enforce 
it and there was no popular demonstration of independence, for it expressed 
a *party line* from which the kabaka remained aloof while .utilizing it as 
a support in the enforcement of his decision-making.
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The same process of decision-making can he seen in relation to the 
ICY iparty, which can be seen as a development and intensification of the 
functions of the Lukiiko in that process. The formal limits of the Lukiiko*s 
party activity had been reached in 1961 - it could not compete in elections 
to itself. The KY also brought second—level leaders more into the highest 
levels of formulation and deliberation on problems. Just as the Kintu 
government had incorporated some of the more able elite faction leaders by 
this time, like L. Basudde, the Chief Justic (ex-PP), and A. Mayanja, 
minister for education (ex-UNC), the KY leadership as stated formally in its 
list of founder members (see Richards, 1964j p.383) joined representatives 
of all potentially significant political groups to the government under the 
kabaka symbol. The kabaka was represented by his paternal uncle, Prince 
Badru Kakungulu, who was also head of the Muslims. Pour ministers and 
two county chiefs were actually included in the list, and one, Mayanja, 
was secretary-general of the party. Besides these *govermental1 members, 
some elite class leaders from the defunct UNC, UCP and PP parties were 
incltided, notably Mulira and D, iubowa of UNC,who was one of the two unofficial 
representatives of the Catholics. The other Catholic, P. Walugembe, 
was elected first party chairman but withdrew in favour of M. Kintu, who 
had come bottom of the poll, when the kabaka let it be known informally 
that he favoured the katikkiro (ibid, p.383-5)• Moreover, 6 of 27 official 
founders represented parties in which secontLevel leaders invested their 
energies after the UNM boycott (see above, & ibid.), and may have been in 
this category themselves. The continuance of direction by the kabaka and 
ministers in KY was clear. The party had no elected officeholders until 
less than a month before Independence, and there were serious enough 
suggestions that the kabaka should lead the party, with the Lukiiko 
comprising the executive committee, for Mayanja to threaten to resign if 
this happened (ibid, p.394* n.33) - the elite faction leaders did not want 
to return to the pre-UNM situation, which such a move might have presaged for 
a post-Independence Buganda with a secure federal position. Another such 
forewarning was the group in KY which wanted to have no policy except 
allegiance to the kabaka (ibid, p.385). Nevertheless, the katikkiro 
became head of the party, despite his poll failure, simply because the 
kabaka wished it; he had found it profitable since the 1955 Agreement 
to leave formal power and responsibility in the katikkirofs hands.
In Rwanda there was a clear formal institutional structure for decision­
making at the disposal of the Tutsi elite class, from the hill or sub­
chief at the local level,' to the king, his court and the Supreme Council 
at the highest level. In the reforms of 1953 and 1956 this hierarchical
structure was more closely defined. The main problems faced by the Tutsi 
elite class were: (l) the authorisation of decisions, following Belgian with­
drawal, of approval, and the Hutu intelligentsiafs challenge (see section 
3(d) ); (2 ) the lack of a clear decision-making structure at the highest
level.
The latter problem seriously affected the chances of success in 
the sphere of ideology, into which the Tutsi elite class put its main 
organizational efforts. Unlike the situation in Buganda, the mwami's 
closest supporters and 'friends* had only informal power as his courtiers.
The Supreme Council was firmly monarchist but represented the views of 
the Tutsi elite class as against the merely sectional views of the monarchy 
(see Lemarchand, 1970* PP*153-4)« Its members were much better educated 
than the mwami's courtiers, possessing the administrative skills required 
for governing a modern state. Their own sectional interests lay in 
movement away from the patron-client system of advancement dominated by 
the mwami and requiring traditional political skills to secure favour, 
towards a more bureaucratic system (see statement by Tutsi 'evolues', 
quoted ibid, p.41n.). At the same time they wished to exclude Hutu who 
possessed the same level of qualifications but whose potential mass support 
in elections was far greater and could well lead to their own 'ethnic* 
monopoly. The division within the Tutsi elite class between bureaucrats 
(,'progressives,', often from the Astrida school - "Astridiens")and courtiers 
( 'conservatives') was longstanding, though the former had won formal power 
from the latter as Belgian proteges in 1931 when Musinga, who conducted 
government by the traditional methods of courtly intrigue, was dismissed 
(chapter 6). Musinga's successor, Rudahigwa (Charles III Mutara) was a 
minor and for two decades unable to take an independent position from the 
Belgians and Tutsi political officials. But the latter*s own revival 
of neotraditional symbolism and elevation of the monarchy as a unifying 
symbol in the 1950s enabled Mutara to recover some of his power informally, 
and gave his ultra-conservative courtiers the opportunity to reject even 
ideological concessions to the Hutu. In Buganda these problems did not 
arise because the 'bureaucrats' won a definitive victory in 1900 and 
the 'King's Ttiends* of the 1950s not represent a structurally- 
differentiated sector from that of the "commoner chief" administrators.
Mutara seems to have attempted to play off his courtiers against the 
Supreme Council during the 1950s, in order to improve his own position in 
decision-making. However, he did not regain control, and the only result 
was a lack of agreement on elite class strategy against Belgian and Hutu 
pressure for political, economic and social reform, j This reached its height
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in 1958-99 when courtiers and bureaucrats adopted different ideo­
logical positions and a few of tlie latter, led by an 'Astridien'r 
Chief Bwahtakweli, formed the Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais 
(RADER). RADER accepted most of the demands; of the "Manifesto 
des Bahutu" and saw the solution to the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in 
nationalisation of the ibikingi ("Manifeste de RADER'/ R,P,p.126). 
We should note that the courtiers formed a pressure group of the 
great Tutsi landowners against any land reform, and this was a 
material reason for their ideological opposition to concessions 
(d'Hertefelt,1964), RADER attracted very little Tutsi support, 
and Hutu mistrusted its Tutsi leadership (Lemarchand,1970,p.16o)* 
Mutara forbade the forming of any monarchist political party, 
which might have secured a clear decision-making structure at his 
expense. In this period (1957-9)» Tutsi reaction to attacks from 
the Hutu intelligentsia in the press,, and to apparent Belgian 
approval of such attacks,, was formed and led by the most conser­
vative group at Mutara1s court, while the 'progressives' were 
inactive (section 3(di)* But Mutara's sudden death in July 1959 
provided an opportunity for the 'progressives', led by 3 chiefs - 
M.Kayihura, P .Mungalurire, and C .Rwangombwa- -, to recover the 
leadership of the Tutsi elite class by installing a 'puppet' as 
mwami and creating a political party to demand immediate indep­
endence. This party, UNAR, gave them control of decision-making. 
It enabled them to take a clear ideological line, putting the 
Rwandan nation before caste divisions and conceding 'natural' 
equality between the castes; and it enabled them to act decisive­
ly against the Hutu intelligentsia. However, the solution of 
this problem while others remained unresolved may have helped to 
provoke the 1959 risings, as I argued in section two.
(d) The Problem of Authority,
After his exile, the kabaka was increasingly the source of 
authority in Buganda. The most effective institutions available 
for its exercise were those of the Buganda Government: ministers,, 
Lukiiko and chiefly hierarchy. During the colonial period, these 
carried traditional titles,, though their functions had changed, 
and claimed to be the'neotraditional' heirs of precolonial chiefs. 
It was through these institutions that the British attempted to 
exercise authority. But their new functions undermined their 
legitimacy. The problem was most serious at muluka level (see 
above). The Bataka Party had sho\m that it was possible for 
specific grievances against lower chiefs, and vaguer ones against
higher chiefs to he organized in a political movement in the name of a 
different pattern of neotraditionalism. This culminated in 1949 i*1 
the demand for elected chiefs, which threatened the political monopoly 
of the elite class and the means of its corporate activity. Moreover, it 
undermined the ideology of the kabaka's supremacy and might have marked 
the end of popular hopes in him (Apter, p.279)*
The Kabaka Crisis provided the opportunity for a 'rite’de passage1 
for all these institutions, analogous to that of the Chief of the Hausa 
and the great landlords in Sabo, Ibadan, who, in Cohen's analysis (1969, 
pp.l70--17l) passed from "Witch to Bajji" (i.e. became virtuous in their 
subjects1 eyes) by going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Although the change was 
personified in Buganda by the kabaka, and it was his new authority which was 
given to the other institutions, the latter also went through a ritual of 
re-evaluation in the people's eyes. Initially, they changed personnel 
as the kabaka changed persona, and the 'King's Friends* came to power.
Prior to the kabaka's return, the chiefly hierarchy was supervised 
according to the tradition of authoritarian, efficient, 'progressive' 
katikkiros like Kagwa and Nsibirwa, who sought legitimacy as much in 
pursuing British criteria of 'progress* as in the neotraditional symbolism 
of their office. Under the two most recent katikkiros, Kawalya-Kagwa (1945- 
5l) and Kavuma (1951-55) 't^ie bureaucracy had been tightened by a remarkably 
strict system of supervision and inspection by officials of both the Buganda 
and Protectorate Governments working together (Richards, 1964* p.368).
Until 1953, the kabaka had been dominated by the British and not posed the
question of the source of authority in Buganda. During the kabaka's
exile, Kavuma and his followers continued to meet the demands of the
Protectorate Government, albeit reluctantly, as in welcoming the Queen in
1954 despite the Lukiiko's refusal. So the way was open for a 
'shadow government* of 'King's Friends* to organize itself informally 
around the symbol of the kabaka as the sole source of authority.
The 'King's Friends' did not come together as an apparently'anti­
progressive* group, including
"Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, as well as chiefs,
radical followers of the Bataka Union, and a number of
...younger, educated men" (Low, 1962, p.24)
simply because they were more "atavistic" than most, as Low suggests.
While other elite factions sought authority mainly by production of specific 
programs, they sought it through monopolizing the king's friendship and 
elevating him as the sole source of authority. They succeeded because the 
kabaka became the dominant symbol fora 'political religion* (cf. Davies,
I97O, p.59) in which people with disparate intentions could unite politically.
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The programs of the new political parties had no such symbolic power, and 
did not acquire any from association with groups of western-educated elite 
politicians. Even 'Independence Wow* had little symbolic potency (Low,
1962', pp.40-4 3 ), partly because it was known to be coming, and partly 
because in Uganda its ambiguities were consciously recognised and not 
contained within the symbol. When the parties tried to attach themselves 
to the kabala symbol they were at a disadvantage to those who had no other 
commitments — his 'friends*. On the kabaka's return, his clear domination 
of the Buganda Government, the purge of disloyal1 officials and replacement 
with 'friends* made way for a reversal of its previous unpopularity and its 
use in the exercise of the kabaka's authority in Buganda.
I am concerned here with the authority of the higher chiefs and their 
change of role. Their main function was now the informal s'party* organi­
zation of the kingdom; under the katikkiro M. Kintu they no longer sought 
legitimacy in terms of the formal bureaucratic efficiency demanded by the 
Protectorate Government. The previous system of intensive inspection 
and chiefly co-operation with British officials came to an abrupt end. 
Richards misleadingly analyzes the change in administrative practices in 
terms of lack of training in British notions of efficiency, and ,'reversion* 
to traditional customs. I suggest that in terms of 'party* efficiency, 
the following instances of 'inefficiency' given by Richards (1964, pp.368-9) 
were quite appropriate:
"after the return of the Kabaka a number of county chieftainships 
have been filled by political appointees..Some seem to have 
reverted to the traditional custom of, sitting in their homes, 
waiting to be visited rather than going on tours of inspection.
They are also said to spend much time in their town houses,
engaged in political discussions, Lukiiko meetings or the search for 
high office..In these circumstances it is not surprising that 
the standard of county, subcounty and parish administration is 
generally agreed to have fallen rapidly.. In the meantime 
government has, rather naturally, become more centralized, 
along traditional lines, rather than less."
It was essential that the chief's role-conflict should be resolved if they
were to be used in 'party* (rather than "natural") centralization. The
only challenges to the authority of the kabaka's political officials came
from outside Buganda and, very briefly, in the UNM boycott. The KY,
Buganda*s mass party, upheld neotraditional authority organized in this way.
As in Buganda, during most of the colonial period the authority of
Tutsi political officials was guaranteed in Rwanda by the Administration,
which possessed overwhelming military superiority. They also derived
authority from fulfilling traditional roles of patronage at the local level.
It was the political organization of the Tutsi caste, making both necessary
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and. legitimate the role of patron with extensive powers over the persons and 
property of clients, which made their use for cheap administration attractive 
to the colonial powers. When the Belgians rapidly withdrew authority from 
the Tutsi as a caste,the latter were still alole to derive the neotraditional 
authority of patronage from their superior political organization. However, 
their use of this superiority to eliminate new rivals for authority, the Hutu 
intelligentsia, was prevented by the continuing overrule of the Belgians.
The Hutu intelligentsia were demanding a new basis for authority 
in direct elections. Since the Hutu could not be intimidated, such 
elections would enable the intelligentsia to penetrate the "encapsulated1'
(Bailey, 1969 ) hill level with their caste-based party. Tutsi authority, 
resting on their capacity to act as patrons on the isolated hills, would 
be destroyed. The adopted solution was to deny authority to the Belgians, 
and thereby their right to switch proteges. The Tutsi political leaders 
claimed that elections were unnecessary - indeed, a colonialist plot to 
delay Independence and divide Rwanda - since the,1traditional* governing in­
stitutions already represented and embodied the authority of the people.
In particular, they claimed that the rawami was the sole source of authority 
in Rwanda, and it was only colonialism which had perverted this uniquely 
Rwandan mode of democracy (see section 3(©) ). Thus the Tutsi claimed 
the authority of an ideal past supposedly embodied in customary modes of 
ruling as against the "foreign" and "abstract" authority derived from 
elections.
Like the Baganda elite class, that in Rwanda sought a. re-evaluation 
of its political institutions by an ideological re-systematization of 
traditional symbolic forms. The monarchy and Tutsi chiefs were to receive 
popular authority as the quintessential defenders of Banyarwanda custom 
and identity. In Buganda these processes were made possible by changes in 
the role-behaviour of political officials after a rite de passage and the 
sacrifice of persons who had made the roles unpopular by interpreting them 
i*wrongly*, i.e. ’bad chiefs*. Thus ^progressive * chiefs were replaced by 
•conservative populist* chiefs (Apter, p.214-). Rut in Rwanda the •conserva­
tive* chiefs were not ,*populists*, and insisted far more than the *progressives* 
on Tutsi distinctiveness and Hutu subordination. Although the Tutsi elite 
class attempted a rite de passage in UNAR, as defenders of the monarchy and 
all Banyarwanda against Belgian colonialism, this remained merely a change 
in ideology. Role-behaviour at hill level could not be altered (even if
poor Tutsi, who were afraid of losing status, had allowed it) without 
endangering the hill chief*s controlcf Hutu mobilization. At the national 
level, the use of neotraditional symbolism merely re-emphasized the instruments 
of Tutsi domination - the army chiefs,-, the education of noble Tutsi at
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court, and above all, the royal symbolism. As Gitera pointed out in 
APROSOMA propaganda, the royal drum (Kalinga),which was said to be the 
main symbol of the unity of Rwanda,was decorated with the genitals of 
conquered Hutu petty kings (d ‘Hertefelt, 1964). Moreover, there was no 
purge of ‘bad* Tutsi chiefs, which might have restored legitimacy to the 
neotraditional political system. The failure of straightforward appeal 
to traditional sources of authority in Rwanda, even when they were 
ideologically reinterpreted, shows that this factor cannot operate independ­
ently of the contemporary situation. In Buganda, out-of-office elite 
factions adopted popular interpretations, of traditional custom, and enabled 
grievances to be expressed in terms of change of personnel - a "rebellion" 
in Gluckman*s terms. In Rwanda, all Tutsi showed great cohesiveness 
against Hutu - Chief Stoanakweli being distrusted by Hutu for that very 
reason - and not one poor Tutsi leader emerged. Popular ideas of the 
(*good patron1 included the requirement of Tutsi caste membership only so 
long as Tutsi controlled supra-local contacts. When this monopoly was 
ended it was possible for a change of personnel, to achieve ‘good patrons\ 
to be projected to bring in Hutu; then "rebellion" became "revolution".
Nevertheless, there was an attempt by the Tutsi elite class to solve 
the problem of authority by denying it to the Belgians and mobilizing 
traditional sources of legitimacy in the monarchy. In July 1959 Mutara 
died suddenly in circumstances which were easily represented as assassination 
by the Belgians, supposedly in a plot with Hutu leaders. ‘Progressive1 
chiefs, led by Kayihura, Mungalurire, and Rwangombwa, took the opportunity to 
install a ‘puppet* ruler, thereby commanding authority over the .‘conservatives**. 
Clear opposition to the Belgians on the issue of sovereignty gave much more 
credibility to their claim to the authority due to leaders of a nationalist, 
democratic movement. This claim was recognised, even after the Hutu revolution 
began, by some anti—colonialist countries, particularly in the UN, but had 
little meaning for Hutu whose local political organization remained under 
the control of the Tutsi hill chief until November 1959*
Mutara‘s funeral was the occasion for a Tutsi coup d*etat to preempt 
Belgian authority. Without consulting the Administration, the abiru 
announced in traditional fashion that Mutara‘s successor would be another 
of Musinga‘s sons, 21-year old Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, with the dynastic 
name Kigeri V. This had clearly been agreed by the chiefs, and stage- 
management of the funeral included a speech by Kayihura explaining the 
customary duty of the abiru, followed by a dramatic .‘spontaneous* demand 
from a Hutu in the crowi£ for the name of Mutara‘s successor. The Belgians
ratified, the fait accompli and thereby seemed to have been defeated by the 
Tutsi monarchists. Within three weeks UNAR was founded under the nominal 
leadership of the Hutu who participated in the coup, P. Rukeba, but was 
in fact directed by the three Tutsi chiefs mentioned above (Lemarchand, 1970, 
p.159). As I showed above, UNAR had available the political institutions 
of the kingdom. A period of intense organizational activity followed 
the founding of UNAR, which began to act in defiance of the Administration 
as if authority had finally been won by the installation of Kigeri V.
The Administration tried to recapture the initiative gained by UNAR, which 
was developing rapidly into a millenarian sense of invincibility (ibid, 
p.l6l), by disciplining its leaders under a back-dated law for attendance 
at the Kigali mass rally. The UN visiting Mission saw this as a "decisive 
turning-point" (quoted ibid, p.l6 2), which only increased the sense of 
urgency among UNAR supporters. Both UNAR and PARMEHUTU represented the 
other as insidiously taking over the state authority and stressed the 
need for urgent counteraction. For UNAR to claim democratic authority 
against the Belgian Administration it was necessary to remove the Hutu 
party leaders. The party leaders now thought they had the authority to 
do this without Belgian interference. I suggest that the November 
risings of Hutu were provoked by an apparent Tutsi offensive,and show 
that the Tutsi elite class had not solved the problem of authority at the 
local level by mobilizing neotraditional ties.
(e) The Problem of Ideology
The ideological process which legitimated the Buganda Government, and 
the kabaka in particular, may be summarised as a re-interpretation of 
the ‘Bataka* ideology and its systematization with the "dominant symbol" 
of the kabaka (see above; and Turner, 1964). He was seen as the 
guarantor of the cosmic rectitude of hierarchical order and of all Baganda. 
This found expression in their politico-military supremacy I which in the 
1950s had the proportions of a myth and also seemed immediately true from 
the kabakajs ‘victory* over the British in 1955 (.Richards, 1964? P»324) - 
under his autocratic leadership. Prom the kabaka*s deportation onwards it 
was claimed that Buganda*s supremacy was under attack by foreigners, and 
his politico-military leadership was necessary.
The symbolism expressing these ideas was neotraditional, employing 
forms current in the 'precolonial period and recalling the kabaka*s 
authority then. Two main themes were apparent in the 1950s, both ex­
pressing the unity of the kingdom in dependence on the kabaka. Firstly, 
he possessed the legitimate use of terror: he could .‘forge* the kingdom 
as the blacksmith*s fire forges iron; at his accession ritual he ritually
conquered Buganda in a board game against his chiefs. He was also 
'namunswa*, the queen termite that feeds on her subjects (Fallers, 1964, 
p.68). This symbol was used in the campaign against the BP, and a 
contrast made with the illegitimate use of force - BP members were referred 
to as .'nnabbe.' the red ant which destroys termites (Welbourn, 1965 p.25).
In particular, it was recalled that the life of a subject was at the 
military disposal of the kabaka, and that after battle cowards had been 
humiliated and killed. Secondly, Richards noted at the time of the Kabaka 
Crisis an apparently contrasting theme which emphasized his harmlessness, 
innocence and embodiment of pleasurable aspects offemily relationships. 
Whether or not this was traditional, as Richards says, its attachment to 
the dominant symbol of the kabaka accords well with Turner 's theory (1964) 
that such symbols unify disparate meanings and, in particular, that their 
"ideological referents" harshly demanding the sacrifice of sectional 
interests to the good of the group are made acceptable by the infusion of 
emotion from "sensory referents" like gentleness and pleasurable family 
relationships. Both these themes were united in the kabaka alone - for 
instance, he was unique in not observing a clan totem (i.e. he was not 
ideologically a rival), yet he was head of all the clans (ssaabataka).
The other dominant symbol of the colonial period was the butaka, 
the estate on which the ancestors are buried. Indeed, Welbourn argues 
that the clans retained much power in the 1950s because of their control 
of inheritance (1961, p.2 9); but Southwold (1956) points out that while 
this was formally true, wills and the kabaka's order of 1926 had made the 
bataka little more than administrators of clear inheritance rules. Much 
more important was the ideological function of clanship in establishing 
relationship with the kabaka, particularly since 1953. Thus the bataka 
outlawed persons joining political parties (see above) against the kabaka's 
wishes, and they organized annual rituals celebrating his return. I 
have already dealt with the arguement of Fallers and others that the 
butakaTs use as a symbol by opposition movements in the colonial period 
were part of a traditional conflict between bataka and the kabaka.(chapter 
6). In fact, Fallers is much more accurate when he analyzes the butaka 
as a symbol of a popular "birthright" in the land of Buganda (l964» p.152). 
The common element in the Bataka movements was a response to some threat 
to this birthright - from Baganda landlords and educated elite, alien 
immigrants, the Protectorate Government, or potentially from white settlers 
an African government. The birthright might be extended from land to 
other.business — rural traders, fighting Asian competition were an important 
element in later Bataka and Kabaka movements. The butaka symbolized the
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absence of an institutionalized hierarchy of groups, and the popular 
element in the Bataka movements was essentially a defensive, *commun>al* 
response from the bakopi when they perceived the existence of such priviliged 
groups (Low, 1962, p.1?)* But they did not. oppose unequal dyadic relations, 
and they looked back ideologically to the ’Golden Age’of traditional Buganda, 
with ’good’ chiefs and kabakas.
Hie Kabaka Crisis enabled these two dements to be systematized. The 
kabaka became the dominant symbol as the expression of the unity cf Baganda, 
in defence of the birthright and in opposition to privileged groups,
After his ’rite de passage * of exile and return as leader, he was the personal 
guarantee of the legitimacy of his government of ’king's men', because as 
the focus and source of authority he was guarantor that power relations 
were ’traditionally’ dyadic. The privileged groups were foreigners. And 
in the words of one Muganda peasant to Richards in 1955 (1964* P*332): 
"Everything is back as it should be.,The Kabaka is giving out government as 
he used to do". Neotraditional forms were not used because of ’atavism*, 
in a haphazard meaningless fashion; they were directed to specific and 
systematic meanings, relevant to contemporary grievances and divisions.
Ideology was the field in which the Tutsi elite class made its major 
effort to organize the Banyarwanda as a political group. Since the other 
organization problems were to be solved by reliance on existing neotraditional 
institutions, which embodied great inequalities of power between the castes, 
much depended on the development of a successful justification for those 
inequalities, for they were being challenged by the Hutu intelligentsia.
The purpose of new ideology was to minimize caste distinctions and unite 
all Banyarwanda under monarchical institutions which would preserve Tutsi 
caste privileges de facto, at least until the mwami became the sovereign 
power in Rwanda.
The ideology of Tutsi ’natural superiority’ had been (taken up by 
the colonial administrates in the first half of the colonial period to 
justify their support for continued Tutsi domination (see Official Report 
1938, chapter 6 ). Yet by 1945 Tutsi intellectuals, composed mainly of 
clergy led by Abbe Kagame, were giving serious attention to the implications 
of ’progress’ for the power structure and developing ancideology of 
’cultural nationalism* which was intended to constrain all modernization 
within the neotraditional institutions under which all Banyarwanda were 
said to have enjoyed a precolonial ’Golden Age*. Kagame complained 
that:
"Certain egalitarian tendencies are advocated in front of 
those elements who are sometimes referred to as ’childlike 
grownups’, without proper intellectual formation..The 
conclusion the masses are likely to draw from all this is
that progress, freedom, in short everything, implies contempt 
for the traditional authorities..The path of progress cannot 
stray from our traditional heritage.”(quoted by Lemarchand, 1970?
P. 137)
Hie ideology stressed ’traditional institutions’ rather than ’natural 
superiority* directly, in part reflecting the growth of a Tutsi elite 
class, some of whom saw their own superiority demonstrated in educational 
qualifications and new life-styles which differentiated them from poor 
Tutsi. Cultural nationalism developed strongly among Tutsi in the 1950s 
as an ideology which identified the glories of the past, and the existence 
of Rwanda itself, as wholly Tutsi achievements (d'Hertefelt, 1964). There 
was no sign that Hutu.shared in this cultural nationalism.
Tutsi depended for Hutu acceptance of their dominance in the mid- 
1950s rather more on traditional cosmology (Lemarchand, 1970, p.l59n)» 
in which the dominant symbol was the mwami. First, rule by the mwami and 
the Tutsi was divinely ordained, and Imaana would punish rebels - less 
abstractly, anyone declared to be an enemy by the mwami was thereby cut 
off from the flow of the life-force and could be killed, legitimately. 
Second, the mwami stood outside the caste categories and could act as a 
cohesive force by avoiding the stigma of special interest; this belief 
was potent enough for AFROSOMA to base its own ideology on appeal to the 
mwami against ’bad* Tutsi.
The switch in Belgian policy, and the challenge to cultural nationalism 
in the 'Manifeste des Bahutu*, presented certain ideological problems.
The Supreme Council dealt with those raised by the manifesto, building on 
existing ideas, and still aiming at an audience of Tutsi, Belgians and 
the UN rather than the Hutu peasantry (R.P. p.37)* 1b.e ’divine harmony’ 
of the traditional political structure was stressed, with emphasis on the 
counterbalancing forces ideally operating in favour of Hutu, revealing the 
essential unity of the Rwandan nation. It was claimed that in recruitment 
to political office all Banyarwanda were equal, as could be seen from 
common clan membership, and the actual distribution of offices simply 
reflected differing abilities (d'Hertefelt, 1960b). The Supreme Council 
further argued that the ’racial’ categories were too mixed to have any use 
in definition, and there was no point in retaining them. They were 
abolished from official documents in 1958. Such social inequalities as 
clearly did exist were said to be the result of Belgian interference 
in ’divine harmony’, and they were being exaggerated by a few unrepresent­
ative Hutu politicians motivated by personal ambition. These arguments 
were set out systematically in J. Mulenzi's "Etudes sur Quelques Problems 
du Rwanda", which became, according to d’Hertef elt (1964), the ’Bible’ of
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Tutsi officials. This modernized version of the 'natural superiority'
theme was the ideology of the 'progressives* of the elite class who,
moreover, saw the need for its dissemination and indoctrination among Hutu.
Mutara would not allow the 'progressives* "to form a party organization
which might achieve these ends. This also meant they could not discipline
the mwami*s courtiers who, being also the great landowners of Rwanda (1960b
p.229), refused to make ideological concessions which harmed their sectional
interests in preventing land reform. In 1958? at the same time that
the Supreme, council was declaring the irrelevance of the caste categories,
a group of courtiers calling themselves the mwami's direct clients, the
bagaragu b'ibwami bakuru, issued a very well-publicised statement condemning
any land reform and stating that 'racial* differences between Hutu and Tutsi
were absolute, entailing the former's permanent inferiority. They
recounted the myths of origin demonstrating the distinctive descent of Tutsi
from their ancestor, Kigwa, who brought civilisation to Rwanda, making the
Hutu his servants, and declared:
"Ceux qui reclament le partage du patrimoine commun sont 
ceux qui ont entre eux des liens de fraternite. Or, les 
relations entre nous (Tutsi) et aux (Hutu) ont ete de tout 
temps jusqu'a present basees sur le servage; il n'y a 
done entre feux et nous aucun fondement de fraternite-”..Les 
Bahutu pretendent que Kanyarwanda ,est pere de Batutsi, Bahutu 
et Batwa; or, nous savons que Kigwa est de loin anterieur a 
Kanyarwanda et trois races Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa qu'il 
a trouvees bien cons t itu£esu ( Let ter,1, p. 35 R.P.)*
For good measure they referred to Kagame's "Ingaji Kaliinga" for evidence
that "nos rois ont tues des Bahinza et ont ainsi conquis les pays des
Bahutu" (ibid,). This ideological position tended to undermine the claim
of 'progressives* that no problem of caste domination existed - as can
be seen in the criticism of "Batutsi manifestoes", as well as Hutu ones,
by the 'progressive* Tutsi Bishop of Nyundo-Kisenyi, Mgr. Bigirumwami
(R.P.p.40).
The final element in Tutsi ideology, and the formation of UNAR to
promote it, came in 1959? when Mutara's sudden death gave the 'progressives*
the chance to recover the initiative by linking defence of the monarchy and
other neotraditional institutions with the new ' and democratic symbolism of
anticolonialism. At the Kigali meeting, Rukeba summarised this position:
"The whole of Africa is struggling against colonialism,
the same colonialism which has exploited our country and destroyed
our ancestral customs..in order to impose alien ones upon us.
The goal of our party is to restore these customs, to shake off 
the yoke cf Belgian colonialism, to reconquer Rwanda's inde­
pendence. To remake our country we need a single party, like 
UNAR, based upon tradition and no other ideology. He who 
does not belong to this party will be regarded as the people's 
enemy, the Mwami's enemy, Rwanda's enemy" (quoted Lemarchand, 1970,p.l59).
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Under its ’progressive leadership, UNAR dropped the assertion of Tutsi 
supremacy, proclaiming "Children of Rwanda..There are no Tutsi, Hutu,
Twa. He are all brothers. fife are all descendants of Kanyarwanda".
(UNAR circular 16.9.1959, Hooted ibid, p.l6l). PARMEHUTU was denounced as 
the tool of the Belgian Administration and European clergy. The failure
idfcoio&y
of this*lay chiefly in the fields of communication and discipline, but it 
should be noted that, unlike the kabaka symbol in Buganda, the mwami symbolised 
the existence of a privileged group. The symbolism and mythology of 
Rwandan unity were, in fact, the royal symbolism and Tutsi mythology which 
justified those privileges. Many Hutu were made aware of this in Gitera’s 
long campaign against the chief royal symbol, the drum Kaliinga.
(f) The Problem of Discipline
The Buganda Government had formal disciplinary machinery, but it could 
not easily use this for ’party’ purposes; though it did try occasionally, 
as in the exclusion of Mulira and other opponents from the Lukiiko in 1958. 
Party discipline therefore required informal organization, achieved by much 
intensified ritual allegiance to the kabaka, i.e. through re-emphasis and 
revival of neotraditional forms of discipline.
In the precolonial period the kabaka's chiefs were in almost permanent 
attendance on him. Every day the kabaka received his courtiers in order 
of precedence and heard them formally acknowledge his supremacy. He 
altered the rank order at will. Men saluted him with their faces to the 
ground, and knelt while they spoke to him. Audience was a great honour 
and granted, even to those of highest rank, only after acceptance of a 
request forwarded by the katikkiro or a personal favourite. After the 
kabaka’s exile the use of such forms was given much greater prominence 
than during most of the colonial period. For example, the form of saluting 
remained, and the picture of a European KY member and Minister prostrating 
himself before the kabaka was much publicised, since it clearly showed 
Baganda supremacy (see section 3(e) ); ritual homage was paid to the kabaka 
by modern bureaucratic officials as well as ’traditional’ officials; the 
kabaka’s supremacy was represented by a throne in each minister’s office. 
(Richards, 1964, p.36l). Submission to the will of the kabaka remained an 
axiom of Baganda ritual behaviour, and was not simply a psychological 
matter; one minister, and secretary-general of the KY,was A. Mayanja, who 
explicitly justified his acceptance of the posts and of x'Kabaka-worship ’ 
to his radical nationalist ex-colleagues in terms of the "need to play 
the traditionalist game" (quoted by Welbourn, 1985? p.2l).
More widely, the removal of the kabaka in 1953* still formally the 
symbol cf Baganda nationality and capacity to rule themselves, precipitated
an intensification of ritual behaviour through which Baganda could recover 
their security of personal identity, which had always been closely bound 
up with political ideology (cf. Richards, 1964, chapter 6 & pp.322-33, 
on ’traditional1 family attitudes and reactions to the news of the kabaka’s 
deportation), by restoring the kabaka’s authority. Tribute was collected 
through neotraditional forms of voluntary labour at his palace and in 
construction work, not only by peasants but also by industrial and white- 
collar workers, and through', gifts. These activities became highly 
organized on a national scale, with competition between groups and individu­
als in the demonstration of loyalty (ibid, pp.329-331). They provided 
the opportunity for informal political mobilization, and organizations of 
different kinds built up support by participating in them (chapter 6).
This itself gave a momentum to the indoctrination process from which 
such groups could not later escape. There was a revival of clan 
activities, not to decentralize power but around the idea, of the kabaka 
as ssaabataka. Money and support for the kabaka were raised during his 
exile by clans and lineages. There was a new interest in clan history 
and other symbols of membership. It became dangerous for political officials 
to show any collaboration with the Protectorate Government, and the 
ideology of military service to the kabaka was recalled to discipline any 
Baganda who wavered - the Baganda were presented, through the newspapers 
and the mobilization groups, with the picture of themselves fighting the 
Protectorate Government in the service of the kabaka (Richards, 1964* P*329 
ff.). Opposition to the chiefs (see chapter 6) could here assume a 
specific form, and after the kabaka’s triumphant return 43 chiefs were 
treated in a neotraditional manner as cowards; they were humiliated and 
driven out of office. Conversely, those political officials who had 
defied the Protectorate Government in even minor ways were hailed as 
heroes (bazira). As I have explained, there was a rite de passage 
of the Buganda Government. The symbolic system developed during the 
Kabaka Crisis, and seen in the often-described triumphal celebrations of 
the kabaka's return (ibid.), did not fade in the following period.
Victory (buyinza) had been gained, with Buganda united and placed on the 
top rank again,through the kabaka pattern of neotraditionalism; 
it continued in intensity so long as .’Buganda’ could be made to appear 
threatened. Ko political party could break through the discipline of 
allegiance to the kabaka, and the only successful parties were those which 
embraced it, the URM and KY. As I showed above, the transition from 
URM to KY was made, and the position of the elite class secured, because 
the symbolism available to those who might have effected a radical organi-
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zation in Buganda (the later UUM boycott leaders) disciplined them and 
their supporters, and led them hack to loyalty to the kabaka. There 
could he no revival of the Bataka pattern, because this had been incorporated 
in the system of kabaka-dominated symbolism. After Independence, the 
Buganda Government had much freer use of its formal disciplinary machinery.
Denied the free use of formal governmental institutions by Belgian 
policy changes, the Tutsi elite class (like that in Buganda) relied on 
the informal discipline of neotraditional ties and cultural forms of 
behaviour. In the absence of organized opposition, such reliance was 
shown to be well-placed by the indirect elections of 1956. Problems of 
discipline raised by the efforts of the Hutu intelligentsia to organize 
political parties were dealt with by initially successful measures ensuring 
the continued isolation of the hill unit. Insofar as MSI or JLFROSOMA 
propaganda reached the local level, it could not be followed up by party 
organization and lost much of its effect.
However, until the formation of UHAR, no efforts were made to in­
doctrinate the new ideology of Rwandan nationality except among Tutsi (in 
the movement of ’cultural nationalism1 which included revival of the army 
chiefs and courtly education). The Hutu peasantry were called on to 
reject the traitorous Hutu intelligentsia, and their religious dependencei 
on the mwami was invoked. But there was no intensification of ritual to 
indoctrinate either the new ideology of nationalism or the old ideology 
of the mwami’s religio-political power. Even UNAR’s efforts to do both 
were made only at the national level, through the political meeting and 
pamphlets - to a necessarily restricted audience. There is a clear
contrast with Buganda, where the intensification of ritual focused on the
kabaka indoctrinated the new ideology effectively. Such a solution was
not possible in Rwanda, where continuance of Tutsi domination in the multi­
plex relations of the castes at the local level ensured that the same 
meanings continued to be expressed in the ritual of social relations. It 
seems that at this time the poor Tutsi were particularly emphasizing their 
higher status in interaction with Hutu as economic and social changes had 
placed it in danger,(I chapter l). In these circumstances, Tutsi relied 
excessively on Hutu loyalty to the mwami and credulity over the new ideology. 
It is likely that their own ideology of cultural nationalism, which modernised 
their claim to ’natural superiority*, led them to expect Hutu acquiesence in 
their demands for Independence under the monarchy. Thus the Tutsi elite
class hardly attempted to deal with the problem of indoctrination and 
discipline, apparently believing it already solved. Even when a monarchis-fc
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political party, UNJiR, was formed it attempted to use neotraditional 
institutions of Tutsi domination to maintain discipline rather than 
creating new local party organisations involving sympathetic Hutu, or 
at least exploiting local Hutu rivalries. The failure of adopted forms 
of discipline has already been analysed as a result of structural different­
iation allowing some Hutu to fall outside them, and project their own 
organization (see section l).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I wish to set the study of Rwanda and Buganda in a more 
broadly comparative framework, considering the implications of the typology 
of interaction between systems of social stratification and political systems 
advanced by Fablers (1967). This will show the wider significance of the 
two variables which I have found crucial in analyzing the cases of Rwanda and 
Buganda.
One variable concerns the symbolic and structural processes affecting
the nature of perception of inequality, i.e. affecting what Fallers calls
"the secondary cultures of stratification" (ibid, p.l45)« These processes
are revealed most clearly when forms of stratification are changing rapidly
as new sources of mobility become available. Structural differentiation
has been a major, but not the only, process which provides such a dynamic.
Even in this case
"the important issue for the relationship between mobility 
and political change is the way that differentiation, forms 
of economic change and historical-^cultural features generate 
perceptions of social structure among the groups affected 
by differentiation....The way in which..incongruities in 
role structuring are perceived (and the argument is that 
the perception is normally derived from the symbolic orders) 
will affect the impact of mobility on political institutions"
(Davies, 1970? pp.107,109).
Structural processes are as important as symbolic processes in determining 
the nature of perception of stratification, for new lines of conflict between, 
for example, economic classes, leads to reinterpretations of old symbols 
or the creationcf new ones.
The other variable concerns the symbolic and structural processes 
affecting the capacity of potentially or actually mobile categories to orga­
nize, formally or informally, as political groups to pursue their common
interests once these are perceived in some way.
These two variables are closely related in most cases, for not only
does unequal distribution of power make it difficult for lower strata
to organize, but also power structures tend to be supported by legitimating
symbolism and ideologies which obscure perception of their 
c ommon int ©rests.
In his discussion of 1 Social. Stratification and Economic 
Processes in Africa" (19^7) Pallers comes to the important 
conclusion that*. in reference to the precolonial period,
TIIt is perhaps not going too far to assert that the emphasis 
in African systems of stratification is primarily political 
, ,.One aspect..,is a tendency for economic structures and 
processes to be overshadowed by - or,, perhaps better,; 
contained within - political structures and processes(pj^),
I have shown that this was broadly true in Rwanda and Buganda, 
Fallers then points out that colonization by states whose own 
economic systems were capitalistic meant "an ever-increasing 
commercialization, of land and labour" and the differentiation of 
of an economic order of institutions from the political. However, 
Fallers does not see that a corollary of the latter process must 
be economic class stratification, for his conception, of strati­
fication is unidimensional. Thus he considers that the encapsu­
lation of economic structures and processes by the political is 
likely to continue in Africa,, principally because the commercial­
ization takes place not tlirough laisser faire capitalism but 
under a considerable degree of state control. Together with such 
factors as continuing kinship links between ’elite’ and ’masses’, 
this means that ’classlessness5’ will be a feature of ’modern’ as 
well as ’traditional’ African stratification systems (ibid,p.149)- 
¥e might note that recent studies indicate that such kinship links 
are often abandoned if an elite, local or national, finds that 
their advantages are outweighed by their disadvantages (see Lloyd, 
1966; Long,1968), However, Fallers considers that structural 
differentiation will take place without creating economic classes 
(p.1^9)* As we have seen, his studies of Buganda are intended 
to demonstrate this thesis.
However, there are no a priori or empirical grounds for 
suggesting that political stratification precludes economic 
stratification,,if it can be shown that there is a differentiated 
economic order. This was the case in colonial Rwanda and Buganda, 
in differing degrees. I have already shorn that Fallers defines 
class by evaluative, cultural criteria rather than market situa­
tion, and so his ’classes’ are in fact occupational status groups 
and categories. This means that when he finds only status 
categories in Buganda, with no marked ritual or ideological 
boundaries, he can claim that there are no classes - though much 
differentiation of power,; wealth and prestige. However,, economic 
classes are defined (cf.¥eber; see Introduction) not by evaluation
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of persons and roles according to the wealth they possess,but by the relative 
advantages wealth (and different types of wealth) bring in the market situation; 
i.e. while Fallers is right in saying "In its essential character, social 
stratification is not an economic phenomenon at all" (p.!4l),it should be 
seen that power relations between persons engaged in processes of production 
and exchange do not depend simply on their cultural evaluations of each others* 
roles. For example, even if a tenant or debtor has higher prestige than his 
landlord or creditor, the latter have economic if not status power over the 
former. Fallers,* formulation would obscure study of the political consequences 
of such role incongruities. Alternatively, in cases where roles are almost 
ideally congruent this cannot be explained simply by the power of ideology 
(as on pp.l44-5)» for "the continuous processes of economic and political 
change foster areas of incongruity both between roles and between power 
structures and ideology. Thus we have to explain, particularly in periods 
of rapid change, continuity of forms of political stratification and ideology 
even if there appears to be no problem of role incongruity between the 
political, status and economic orders. I have shown that this is the 
particular form of the problem in study of Buganda, for a precolonial 
political elite was successful in dealing with structural differentiation 
in the colonial period and using it to its advantage. Areas of role 
incongruity were more marked in Rwanda, notably in the economic mobility 
of some persons who remained in the lower caste and were excluded from 
formal political power. These changes were, in particular historical 
circumstances, enough to provide solutions to the organizational difficulties 
maintaining the powerlessness of the lower caste.
It should be noted that I am not suggesting that there is a natural 
tendency to role congruity, stasis and balance (of. Goldthorpe, 19^7* 
pp.650-65i)? -^03? that role incongruity is necessarily a stimulus, psycho­
logical or otherwise, of political change. Role incongruity as an 
analytical concept in sociology may, however indicate points in social 
structure where upwardly mobile persons find that the route to further 
advancement requires organization for collective mobility of persons in the 
disadvantaged stratum to which they are indissolubly bound. Here we see 
the importance of the variable of capacity for organization, to which I 
referred earlier. I suggest that while the political struggles in Rwanda 
immediately before Independence took place between castes and not classes 
it was the appearance of a differentiated economic order, which enabled 
a few Hutu to achieve economic mobility such that they,could begin to compete 
for market advantages with Tutsi, that enabled the organizational problems
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©f the lower caste to he solved. Longstanding, hut unorganised, inter caste 
antagonism deriving from the higher casteTs political and economic exploitation 
could he organized by those in the lower caste for whom economic mobility 
became,in a limited way, possible while political mobility remained impossible. 
Precisely because neotraditional culture did not recognise a differentiated 
economic order this block on political mobility also prevented full economic 
and status mobility. By contrast, in Buganda where structural differ- 
entiatiation had gone much further and economic class relations were far 
more widespread in the population, the relative absence of directly 
antagonistic class relations since the 1927 land reform meant that economic 
stratification did not prevent the Baganda organizing as a political group. 
Economic stratification did, however, considerably affect the nature of 
political change: (l) by mobilizing Baganda against the economic mobility of 
the class of (mainly immigrant) landless labourers, and against the Asians 
who dominated the trading and middleman sectorsj (2 ) by providing an 
additional source of power for the political elite of 1900, so that they 
became and remained an elite class. In Buganda the variable of the nature 
of perception of stratification in these circumstances is as important in 
explaining the relationship of stratification systems and political change 
as in Rwanda.
The differentiation of an economic order, and the formation of classes, 
was clearly a process which played a major part in determining forms of 
political change in Rwanda and Buganda. It has been scarcely dealt with 
in the literature on the two kingdoms, though structural differentiation 
has been a major theme in work on Buganda. It has been my argument that, 
having recognized this process, it is not possible to explain the forms of 
political change in the two kingdoms without examining them in relation to 
cultural and structural processes' affecting the actor:Ts perceptions of 
social structure and the capacities of different strata for political 
organization. Moreover, the distinction of cultural and structural processes 
is clearly not absolute, and in order to understand the political strategies 
of the two elite classes at the end of colonial rule it is necessary to 
examine the revival of neotraditionalism as an organizational process.
The success and failure, respectively, of the elite classes in Buganda and 
Rwanda in their efforts to retain political power into the period of 
Independence can be explained in terms of the same model of political change, 
involving not only forms of stratification but also the nature of perception 
of stratification and differential capacities for political organization.
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